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The industrial working class began the middle decades of the twentieth
century with unlimited hope and possibility but ended them fraught with
disillusionment and dismay. This marked a disjointed experience as optimism for the
future gave way to disenchantment. With the ratification of the National Industrial
Recovery Act in 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, hundreds of
thousands of workers across the United States became union members. The euphoria
that this initial burst of unionization created, however, could not be sustained
throughout the post-World War II years. The Cold War, McCarthyism and later the
onset of de-industrialization ushered in new phases in working class history marked
by the gradual ineffectiveness of the working class to shape domestic policy.
In order to provide better insight on the potential, achievements, and
disappointments of the industrial working class in the twentieth century, this study
examines a community-based leather worker's union-Local21-in

the small New

England city of Peabody, Massachusetts, from 1933 to 1973. Eighteen miles northeast
of Boston, Peabody was considered the leather capital of the world in 1919 when it
employed 8,600 people in 106 tanneries and produced more leather in a year than
anywhere else in the world. Because of their importance in the early and midtwentieth century, Peabody and its leather workers offer an insightful case study for
understanding the working class during a transformative period. Growing out of
community unrest during the New Deal era, Local 2 1 persevered through the darkest
days of the national union movement after World War I1 and remained a communitybased union intent on creating a more democratic culture-a

culture based on a moral

economy stressing the needs of the working class individual over corporate profits.
Even though the union's gains did not totally alter the social and industrial landscape
of Peabody, for a brief time Peabody leather workers gained a measure of power that
allowed them to have a voice in reshaping their workplace and community.
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INTRODUCTION:
Peabody and Its Leather History
The history of the working class is the history of people, their
problems and their choices, their potential to change social relations,
as well as their powerlessness to bring about change. Learning from
them does not mean sanctifying an abstraction called the working
class, as if it were a totem encapsulating all that is good in the world.
Instead, it means taking seriously the limitations and accomplishments
of ordinary people as they try to address the gap between who they
want to be and the lives they have to lead.'
The industrial working class began the middle decades of the twentieth
century with unlimited hope and possibility but ended them fraught with
disillusionment and dismay. This marked a disjointed experience as optimism for the
hture gave way to disenchantment. With the ratification of the National Industrial
Recovery Act in 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, hundreds of
thousands of workers across the United States became union members. The euphoria
that this initial burst of unionization created, however, could not be sustained
throughout the post-World War I1 years. The Cold War, McCarthyism and later the
onset of de-industrialization ushered in new phases in working class history marked
by the gradual ineffectiveness of the working class to shape domestic policy.
In order to provide better insight on the potential, achievements, and
disappointments of the industrial working class in the twentieth century, this study
examines a community-based leather worker's union-local

21-in

the small New

England city of Peabody, Massachusetts, from 1933 to 1973.2 Eighteen miles

'

George Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1994), 11.
The ending date of 1973 was chosen because that is when Local 2 1 's longtime leader, Richard
"Mlke" O'Keefe, died. Throughout this dissertation the city of Peabody will be referred to as the

northeast of Boston, Peabody was considered the leather capital of the world in 1919
when it employed 8,600 people in 106 tanneries and produced more leather in a year
than anywhere else in the world.3 Because of their importance in the early and midtwentieth century, Peabody and its leather workers offer an insightful case study for
understanding the working class during a transfonnative period. Growing out of
community unrest during the New Deal era, Local 21 persevered through the darkest
days of the national union movement after World War I1 and remained a cornmunitybased union intent on creating a more democratic culture-a

culture based on a moral

economy stressing the needs of the working class individual over corporate profits.4
This Peabody union of leather workers overcame the rifts among varying
ideologies, aspirations, cultures, and national sentiments that created disharmony in
other unions during the middle part of the twentieth century and managed to initiate
better living and working conditions for its members. Even though the union's gains
did not totally alter the social and industrial landscape of Peabody, for a brief time
Peabody leather workers enjoyed benefits and a quality of life that previously had
been unknown to the industrial worker in this city.' Along with industrial workers
across the country, Peabody's union members, like other trade unionists, "made their
political grievances-debilitating economic insecurity, the lack of workplace rights,

Leather City, the Tanner City, and the Leather Capital of the World. They are all nichames for the
city of Peabody.
"Common Dedicated to Tannery Workers," Peabody Times, June 14, 1993.
Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism,
1945-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 3-4. Other historians have voiced similar
arguments. Nathan Godfiied, WCFL: Chicago's Voice of Labor, 1926-78 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1997); Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Verso, 1997).
Doris Schwerin, Diary of a Pigeon Watcher: An Autobiography (New York: William Morrow, 1976),
146-147, 198.

'

pervasive class inequality-the

central issues" of debate. Just as labor leaders in other

industries "were carried away with the notion that labor's march would sweep all
before it and leave in its wake an utterly new society," Peabody's union leaders
~ . ~part of the leather workers' reshaping of
believed in a similar r e ~ r d e r i nAs
America's capitalist system, they wanted to reconfigure society's "economic and
political relationships to the advantage of the working ~ l a s s . "Though
~
these feelings
of hope and progress could not last indefinitely, before they had faded completely
Peabody's leather activists gained a measure of power that allowed them to have a
voice in reshaping their workplace and community. While these leather workers were
unable to prevent the ultimate demise of the leather industry in Peabody, they worked
tirelessly to slow its migration to other parts of the country and overseas by
stabilizing wage rates across the country.
Labor conflict and the growth and contraction of the labor movement cannot
be understood without addressing the community and the local factors where labor
unrest grows.8The relationship between Local 21 and the community of Peabody is a
focal point of this research. Studying this working-class community in the middle part
of the twentieth century demonstrates the conditions that gave rise to this resourceful
union and the external forces that ultimately diminished its effectiveness. Trade
unionism is more than a force intent on consensus and accommodation and concerned
merely with bread and butter issues like wage gains; instead, varying ideologies,
Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914-1960 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 153.
7
Roger Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and Fight! " A Social History of Industrial Unionism in
Meatpacking, 1930-90 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 6 .
* John Cumbler, Working-Class Community in Industrial America: Work, Leisure, and Struggle in Two
Industrial Cities, 1880-1930 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 4.

aspirations, and even cultures need to be incorporated into the equation to better
understand union activity.9
Various scholars-Staughton
Faue, to name a few-have

Lynd, Gary Gerstle, John Borsos, and Elizabeth

looked at the labor movement of the early thirties, prior to

the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO--initially called the
Committee for Industrial Organization), and characterized what happened in a variety
of communities as an alternative unionism, also known as community-based or
solidarity unionism. Scholars depict this alternative unionism as "emphasiz[ing] local
autonomy and community-level organization." Highly democratic and politically
independent, community-based unionism stressed egalitarian, horizontal networks of
rank and filers. These networks "generated a distinctive organizational culture and set
of attitudes." Relying on the "culture of solidarity that developed during protests,"
community-based unionism stressed unity and "gave new and collective meaning to
formerly individual violence, aggression and struggle."'0 Solidarity unions were not
formed by organizers coming into a community and signing up workers; instead
solidarity unions "were generally organized fiom below, by committees of ordinary
workers who teamed up with others in their shops and with other workers in the
community where they lived." Most importantly of all, solidarity unionism "relied on
direct action"-the
9

strike, but the decision to strike canle fiom the workers, not a

Curnbler, Working-Class Community, 3-4.
Staughton Lynd, ed., "We Are All Leaders ":The Alternative Unionism of the Early 1930s (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1996), 2-3 (first quote); 174-175 (second quote). The temx comn~unitybased, alternative unionism, and solidarity unionism are interchangeable. This dissertation uses all
three temls. See also Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism; Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering
and Struggle: Women, Men and the Labor Movement in Minneapolis, 191 5-1 945 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 199 1); John Borsos, "'We Make You Tlus Appeal in the Name of
Every Union Man and Woman in Barberton' Solidarity Unionism in Barberton, Ohio, 1933-41" in
Lynd, "We Are All Leaders, " 238-293.
10

union official in a distant place.11In the purest sense, unions that engaged in
solidarity unionism did not look to a national organization to mandate their policies
and direction; local union members made all the decisions affecting their local.'* In
the formative (pre-World War 11) years of the CIO, some of its industrial unions still
adhered to aspects of solidarity ~ n i o n i s m .But
' ~ the guiding structure of the World
War II and post-World War CIO industrial unions, also called business unions, was
vertical;14 they were hierarchical organizations with power flowing from the top
down:
The international union officers appoint the staff men, the district
directors depend on the international union for the share of the dues
check-off money, the staff men take over the local union grievances
after the first couple of steps, and the grievance committeemen settle
grievances without consulting the members who filed the grievance
and who, more than any one, are affected by how the grievances are
settled."
Solidarity unionism differed from industrial unionism in that there was no
bureaucratic chain of command in the former. Technical expertise and prescribed
union ideology did not have a place in conmunity-based unions. Workers came

II

Staughton Lynd, Solidarity Unionism: Rebuilding the Labor Movement from Below (Chicago:
Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 1992), 25.
I2
When U.S. unions used the word "international," they meant that their unions were national (nationwide-as well as Canada). These unions were vertical in their chain of command. Local unions turned
over a certain amount of their dues to support the international organization, which in turn supported
the local in a variety of monetary and organizational endeavors.
1 3 ~ oargood discussion of the CIO see "History of the CIO: A Symposium," Labor History 37 (Spring
1996): 157-188.
l4 Chapter Four discusses the transfornution of the CIO into a more bureaucratic entity. Historian
David Brody concedes that the early CIO did have radical potential-militant rank and file, use of
strike activity and mass picketing, political activism, and a developed social position advocating
industrial democracy. David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Centuly
Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
IS
Lynd, Solidarity Unionism, 33.

together, especially in times of crisis, and formed an organization based on each
other's experiences. "It was organic."16
This type of unionism did "not stop at the formal lodge meeting. It [saw] the
union as a way of life which [involved] the entire community. If the factory was 'the

In his work
pivot of all organizational effort,' the community was its s~stenance."'~
on the Barberton, Ohio mass-production workers in the thirties, historian John Borsos
illustrates how solidarity unionism gained momentum in one Ohio manufacturing
town. In order to bring the labor movement into people's personal lives-not
their work lives-Barberton

just

labor leaders defined their unions as "social institutions .

. . [that] sponsored dances, Christmas dinners, and other social events." In supporting
the unionization effort in Barberton, community members found that everybody in the
community benefited." Through these formal and infonnal organizations the working
class formed bonds that cut across various ethnic differences.19
The Barberton labor movement enjoyed "widespread community support" in
part because the leaders of the various labor organizations "dictated that an injury to
one was indeed an injury to

Everyone in the Barberton community had a stake

in the success of the rank and file worker. W. Lloyd Warner and J.O. Low, who in the
1940s wrote about community unionism, saw the social service programs offered by
some industrial unions as an indication that these unions wanted to ameliorate barriers
of class, race, and ethnicity. This was in sharp contrast to the craft unionism of the

16

Borsos, "We Make You This Appeal," 245. See also Lynd, Solidarity Unionism, 33-34.
Community of Sufering and Struggle, 2.
l8 Borsos, "We Make You This Appeal," 244 (quote); 276-277.
l9 Cumbler, Working-Class Community in Industrial America, 2 19.
20
Borsos, "We Make You This Appeal," 274.
" Faue,

American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) that sought to differentiate workers based on
skill level. In characterizing community-based unions' efforts at eliminating social
hierarchies, Warner and Low said: "these tendencies are based on the principles and

feelings that all workers are alike and are accepting the status of workers who are
irrevocably opposed to management."21This ideal of community-based unionism
where class, race and ethnic differences are muted and all jobs are considered equal
could be found in Peabody throughout the thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties. As
former leather worker George Georges recounted, "We all stuck together. Irish, the
Greeks, everybody. There was no argument between all of

Local2 1 epitomized

this ideal of community-based unionism even after joining the CIO and later merging
with the International Fur Workers Union (IFWU), which was unusual.23The
majority of independent unions, as Local 2 1 had been in the early thirties, gave up
their administrative control and practice of solidarity unionism when they joined
forces with a nationally federated labor organization like the CIO or AFL and
especially when they merged with an international or national labor organization,
which were mainly vertically s t r ~ c t u r e d Part
. ~ ~ of the reason for joining these
federated labor organizations and national unions, even though doing so meant

" W. Lloyd Warner and J.O. Low, The Social System of the Modern Factoly-The Strike: A Social
Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, l965), 182.
22 Transcripts from Leather Soul documentary interviews, April 21-23, 1989 and April 27-30, 1989
around the city of Peabody, Tanner FilmNideo, 32-15 35" Street, Astoria, New York 11106, Interview
with George Georges, 47-48.
23 Lynd, "We Are All Leaders," 269-277. The rank and file Borsos studied also retained horizontal
organizations in the face of national organizations. There are those historians, however, who disagree
with Staughton Lynd and John Borsos's articulation of the CIO as being bureaucratic and less radical.
See "We Are All Leaders: A Symposium on a Collection of Essays Dealing with Alternative Unionism
in the Early l93Os," Labor Histoly 38 (SpringISummer 1997): 165-201.
" Rick Halpem and Roger Horowitz, Meatpackers: An Oral Histoly of Black Packinghouse Workers
and Their Struggle for Racial and Economic Equality (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 26.

sacrificing a measure of local autonomy, was to utilize an already established
bureaucracy that had the monetary and administrative resources available to organize
workers, implement programs, and fight for better wages. Local 21, however, did not
relinquish its independence. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the Peabody
union retained, to some degree, a horizontal structure of unionization in which each
union member was considered as important and influential as every other member.
This union of leather workers did not rely solely on its parent organizations to enact
change and reform. Various controversies throughout the middle part of the twentieth
century tested this egalitarian mode of operation, but in the end the members of Local
21 withstood pressure from both the manufacturers and community leaders and held
fast to the position of equality anlong all leather workers and for all leather workers.
Local 21 possessed two qualities that allowed it to remain a vital entity: unity and
leadership.
As a solidarity-based union, Local 21 strived throughout its long history to
keep its members united. By implementing a host of social programs, Local 21
worked to instill a sense of camaraderie among the rank and file. By including family
members in union activities, Local 21 became a focal point in the workers' lives.
Representing leather workers from more than fifty different tanneries doing different
types of leather work, this union of leather workers was able to achieve a sense of
unity in spite of workplace, skill, ethnic and religious differences.
The programs Local 21 initiated in the forties and fifties resulted from the
efforts of interested union members and committed leaders. Even though Peabody's
leather workers were not able, in the final analysis, to refashion the capitalist society

in which they lived, the leaders of Local 21 had a significant effect on the lives of
leather workers in their community and throughout the country. These labor leaders,
like the unity they helped to create, were key to Local 21's success.
Without any formal labor union training, certain individuals in the greater
Peabody community rose through the ranks of union membership and had a profound
influence on other leather workers. Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci
characterized this type of individual as an organic intellectual-individuals

who

without prior training or education "direct the ideas and aspirations of their class."25
The leaders of Local 21, like long-time business manager Richard "Mike" O'Keefe,
were not, according to historian George Lipsitz's definition of the tern1 organic
intellectuals, "troublemakers or loudmouths"; instead they were individuals who
were able to "articulate and activate ideas already present in the community." Organic
intellectuals use social contestation as a means to "originate and circulate their
ideas."26 The social programs Local 21 created for its membership and the larger
community were a testament to these powerful organic forces inherent in the labor
movement of the New Deal era. But unlike many rank and filers in other workingclass communities, Peabody leather workers did not relinquish their working-class
militancy and grass-roots mobilization when societal and cultural pressures dictated
that it was no longer acceptable to be militant.27

25 See Antonio Grarnsci, Letters From Prison, trans. Ray Rosenthal (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994); George Lipsitz, A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Peny and the Culture of Opposition
(Phdadelphia:Temple University Press, 1995), 9.
26 Lipsitz, A Life in the Struggle, 9- 1 1.
27 Elizabeth Faue, "Paths of Unionization" in Lynd, "We Are AN Leaders, " 189-190. See also Faue,
Community of Suffering and Struggle. 145-146; Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: The CIO
in World War 11 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 10.

While community-based unionism was effective in many communities, such
as Barberton and Peabody, it did have limitations because of the political conditions
of the time. Although the Wagner Act in 1935 secured workers' right to collective
bargaining, the recession of 1937 resulted in "hundreds of thousands of newly
organized workers" across the country without jobs. During this recession, workers
throughout the country attempted to maintain their current contracts "without a cut in
pay or erosion of other union conditions." This proved to be difficult as
manufacturers fought to hold on to their diminishing profits. As the decade waned
and Congress became a "conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern
Democrats," further strengthening the manufacturers' hard-line position against
unionization, maintaining union gains became increasingly difficult.28The World
War 11years, post-World War 11years, and the rise of anti-communism exacerbated
union hardships. Many independent unions merged with larger, more prosperous
unions in the late forties and early fifties just to survive. With the de-industrialization
of many of America's key industries in the sixties and seventies, this trend toward
anlalgamation inten~ified.~~
Community-based unions that wanted to retain local
control but prosper and affect change had to assume altered forms.
Peabody provides a case study to observe the changes that were required for a
community-based labor group to retain its basis of solidarity unionism throughout a
turbulent period in the twentieth century. An analysis of Local 21 does three things: at
a minimum it documents the history of one industrial community and its union

Ibid., 19.

''Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century (San Francisco:
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1986), 90-9 1.

10

activity, on another level it provides a better understanding of how community-based
unionism functioned in the pre- and post-World War II years, and as a basis for
debate it argues that a community-based union tried and, to a degree, influenced the

U.S. capitalist system by remaining true to its solidarity unionism roots. The members
of Local 2 1 shared a general commitment to create or refashion "whole social
structures" in society to the advantage of the working class.30Although some labor
historians define the post-World War II labor movement as a "passive agent in
relation to its economic setting-lacking

the capacity or even the intention of

influencing the technological, political, or economic changes that were determining
its strength," this characterization did not hold true for Local 21 .3'
One reason the post-World War 11labor movement has been accused of being
a "passive" entity in terms of enacting real social change is that there is a "paucity of
community studies" that concentrate on labor in the mid-twentieth century.32
Historian Mark McCollock characterizes the work done by historians on labor after
World War 11as "an afterthought, consisting of sweeping generalizations" that
characterize the labor movement as ineffective in effecting any real social, political,
economic, or cultural change.33Joshua Freeman argues that the failures of the postwar CIO "make it tempting to see the history of industrial unionism as anti-climatic."
This, however, does a disservice to the CIO, he contends. The industrial unionism of
30

Horowitz, "Negroand White," 6 .
Ronald L. Filippelli, "The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations," in US. Labor
Relations 1945-1989: Accommodation and Conflict, ed. Bruce Nissen (New York: Garland Publishing,
1990), 141.
32
Borsos, "We Make You This Appeal," 238.
33
Mark McCollock, "The Shop Floor Dimension of Union Rivalry: The Case of Westinghouse in the
1950s," in Steve Rosswumh ed., The CZO's Left-Led Unions (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1992), 183.
3'

the New Deal era "helped reshape the very fabric of American society" and radically
changed the lives of the working class.34In order to argue that labor had choices in
the middle part of the twentieth century and that its fate was not preordained by
governmental limitations, specific examples of these choices must be provided.
Correcting these deficiencies is essential for providing a more accurate picture of the
past. This work on Peabody leather workers offers an alternative vision of what the
working class was able to accomplish in the pre- and post-World War 11years; in so
doing it will begin to correct some of the misconceptions of labor's potential-r
of potential-in

lack

the middle part of the twentieth century.

Both Nelson Lichtenstein and James B. Atleson argue that the "ultimate
character of the new CIO was not f~reordained."~'Using the United Auto Workers
Union and the International Association of Machinists as his examples, Lichtenstein
describes how prior to World War 11, industrial unions exerted a fair amount of
pressure on business and government. However, Lichtenstein sees the coming of
World War 11 as the force that solidified "the tendency toward hierarchical control
and dependence on the government within the new industrial unions."36 Atleson
attributes this governmental dependence to legal regulations, policies, and pressures.
Rather than seeing this subservience to government as being preordained, Atleson
Joshua Freeman, In Transit: The Transport Workers Union in New York City: 1933-1966 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), vi. Max Kampelman also characterizes the CIO as "one of the
most significant social, economic, and political events of American history." Max Kampelman, The
Communist Party vs. The (2.1.0.: A Study in Power Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957),
xi-xii.
3S Nelson Lichtenstein, "Defending the No-Strike Pledge: CIO Politics During World War 11," in
Workers' Struggles, Past and Present: A "RadicalAmerica " Reader, ed. James Green (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1983), 270. There are some historians who argue that the CIO, fiom its very
beginning, was limited in what it could do. See Walter Galenson, "Communists and Trade Union
Democracy," Industrial Relations 13, 1 (1974): 228-236.
36
Lichtenstein, "Defending the No-Strike Pledge," 270-27 1.
34

sees it resulting from "conscious decisions . . . made by Washington policy makers
that dramatically affected union life after World War 11."~~
David Milton concurs
with Lichtenstein and Atleson, arguing that while corporate power was not inevitable,
the rise of anti-communism after World War 11hampered the "advance of class
conscious industrial unionism."38
The corporate power, characterized as Big Business, heled this anticommunism ideology. The marketplace, however, did not enjoy uncontested
supremacy after World War II. Forces were at work in the country that offered the
working class a different vision of American life-a

vision more concerned with a

worker's quality of life than the factory owner's bottom line. Historian Elizabeth
Fones-Wolf argues that the post-World War 11years witnessed a battle between labor
and big business to shape worker consciousness and direct the political culture. Each
group vied for a dominant role in directing America's post-war social, political,
economic, and cultural life.39Although big business had more resources available to
spread its ideology, some unions succeeded, to a degree, in altering their
community's capitalist overtones by creating a more worker-friendly environment
within the larger society. In studying the CIO-affiliated United Packinghouse
Workers of America (UPWA), Richard Halpern and Roger Horowitz found that even
in post-war America some affiliated unions managed to remain true "democratic
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(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998) ix.
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Monthly Review Press, 1982), 122. For a discussion of the CIO during this period see Zieger, The
CIO; "Robert Zieger's History of the CIO: A Symposium," Labor History 37 (Spring 1996): 157-188.
39 Fones-Wolf, Selling-Free Enterprise. George Lipsitz also discusses this quest for hegemony. See
Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight, 264-265.

organization[s] responsive to [their] members." Halpern and Horowitz argue that
despite a nationwide discriminatory attitude toward African Americans in the postWorld War 11years, "black packinghouse workers . . . [used] the UPWA to achieve
upward mobility and racial equality" in terms of workplace experiences and union
positions.40This type of local democracy within a union, despite governmental
pressure, existed in other unions as well.
In studying one local of the International Fur and Leather Workers Union
(IFLWU) in Gloversville, New York, Gerald Zahavi showed how voting to have "no
union" as an election option was an example of workers exerting a specific choice
and trying to forge their own future in the face of governmental restrictions like the
Taft-Hartley Act, which sought to limit the advances unions had made in the preWorld War 11years. Because this Gloversville union had a known communist as its
leader, Clarence Carr, it could no longer be represented by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). Without the backing of the NLRB, the union would be
powerless in the face of manufacturers' demands. Instead of having to ask their
longtime leader to step down, the members of the Gloversville local opted not to be
represented by a union at all. In foregoing union representation, Gloversville workers
made a clear statement: they preferred no union representation to representation
dictated by the government. By so doing these Gloversville leather workers voiced a
shared sentiment that they would not allow outside forces-the
CIO-to
40

government or the

control their destiny.4'

Halpern and Horowitz, Meatpackers, 26.
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As historian Gary Gerstle shows with his study of unionization in
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, unionization efforts did confront many competing forces
during the World War I1 years. In addition to the governmental restrictions faced by
the Gloversville workers, Gerstle's rank and file faced ethnic and economic
conditions that exacerbated their struggles. "The battles that erupted within ethnic
communities and radical groups, and the manner of their resolution, profoundly
shaped American working class politics and culture.'42 Like Gerstle, Borsos
demonstrates with his workers in Barberton, labor could and did choose alternative
paths to unionization besides the framework offered by the federated and national
labor organizations. Borsos argues that while bbbureaucraticunions are the major story
of organized labor in the United States from the 1930s to the present," they are not
the only story.43

An examination of Peabody leather workers during the middle years of the
twentieth century offers a more detailed analysis of how the competing forces of
capitalism and worker rights played themselves out over a forty-year span in one
industrially important community. Even though in the end-at
twentieth century-the

the close of the

industrial working class had a precarious hold on the U.S.

share of the industrial marketplace, as the Peabody leather workers illustrate, the
working class did amass some measure of control during the middle years of a
formative century.44

-

Gerstle, Working Class Americanism, 4 .
Borsos, "We Make You This Appeal," 239.
Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf argues that "most historians in portraying the fifties emphasize the
apparent harmony not only between [labor and organized business] but withm society as a whole."
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Unlike the leather workers in Gloversville, Peabody leather workers strove to
remain unionized. In order to remain part of a union, however, these leather workers
had to alter their union throughout its history to accommodate the needs, wants, and
desires of its membership and the larger community. Though their passion to struggle
for social justice gradually ebbed in the face of external pressure, before the members
of Local 21 lost their determination to push for social reform, they, like other
"radicals and . . . activists managed in many instances, to set in motion plans for
gaining working-class power that would significantly alter their society's culture,
economy, and politics for years to come."5 This reshaping of society by the industrial
workforce was evident in Peabody during the middle part of the twentieth century. At
this time Peabody leather workers, because of the strength and perseverance of their
union, won better working conditions. Peabody's leather workers, along with
industrial workers across America, successfully sought workplace reforms that are
now commonplace: vacations with pay, holiday pay, a forty-hour work week, sick
days, pensions, health insurance, safety standards, and the like.
Local 21 was not concerned merely with bread and butter issues like wage
gains or even with union recognition; it wanted a leveling of society. The desire for
equality among all segments of society becomes especially apparent when delving
into the history of Local 21's interactions with the Peabody community, the leather
industry as a whole, and the national union-the

International Fur and Leather

Workers Union (IFLWU). The problems that developed between Local 21 and those

Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise, 3-4. Other historians have voiced similar arguments. Godfried,
WCFL: Chicago S Voice of Labor; Denning, The Cultural Front.
45 Ibid.
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entities produced an interesting and unusual union-a

union that adjusted and

accommodated itself to survive but did not sacrifice its ultimate goal of reforming
society.
Although Local 2 1 did unite with a national in the late thirties, believing as
did most other industrial unions at the time that "highly centralized bureaucratic
national unions could give locals the stability they needed," Local 2 1 never gave up
its local control and autonomy.46For five decades-the

1930s to the 1970s-the

Peabody leather workers union exhibited what historian Elizabeth Faue defines as a
unionism "rooted in the community and directed . . . [at] the reproductive spherespecifically, consumer concerns, family and community networks, and edu~ation.'~'
Local 21 grew out of the turmoil of the Great Depression and its membership worked
to eradicate the capitalist marketplace's inhumane treatment of the worker by
providing specific services and activities for members and their families. Without
direct representation in the governing of Peabody on a daily basis, Local 21 officials
nevertheless exerted a measure of control over what happened in the city in terms of
relief work, social activities, and laws governing the workplace.
Local 2 1, under the leadership of Joseph Massidda, Charlies Chamouris, and
O'Keefe-all

former leather workers who advanced to leadership status-never

underestimated the potential of its membership base. The union's militancy and
solidarity became evident early in its formation. As Local 2 1 matured, cultural and
political forces tempered its militancy, but it remained a community-based union.
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Faue, Community of Suffering and Struggle, 12.

Even when faced with expulsion from the CIO and later the IFLWU, Local 21
persevered to maintain an organization that was committed to the needs and desires of
its rank and file.48
This 4,500-strong union of leather workers in the Northshore area of Boston
did not allow the turbulence of the time-the
Cold War and McCarythism-to

Great Depression, World War 11, the

shape its agenda. Instead, Local 21 made decisions

based on its members' needs: adequate housing, food, clothing, consumer goods,
medical attention, and social and cultural a ~ t i v i t i e sAn
. ~ ~examination of Local 21
offers a microcosm of the labor movement; it illuminates how the "invisibility of
labor in the present" is not characteristic of the labor movement's past.
For most of this past century, working people have been a powerful force for
democratic change in the United States. At the point of production they have
struggled over the purpose, pace, nature and rewards of work. In community
life, they have created and sustained institutions designed to provide more
democratic access to education, housing, medical care, and recreation."
While these efforts were, at times, fleeting and often blocked by industry, Peabody's
working class, through the leather union, created a community of educated workers
who took pride in what they did; these rank and file workers tried to create a more
equitable society for themselves and their offspring.
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This fight for workplace rights is the centerpiece of Chapter One, which
details the struggle for unionization that ensued between Peabody leather workers and
the tannery owners in the early thirties. Undaunted by owners' refkal to recognize
their fledgling union, these leather workers held fast to their position and rallied the
community's support. United, these Peabodyites proved they were effective in
winning wage and labor concessions; as a team they organized to better the plight of
all leather workers in the greater Northshore area.
The euphoria over the initial success of organizing a union waned, however.
As the Great Depression continued, Local 2 1 faced increasing hardships, as detailed
in Chapter Two. By the late thirties leather workers realized that the fight for a more
equitable standard of living would require constant vigilance and the support of a
national. The decision to join forces with the International Fur Workers Union
(IFWU) and the ramifications of that merger are detailed in this chapter.
Though the early days of Local 21's affiliation with the IFWU were not
carefree by any means, in the early forties Peabody leather workers positively
changed their living and working situations. Chapter Three reveals how the early
years of affiliation with the International Fur and Leather Workers Union (IFLWU)
afforded the Peabody leather workers an opportunity to explore a variety of initiatives
that gave these rank and filers a quality of life they had never before experienced.
Peabody leather workers fashioned for themselves a comnlunity-both
outside the factory-that

inside and

went beyond the basics of life. Cultural and social

endeavors became a part of the leather workers' experiences. Opportunities for

recreation and social camaraderie became commonplace for both leather workers and
their families.
These newfound pleasures, however, did not come without a price. Chapter
Four indicates the toll that securing and maintaining benefits would exact on the
leather workers. As the industry began to experience more hardships and tannery
owners squeezed ever tighter to reap the biggest profit, union members found
themselves in a more contentious situation. Feelings of animosity among leather
workers, factory owners, and the community intensified as an anti-communist crusade
began to dominate the national scene. With the IFLWU's expulsion fiom the CIO in
1950, Local 21 found itself in a precarious position.
Exacerbating this difficult situation was Local 21's decision in the mid-fifties
to distance itself fiom the IFLWU. Chapter Four also explores the events and
ran~ificationsof Local 21's decision to leave the International's fold. Faced with
mounting allegations of Communist dealings, Local 2 1's leadership did what it felt
was best for the union. The resiliency of this union under these attacks highlights the
strength and support this union had fiom its membership and the community at large.
The Epilogue briefly explores the dissolution of Peabody's leather industry.
As the United States leather market was contracting, the city of Peabody and Local 21
fought to maintain Peabody's niche in the leather trade. With the closing of the A.C.
Lawrence Leather factory, the biggest concern in the United States, in 1991,
Peabody's status as the leather capital of the world had finally ended. Local 2 1,
however, retained a presence in Peabody even after all the major factories and leather
shops closed.

This study of a working-class community relies on local newspapers, labor
periodicals, trade publications, church and city records, union documents, oral
histories, and personal narratives to describe the conditions that gave rise to a
resourcehl union and the forces that ultimately stifled its progress. The study
challenges the accepted opinion of industry leaders and some community members
today that Local 21 hastened the demise of the leather industry. On the contrary, by
regulating wages nationally in the leather industry, Local 21 proved instrumental in
maintaining Peabody's viability as a leather center well past the industry's prime.

CHAPTER ONE:
The Birth of a Union: The NLWA Rises from the Chaos
All that harnls labor is treason to America. No line can be drawn
between the two. If any man tells you he loves America, yet he hates
labor, he is a liar. If a man tells you he trusts America, yet fears labor,
he is a fool.'
A stranger to Peabody, Massachusetts, during the middle part of the twentieth
century would recognize immediately that this small, ethnically diverse city situated
eighteen miles northeast of Boston, was an industrial city-a

city whose livelihood

was based on the manufacture of products. In Peabody's case the product was leather.
Smokestacks clouded the skyline and the smell of dead animal skins permeated the
air. A minimum of 32 different factory whistles could be heard throughout the day
signaling the end of one shift and the beginning of another. "In the morning when
they [the whistles] rang, it was like m ~ s i c . "That
~ music, however, rings no longer.
With the closing of the last leather factory in 1991 and only a handhl of leather
concerns left, Peabody is no longer considered an industrial city.3Former tannery
buildings, not slated for demolition or already demolished, boast a new look; they
have been turned into upscale condominiums housing a new generation of
Peabodyites-those

who work in the high-tech industry along the Route 128 beltway

around Boston.

'

Richard 0. Boyer and Herbert M. Morais, Labor S Untold Story: The Adventure Story of the Battles,
Betrayals and Victories ofAmerican Working Men and Women (New York: United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, 1955), 11.
Leather Soul documentary transcript, Uncut Version, Shoot #2 April 21-23, 1989 and April 27-30,
1989 around the city of Peabody, Tamer FilrnIVideo, 32-15 35' Street, Astoria, New York 11106,
Interview with George Katsulous.
There are no full service tanneries left. The leather factories that remain do only part of the taming
process.

Considered the leather capital of the world in 1919, Peabody's leather history
was long and varied. Tracing the city's leather roots back to the Native Americans
who believed the "water in the ponds and streams of Peabody [to be] especially
adapted for the manufacture of their leather," many Peabodyites recall the days when
. ~ 1939 Peabody was home to 2 1,711
leather concerns crowded the d ~ w n t o w nIn
residents and 89 leather concerns (this figure includes both the full-scale tannery
where hides were tanned, curried and finished and the small leather shop that only
specialized in a particular ~ervice).~
In the late thirties and early forties, the Peabody-Salem area housed one-fifth

of the 450 tanneries scattered throughout the United States, and about half of the 182
tanneries in the state of ~ a s s a c h u s e t t sWhile
.~
these 450 tanneries averaged one
hundred employees, a typical tannery at this time would employ between 20-50
workers. In 1933 only thirteen U.S. tanneries employed more than 500 employees and
only four employed more than a thousand. A.C. Lawrence, in Peabody, was one of
4
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those four plants. The majority of leather workers in the middle part of the twentieth
century lived in the east (65 percent), with a quarter living in the west and only 10
percent in the south. By the end of the century, the majority would be in the far
northeast and south. In 1933, nearly half the tanneries were located in small
communities housing fewer than 50,000 people. One quarter of the 450 tanneries
found homes in towns with less than 12,000 people, and an eighth of the tanneries
situated themselves in villages with populations of less than 2,500.' These statistics
reflect Peabody's status as a major leather center in the middle part of the twentieth
century. This multitude of factories drew thousands of immigrants to this small New
England community.'
When the leather industry really started to blossom after the Civil War with
the advent of the machine age, Peabody became a cosmopolitan town with many
Greek and Turkish immigrants. Mainly male, these immigrants came to Peabody to
seek their fortune in the leather industry and return home as soon as possible. While
the leather industry provided a somewhat steady income, it did not prove to be an
occupation that lent itself to creating fortunes for individuals engaged in it. Thus,
many of the immigrants who came to Peabody at the turn of the century, instead of
amassing a fortune and leaving, ended up staying and raising families. These
immigrants were joined by many others-Irish,

Russian, Canadian, French Canadian,

Portuguese, Austrian, Polish, and Armenian, to name a few. When Peabody
celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary as a city in 1941, it boasted thirty
7
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For a discussion of immigration to New England see "Population Changes Indicate Need for Carehl
Planning in New England," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 52 (September 13, 1947): 6072.

nati~nalities.~
These immigrant families became entwined with the leather industry.
John Stanton, a former Peabodyite, characterized Peabody as "the embodiment of the
American factory town. . . . People came together because they could get jobs and the
town grew into a city around these people."'0
Although not much research has been done on Peabody's leather history,
especially in terms of the twentieth century, the information that exists does a major
disservice to the men and women who toiled in this labor-intensive industry and lived
in this community. The few existing histories of Peabody characterize the twentieth
century as a time of declining leather production and labor strife. These sources
highlight the slowdown in the leather industry and gloss over the achievements of this
community of workers. Even publications trying to attract tourists downplay the
ingenuity of the mid-twentieth century Peabodyite. For instance, a National Park
Service brochure discussing the industrial revolution represents Peabody's leather
history as dismal and almost defunct by the late thirties.
Peabody tanning and leather production dominated the local economy
producing fine leather machinery and new technological processes.
The 1920s and 1930s brought foreign imports, the depression, and
cheaper labor causing the gradual decline of the shoe and tanning
industries."
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The information in this brochure is true. The shoe and tanning industry did decline
because of foreign imports, competition from cheaper labor abroad, leather
substitutes, environmental regulations, and new machinery, to name a few causes.12

In 1931 there were 3,702 leather establishments in the United States compared
to 6,798 in 1914. (This number represents the industry as a whole-the

full-scale

tannery and the small specialty shop.) In just seventeen years, the United States lost
3,096 leather establishments. The industry suffered contraction after World War I,
declining from 6,423 leather facilities across the country in 1919 to only 4,827 by
1921. While this drop could be attributed to the end of World War I and a decline in
the demand for leather products associated with the war, the numbers remained on a
downward spiral.I3 For instance, from 1947 to 1967 Peabody experienced the loss of
more than 30 leather concerns, and approximately 1,000 workers lost their jobs. The
leather industry did not just consolidate; it evaporated.
The kid, goat, and calfskin market, all used in shoe leather, experienced the
biggest decline in the post-World War I1 years. Though the decline started in the
1920s, it became obvious after the war that leather substitutes and a lack of raw
supply had hurt the shoe leather market. After World War 11, the United States, which
had long depended on underdeveloped countries (in Asia and Latin America) to
supply its raw kid and goatskins, faced exportation restrictions. "It became
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increasingly common during this period [post World War 11] for these poorer
countries to restrict the exportation of kid skins in order to have a source of supply to
build up their own tanning ind~stries."'~
The calfskin market, also used for shoe production, suffered a slowdown in
the post-World War II years. The fifties, a time of growing affluence in the United
States, ushered in a new technique for cattle raising. Economics dictated that farmers
raise the cattle for beef instead of killing calves for their hides. This created a lack of
available

calfskin^.'^ The decline in these markets was striking. In 1950 the United

States tanned 37,302,000 pounds of kid and goatskins; by 1955 America's share of
this market had dwindled to 26 million pounds; 19 million pounds in 1960; 14.5
million pounds in 1965; and 4 million pounds in 1970.'~While sixty percent of all
shoes manufactured in the United States contained leather soles in 1948, in 1973,
only twelve percent of the U.S. shoe market had leather soles."
By the end of the twentieth century the leather industry was severely crippled
throughout the United States and virtually extinct in the greater Northshore area,
which comprises Essex County, including peabody.I8 In 1945 the leather industry
provided jobs for 358,000 individuals throughout the country. By 1991 only 123,700
individuals engaged in a leather-related occupation, and the majority of those jobs
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were scattered in the south and northern New England. At the dawn of the twentyfirst century, only 7 1,400 individuals in the United States call themselves leather
workers.lg The National Park Service brochure accurately acknowledged the decline
in the leather industry, but by condensing Peabody's leather history and highlighting
the negative, the brochure obscured the larger story.
The larger story of Peabody encompasses Local 21 and the workers who
comprised this union. In order to appreciate the success and longevity of Local 21,
one must understand the basics of the leather industry, the types of leather concerns
that dominated Peabody, and the earlier attempts at unionization in the Leather City.
The term leather industry encompasses "all persons engaged in tanning or finishing
leather, for further fabrication or for sale."20 In the late thirties there were roughly 450
leather establishments in the United States; the Census of Manufacturers defines an
establishment as "an economic unit that produces goods or services at a single
location and is engaged in one type of economic activity."21These leather
establishments ranged in size from a handfid of employees to more than 600 workers.
Regardless of the size of the tannery, the work done was highly skilled, and
mechanization was not practical for many parts of the tannery process in the middle
part of the twentieth century.22Unlike some industrial concerns, processing leather

l9 Eva E. Jacobs ed., Handbook of U.S.Labor Statistics: Employment, Earnings, Prices, Productivity,
and other Labor Data, 5' edition (Lanham, Maryland: Beman Press, 200 I), 16 1 - 164; U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1967, Volume ZZZ,Area Statistics, Part
I , Alabama-Montana (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971) 22-6; 22-32.
20 "Code of Fair Competition for the Leather Industry," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 38
(September 2, 1933): 5.
21
Jacobs, Handbook of U S . Labor Statistics, 1 59.
22 John Cumbler discusses the pride and slull Peabody leatherworkers display in their work and the
high degree of craftsmanship that was necessary for thls industry. John T. Cumbler, Working-Class

was a handicraft; "it uses simple machinery and handles a variable and perishable
natural raw material, which requires flexibility of process and constant skilled
attention over a period of weeks."23 Improperly handled skins resulted in damaged
stocks. Skill and training were necessities in the leather industry.24
During Peabody's heyday as a leather town, its tanneries performed four
different operations on a hide: curing and sorting, removing hair, tanning, and drying.
When hides arrived at a tannery, they were sorted and stored in a cooled hide house
where, if they had been properly cured, they could, if necessary, be kept for several
months. But they did not improve with storage, so tannery owners did not want to
stockpile hides. (When workers went on strike, hide spoilage was a major concern for
the factory owners.) Once the hides had been sorted, hair, fat, and tissue were
removed from them. This work was done in the beam house. Hides would be washed
briskly to remove salt and dirt and soaked until thoroughly wet. The hair was then
removed by soaking for several days in some sort of depilatory (a liquid or cream
used to remove unwanted hair), after which the hide was rolled through a dehairing
machine that scraped off the loosened hair. The flesh side of the hide was also
cleaned until it was a smooth gray color. The final beam house operation, called
bating, was more subtle: workers used powerful chemicals-enzymes-to

remove

further reticular (networked) tissue and condition the hides for the tanning process.
Community in Industrial America: Work, Leisure, and Struggle in Two Industrial Cities, 1880-1930
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 72.
23 Helburn, "Brief Submitted,"7. For a discussion of the leather industry see Philip S. Foner, The Fur
and Leather Workers Union: A Story of Dramatic Struggles and Achievements (Newark:Nordan Press,
1950). The use of more modern equipment, however, did start to change. While the leather industry
still necessitates personal attention, a 21'' century tannery does use modern machinery to replace many
workers.
24 Foner, Fur and Leather Workers Union, 528.

The grade of the raw hide determined the tanning process; either leached
vegetable materials or mineral chrome salts would be used.
Vegetable tanning is used primarily for sole leather. . . . The hides are
subjected to the action of the tanning liquor in a series of rocker vats, where
the even and properly graded absorption of the acid is highly important to
good-quality tanning. They are then placed in lay-away vats for several
months; here they soak, without agitation, in tanning fluids. It is this that
makes the process of vegetable tanning so lengthy-from two to four months.
Chrome tanning is relatively swift. The hides are briskly agitated in a drum or
paddle vat containing salt brine; chromium sulphate is then added graduallythe whole process takes a matter of hours.25
The final step in transforming a hide into a piece of usable leather was the
drylng process, which gave the leather texture and color. Different types of leather
required different drying techniques. For instance, sole leather used in shoe making
required the leather to be dried, oiled and rolled. Most leather in the drying process
went through an aging and stretching process as well. After that, "further coloring,
graining, waxing, soaping, and oiling, can be performed to customers' specifications
after the orders have been received."26 The manufacture of leather required years of
training, experience, and skill; even with the advent of more machines toward the end
of the twentieth century, almost every facet of the tanning process required manual

In the thirties, Peabody housed approximately 113 leather concerns, and
roughly ninety of these concerns were full-scale tanneries where this four-step

''

Mack, Consumption and Business Fluctuation, 16-17. See also "Earnings in Leather Tanning and
Finishing, May 1959," Monthly Labor Review 82 (October 1959): 1 1 15.
26 Mack, Consumption and Business Fluctuation, 16.
Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers, 528. See also "Leather Tanning is an Art," p. 1, 14.
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process took place.28Throughout the middle part of the twentieth century, Peabody
claimed approximately 5,000 leather workers.29Roughly one in every six Peabodyites
was a leather worker.30Many of those not employed in the leather industry worked
for the Essex Glue and Gelatine Company, the American Glue Company, or the
Naumkeag Steam Cotton ~ l e a c h e r y .Many
~'
of Peabody's leather concerns made
light-weight leather for use in shoes, which were manufactured in the neighboring
~ ~
city of ~ y n nIn. addition
to sending leather to nearby Lynn, Peabody factories
shipped leather to Gloversville, New York; France; Germany; Holland; and
~el~iurn.~~
The largest tannery complex in Peabody was the A.C. Lawrence Leather
Company owned by the Swift Company, a huge meat-packing firm. A.C. Lawrence
claimed three tanneries in Peabody that together employed roughly 1,700
individua~s.'~
By U.S. leather industry standards the three A.C. Lawrence companies
constituted a large plant. Another large concern was the A.B. Clark Company, whlch
produced 72,000 pounds of finished sheepskins a week in the early part of the

28 Information about these various concerns comes from John Wells, The Peabody Story; the Salem
Evening News; Peabody Enterprise; The Peabody Times; Leather Soul; and a variety of leather
gamphlets.
John Wells, Report on the Leather Industry of Peabody and Salem, Massachusetts and the South
Essex Sewerage District for the Salem-PeabodyArea Tamers (SPAT) (no date for this report). This
figure is for the city of Peabody alone.
30
Wells, The Peabody Story, 386.
" Information based on interviews with fomler leather workers by the author.
" "Earnings in Leather Taming and Finishing," Monthly Labor Review 82 (October 1959): 1114-1115.
For a brief discussion of what Peabody was like before the shoe industry left Massachusetts see
"Remembering When Leather Ruled," Salem Evening News, April 18,2000.
33 Transcripts from Leather Soul video interviews, Cut and Categorized Version, Shoot 1 and 1A;
March 12, 1988 Strauss Tanning, September 14, 17, 1988 Rex Leather, John Schmidt and Sons
Finishers, Flynntan, and Interviews around the city of Peabody, Tamer FilrnNideo, 32-15 35" Street,
Astoria, New York 11106, Interview with Jack Reardon, fomler Peabody city councilor, 136.
34
This number fluctuated through time. In the late thirties A.C. Lawrence employed approximately
3,700 leather workers.

twentieth century. Industry officials characterized A.B. Clark as the largest individual
sheepskin manufacturer in the world. The L.B. Southwick Company, though not as
large as A.B. Clark, produced about 1,000 pounds a day with a great variety of
finishes and colors. During peak production, this plant employed 500 men.
The family-owned Nathan H. Poor Leather Company was another Peabody
industrial landmark. Nathan A. Poor, the founder of the company, "was a pioneer in
the application of scientific methods to tanning and finishing sheep and goat skins."35
Also working in the sheepskin finishing process was the Monill Leather Company,
which finished skins in many colors. Benjamin N. Moore and Sons Company
specialized in fancy leathers. This concern made the largest variety of fancy leathers
of any U.S. firm in the early part of the twentieth century.36
One of the largest chrome tanneries was A.L. Kraus. This plant processed
3,600 pounds a day. Also working with chrome leather was the Essex Tanning
Company employing one hundred men. The Dimond Kid Manufacturing Company
averaged 3,500 pounds per day with 242 workers. The C.P. Osborne Leather
Company was another tannery employing more than one hundred individuals in the
early part of the twentieth century.
The Foan Brothers Leather concern, known throughout the world, produced
high-grade leather for shoes and novelties. The E.A. Woelfel Company also
specialized in leather novelties by producing embossed leather. This concern
35 Wells, The Peabody Story, 406. See also "Nathan Poor Was Pioneer in Leather Manufacturing,"
Peabody Enterprise, May 3, 1940, p. l , 3 .
36 Wells, The Peabody Story, 407. This information is corroborated in various issues of the Peabody
Entelprise, the Salem Evening News, and The Weekly Bulletin ofLeather and Shoe News. Also see
"U.S. Leather Trade Exports to World Markets," Leather-International Journal of the Industry 177
(August 1975): 30.

introduced the embossing process in New England and became the largest fancy
leather embossing and decorating plant in New England, reproducing animal and
reptile hides for fancy shoe leather and pocketbooks.37The Kirstein Tanning
Company made specialty leather in various colors; this leather was used for
bookwork.
In the early thirties, the Rankin Leather Company produced six thousand
calfskins a day and five hundred individuals were employed. Verza Tanning, another
producer of fine calf leather, was ranked among Peabody's finest calfskin tanners.
The company's founder, Louis Verza, developed a way to transform coarse grain
leather into smooth looking grains.38Another large Peabody leather concern was the
Can Leather Company employing two hundred workers who specialized in calfskin.
The Korn Leather Company had a yearly production of 15 million pounds of leather
during the Depression, keeping three hundred men employed. During World War II,
Korn Leather was the largest tanner of splits (single thickness hides) in the world with
a payroll of $500,000. The B.E. Cox Leather factory tanned and finished 7,500
pounds of sheep leather daily in the late forties.39Because of all its building additions,
the B.E. Cox factory became known as the "Leaning Tower of Pisa." It was
Peabody's only skyscraper tannery.
The James F. Ingraham Tannery was known for its "Bear Brand" morocco
leather, which was the strongest sheepskin made. The Richard Barry plant also
" Wells, The Peabody Stoiy, 41 8. See also "Dirnond Kid Manufacturing Company," Weekly Bulletin
of Leather and Shoe News XLIII, #47 (November 19,1938): 8.
"Nathan Poor Was Pioneer in Leather Manufacturing,"Peabody Enterprise, May 3, 1940, cover and
3.
39 The information for Peabody's leather company hstory came from Wells, The Peabody Stoiy, and
the Shoe and Leather Reporter, 1949.
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specialized in morocco leather. Known for its manufacture of welts (a strip of leather
or material stitched into a shoe between the sole and the upper), flexible innersoles,
taps (a thin layer of leather applied to a worn-down shoe heel or toe), and smooth
. ~ ' the
linings, the F.P. Osborn Company had a long history in ~ e a b o d ~Joining
Osborn Company in the production of leather welts and innersoles were the G.H.
Furbash Company and J.S. Crehore Con~pany,which together employed about 150
men.
This abbreviated list of tanneries in Peabody provides a sketch of the
industrial concerns dotting the city's landscape. Besides these major leather factories,
there were smaller specialty shops and other companies, which used the byproducts
from the leather industry or produced products for the leather industry. For instance,
the Densten Hair Company utilized the cattle hair waste from the leather industry and
manufactured plaster, upholstering cloth, and felting. Employing one hundred
workers, Densten had a direct, beneficial relationship with Peabody's leather
industry. The Newel1 and Knowlton Extracting Works Company also had a
relationship with the leather factories. This company used the waste material that
came from the manufacture and dressing of leather to make grease for soap
manufacturers and curriers. In 1930 George Eastman founded the Eastman Gelatine
Company in Peabody which uses cattle bones to produce gelatine. This company was
still in existence in 2003.~'

Definitions in parentheses from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 8&ed.
(1979) s.v. "welt,""tap."
4 ' Sean Corcoran, "Eastman Gelatine a good neighbor, despite the odor," Salem Evening News,
February 2 1,2003, pp. 1, 1 1.
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Peabody was also home to a number of factories that produced equipment and
necessary products for the leather industry. The Morse Blacking Company made the
Victor line of blacking finishes and seasonings used during the tanning process; the
Turner Tanning Machinery Company produced machinery used in the leather
industry; and the Tanners Specialty Company, owned by the Strauss family, sold a
liquid dye solution used to color suede leather.42
While most of the leather produced in Peabody was sold to concerns outside
the city limits (for instance, Lynn's shoe producers bought Peabody leather), there
were also a handful of companies in Peabody that used the leather produced in the
city for the manufacture of finished products. The Ryan White Shoe Company, later
known as the New England Sportswear Company, employed approximately 100
operatives in the production of boys' shoes and later leather clothing. Industrial
companies like this employed Peabody's working-class women. While a handful of
women did work in the leather factories-about

nine percent of the labor force-most

tannery work was considered too heavy and dangerous for females, so they often
worked as leather stitchers in factories producing clothing or shoes.43
This overview of Peabody's industrial landscape reveals a working-class
community defined by its leather industry in the early thirties. Leather workers lived
in the neighborhoods bordering the center of the city-Peabody

Square-which

housed the majority of the leather concerns. Because most of Peabody's working

"Nathan Poor," May 3, 1940, p. 3
"Earnings in Leather Tanning and Finishing,"Monthly Labor Review 82 (October 1959): 1 1 16. Thls
percentage of women, however, varied depending on the type of leather tanned in a particular
geographical area. The largest number of women would be employed in concerns producing kid uppers
for soles.
42
43

class did not need or could not afford an automobile, workers walked to work. Ethnic
enclaves comprised different neighborhoods within the

For instance, the Turks

in the early days of the twentieth century congregated on Peabody's east side; this
became known as the Barbary coast. The Greeks also lived on the east side; these two
ethnic groups lived in tenement and multi-family houses on Walnut, Tremont, Harris,
and Paleologos Streets. The Poles and Armenians lived on the north end of the city,
congregating around Wilson Square and Warren Street Extension. Multi-family
houses dominated this neighborhood. The Irish, also living in multi-family
complexes, resided in the neighborhoods surrounding Peabody Square. The majority
of native-born Americans lived approximately five miles fiom the tanneries in South
Peabody. Single-family dwellings characterized this part of the Leather City. Many
South Peabody residents worked in Lynn's General Electric plant where wages and
benefits exceeded those earned in the leather industry. Until the early fifties, West
Peabody, as it was called, consisted mainly of farmland.45

In spite of these ethnic divisions, which created language and cultural barriers,
Peabody leather workers had a history of leather unionization dating back to 1833
when a national trade union was established in Salem, Massachusetts, which
encompassed South Danvers-later

known as the town of Peabody and then the city

of ~ e a b o d ~
Although
. ~ ~ this first leather union was ephemeral and ineffective, by the

44

Interview with James Sawyer, current business manager of Local 21, Peabody, Massachusetts,
February 22, 2001.
45
Demographic information compiled fiom a variety of interviews by the author with Peabody
residents and an overview of Peabody city directories.
46
Richard B. O'Keefe, "Unionism in the Leather Industry," Salem Evening News, March 12, 1957, p.
15. Infommtion also cited in Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers Union, 528-536. In the late forties,
the IFLWU leadership gave Foner the union's records. For a discussion of ethnic and racial limitations

turn of the century leather workers in the Peabody area became more union conscious
and started making gains. Under a charter fiom the American Federation of Labor,
the United Brotherhood of Leather Workers negotiated for six years and eventually
won the nine-hour day. The workweek was still six days, and the pay was seven
dollars. Even with these small triumphs, however, union gains proved inconsistent
because of internal and external disruptions exacerbated by ethnic differences and
employer manipulation. These obstacles plagued the reign of the United Brotherhood
of Leather Workers. In 1905 when the Amalgamated Leather Workers of America
came into existence, the United Brotherhood had to vie for membership. Further
muddying the situation was the organization of an Industrial Workers of the World
chapter in the Salem district. By 1910, the United Brotherhood of Leather Workers
had successfully defeated its competition but could not hold on to its attempts at
unionization. Internal strife and manufacturers' machinations limited union gains.47
Manufacturers not only used the ethnic divisions among employees to thwart
unionization attempts, they tried to keep new immigrants ignorant about organizing
activity. In the early days of the twentieth century, the leather manufacturers, with the
federal government's support, controlled factory life. Tannery owners objected to
unionization, and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), formed in 1895
"to expand trade possibilities for its business members" revamped its goal by 1903 to
be one of "belligerent opposition to union organization.'** NAM opposed collective

to unionization see Roger Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and Fight! " A Social History of
Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-90 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 58-73.
47
O'Keefe, 'Unionism in the Leather Industry," 15; Foner, Fur and Leather Workers Union, 528-536.
48
Irving Richter, Labor's Struggles, 1945-1950: A Participant's View (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 4. Richter presents a good historiography of NAM.

bargaining, and most of the Peabody leather industrialists subscribed to NAM's
philosophy. This intolerance of unions set an industrial atmosphere that prevailed
throughout the city and the country.49The Republican regimes of the Progressive era
supported this business elitism and further served to thwart the efforts of those
"radicals" wanting to disrupt the businessn~en'sstatus quo.50
Both the government and NAM after World War I used anti-union rhetoric to
instill in the minds of the American public that organizing was unpatriotic.
Associating trade unionists with Communism, the "legitimate rights and justified
grievances of the workers were forgotten in a fearful eagerness to make Bolshevism
This "invented" red scare made unionization efforts
the cause of all labor ~nrest."~'
more difficult in Peabody. For instance, on January 2, 1920, under the direction of
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and his aide J. Edgar Hoover, federal police
raided workers' homes in seventy different U.S. cities, including Boston "where 400
workers were led through the streets manacled and handcuffed, clanking with
chains." Nationwide the red scare of the twenties "was a magic formula to break
strikes . . . [and] the sure recipe for low wages."52 As a locus of first-generation
inmigrants in the early part of the twentieth century, Peabody housed a population
that had fled Europe for political and economic reasons. Many of these individuals
were happy to have a job, even if they were at the mercy of the tannery owner. With
the government and industry so zealously anti-union, it is no wonder Peabody leather
49

Richter, Labor's Struggles, 3.
Ronald L. Filippelli, "The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations," in U.S. Labor
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Inc., 1990), 140.
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workers had trouble unionizing and withstood another decade of abuse from factory
owners. 53
As George Georges, a former tannery worker, remembered, the early unions
(prior to 1933) "were w ~ r t h l e s s . "Things
~ ~ were tough in those days. Former leather
workers recalled that the owners of the tanneries and shoe factories took advantage of
their employees in all respects-low

pay, deplorable working conditions, unfair

employment opportunities, and so on. Ed Freeman, a former leather worker and Local
21 official, said that after the stock market crash in 1929, things went from bad to
worse in the leather industry.
The industry started to cut wages. We never had no holidays,
vacations, or what have you like that. Now, for instance, I had
a job where I used to make $42 a week. The people in back of
me were probably making some $12, $18 a week. The next
thing I know, I was down to $37 a week. And then I was down
to $35 a week. Then down to $32 a week. Down to $30 a week.
Finally get down to $25.55
Moe Maney, another retired leather worker, corroborated these conditions; he
remembered that prior to 1933 workers would "come in at sunup and work till
sundown." And the workweek did not end on Friday. "They worked seven hours a
day on Saturday" but only "got six bucks a week! They had to bring up a fanlily.
Consequently, they struck," Maney said, but the leather manufacturers fought them
"every inch of the way."56 Although he was only seventeen at the time, Ed Hall, a
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For a discussion of the role of immigrants in the early twentieth century industrial workforce see
Gwendolyn Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development: Union, Party,
and State, 1875-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 41; Foner, The Fur and Leather
Workers Union, 528.
5
?ranscripts from Leather Soul, Interview with George Georges, 43.
55 Ibid., Interview with Ed Freeman at the Union Hall, 72.
56 Ibid., Interview with Moe Maney, 2 Union Section.

former leather worker, remembered the difficulties facing the leather workers in the
early thirties. "They had nothing. And they'd [the tannery owners] come in and they
could lay you off anytime they want. Get rid of ya. Tell you all done."57
These reminisces realistically portray life in what had become known as the
Tanner City in the early thirties. By 1933 leather workers in the Northshore area of
Boston (including Peabody) had suffered a ten percent wage cut and an increase in
the workweek to ten hours per day, Monday through Friday, and five hours on
Saturday. While wages varied in the Massachusetts leather industry, on average
unskilled male help received $14.98 a week, skilled male help $2 1 a week, and
women and boys 27% cents an

Wages throughout the U.S. leather industry

were comparable to those being paid in Massachusetts. "Between 1930 and 1932 the
vast majority of the employed leather workers [across the country] suffered four wage
reductions of 10 percent each. The top wage of a skilled leather worker (if fully
employed, which the vast majority were not) was $23.74 for a fifty-five hour week."s9
Thus, a skilled leather worker, if he were lucky and remained employed twelve
months a year, might bring home $1,248 annually in the early thirties. Other
industrial and blue-collar male workers saw salaries at slightly higher levels-railroad
workers earned roughly $1,700 annually, wholesale and retail trade workers saw

Ibid., Interview with Ed Hall, 3 Union Section.
in the Leather Industry," 15. The statistics cited in this article differ slightly
5 8 0 ' ~ e e f e"Unionism
,
from Ed Freeman's testimony on the previous page. The statistics cited in the Salem Evening News are
corroborated with figures provided in "Wages and Hours in the Tanning Industry," Weekly Bulletin of
Leather and Shoe News 43 (February 12, 1938): 21. This source cited average weekly earnings as
follows: 1929=$24.89; 1935=$21.87; 1936=$22.50; 1937=$24.08. These figures are also supported in
the Monthly Labor Review. This periodical averaged the May 1933 salaries for the leather industry and
found the average to be 38.5 cents to 39.5 cents an hour. "Salaries in Leather Industry," Monthly Labor
Review 37 (July 1933).
59 Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers Union, 535.
57

yearly incomes of $1,569, and other manufacturing workers in the nondurable goods
services (such as leather) received $1,425 on average with their counterparts in
durable goods earning slightly less-$1,391 .60Leather salaries were low, especially
considering the risk of sickness and injury resulting fiom tannery work.61
The trade publication Industrial Hygiene concluded that turn-of-the-century
tanneries bred a minimum of forty-two different occupational diseases. Poisoning
fiom chemicals used in the tanning process killed many workers because employees
were not given protective rubber gloves, overalls or boots. Most tanneries failed to
install proper exhaust systems or provide adequate fresh-air breaks to alleviate the
noxious chemical fumes.62A study initiated in 1921 by the U.S. Public Health
Service that looked at industrial concerns in the North Central, North Atlantic, and
New England states corroborated what Peabody workers already knew: in-plant
safety and health care services for industrial workers were almost nonexistent. Only
about five percent of the plants studied and twenty percent of the workers had the
services of a part or full-time safety director. In most instances, large plants were the
only ones to have a safety director and medical or nursing care. While seventeen
percent of the workers had a part-time medical supervisor, only fifteen percent had
the services of a full-time physician. Full-time nursing services were provided for
thirty-four percent of the employees, but part-time service was virtually nonexistent
Scott Derks, Working Americans: 1880-1999: Volume 1: The Working Class (Lakeville, CT: Grey
House Publishing, 2000), 234.
61
The occupational hazards of the leather industry are discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter
Three. For a description of the safety hazards of a tannery see Andrew Rowland, " Tanning Leather,
Tanning Hides: Health and Safety Struggles in a Leather Factory," in Workers ' Struggles, Past and
Present: A "Radical America " Reader, ed. James Green (Phdadelphia: Temple University Press,
1983), 362-378.
62 Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers Union, 537-538.

in the other plants. "The so-called small plant [of which Peabody had many] was in
general found to be lacking in those welfare provisions which are important to any
constructive program for industrial hygiene."63 Because of these dismal working
conditions and a lack of proper medical care, two workers in Peabody "died in 1932
after sweating blood from their pores."64 Local papers detailed other such atrocities
and deaths on a regular basis.

In the early thirties Peabody had only one company, A.C. Lawrence, that
employed a doctor on staff and made regular attempts to educate workers about
workplace safety.65For the vast majority of Peabody leather workers employed
outside of A.C. Lawrence, the union was their only hope for protecting their welfare
and that of their families. As one former leather worker said, "Let's put it this way,
everybody says that you don't gain by a strike. Well, we weren't interested in a nickel
an hour. With the union we couldn't a had nothing. So that's that."66 Workers were
ready for a change in the workplace.
This change, however, could not come from just these New England leather
workers. One had only to look to the recent past to see the troubles labor had had in
organizing any type of industry. As mentioned earlier, prior to the 1930s, "the U.S.
labor movement operated in a social and economic environment that was generally
unfavorable to the recognition of trade unions. Government and the courts were on
63
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the side of the employer, and refusals to bargain were common and frequently
supported by the full power of the ~tate.'"~
As historian Gary Gerstle acknowledges,
the role of the state cannot be underestimated. At various times throughout U.S.
history-most

particularly the thirties-the

federal government has acted in

accordance with popular public sentiment. The state, according to Gerstle, is a
malleable entity; it cannot "be regarded as a capitalist tool, nor as a mechanism that
invariably reinforces society's prevailing distribution of power. It should be regarded
instead as a political arena in which society's social conflicts and tensions are
themselves fought out." Historically, groups with money, like the capitalists, usually
control what happens, but "in moments when they [capitalists] have been weakened
as a result of the economy's poor performance or as a result of ideological divisions
within their own ranks" other groups are able to take control. This is what happened
in 1 9 3 3 . "Popular
~~
insurgency and capitalist disarray not only caused the state to pass
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) but also allowed workers . . .to gain the
upper hand in the state-supervised industrial relations machinery that was then
e~tablished."~~
Scholar Ronald Filippelli characterizes the period of labor growth

''A Labor Historian Views Changes in the Trade Union Movement," Monthly Labor Review 92 no. 9
(September 1969): 8.
Gerstle, Working-ClassAmericanism, 332-333.
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Ibid. Other historians have voiced similar sentiments. "A Labor Historian Views Changes in the
Trade Union Movement," Monthly Labor Review 92 no. 9 (September 1969): 8; Robert Zieger, The
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between 1933 and 1939 as an anomaly because of the "extraordinary domestic crisis"
that led the government to reshape the "nation's political alignment" in a direction
more favorable to the working person.70
In the midst of the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the

NIRA into law on June 16, 1933. This bill passed by the Seventy-third Congress was
designed to "rehabilitate industry and relieve unemployment." Section 7 (a) of the
NIRA specifically provided that

employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be fiee fiom the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
This act further stipulated that "employers shall comply with the maximum hours of
labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or
prescribed by the

resident."^' While this law lacked specific enforcement language,

the symbolism of it was enough to serve as a catalyst to incite the working class to
organize.72Even before its passage-as

is evidenced in Peabody-the

federal law

the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 121. See also Ronald L.
Filippelli, "The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations," in U.S. Labor Relations, 19451989: Accommodation and Conflict, ed. Bruce Nissen (New York: Garland, 1990), 137-162; Richter,
Labor S Struggles. There have been historians on the other side of the debate as well. In Art Preis's
work he says that "the right to organize had been fully sanctioned in the Norris-LaGuardia AntiInjunction Act of 1932, adopted in Hoover's administration. . . .Had the workers not been ready and
eager for organization, Section 7 (a) affirming their right to organize and bargain collectively and to
pick their own union representatives fiee fiom employer interference, would have had no effect in any
sense. The facts are that the workers were already on the move when Roosevelt took office and Section
7 (a) was a reluctant response to labor pressure." Art Preis, Twenty Years of the CIO: Labor S Giant
Step (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), 12-13.
70 Filippelli, "The Historical Context," 14 1.
7 1 'LLaborLaws," Monthly Labor Review 37 (July 1933): 74 (first quote); 78 (block quote and third
yote).
James B. Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and Law During World War II
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became a springboard fiom which organized labor could finally gain a foothold in
securing a better quality of life. The industrial workers in America were ready for
workplace reform and now had a platform from which to negotiate. Surveys and polls
taken in the 1930s revealed a trend that "working class Americans were moving to the
left . . . . Workers were angry, restive, and determined to effect changes."73 Across the
country workers started to realize that gains could only be made if all workers joined
together. Aiding this feeling of solidarity among workers was the curtailment of
immigration after World War I and the Immigration Acts of the early twenties; ethnic
divisions were not longer as divisive a force.74Though Peabody was still ethnically
diverse, as in other communities a "shared economic relationship of dependence on
wages can induce cooperation among people who otherwise are very different . . . .
Common class interests have the potential to bring working people together who have
little else in common and in fact may not like each other at

This is what started

to happen in the Northshore in the spring of 1933. Diverse groups of workers from
various towns-Lynn,

Salem, Wobum and Winchester-joined

together to push for

reform.
But the success of the union movement in any particular community was not
assured. Since Section 7 (a) of the NIRA was unenforceable, union advancement
hinged on the actions and beliefs of the various labor factions within a particular
73 Zieger, CIO, 43-44. Alice and Staughton Lynd talk about how "the industrial union organizing drive
of the 1930s was a movement for democracy. Talk to the mass production workers who took part in it,
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locale and the reaction to the union on the part of area employers, clergy, politicians,
and the community at large.76"Militancy, solidarity, and class-consciousness were
not universal among industrial workers. Even in the relatively favorable climate of
the early 1BOs, joining a union was a risky business."77 Peabody's leather workers
epitomized the challenges facing the union movement in the early thirties.
While their brethen in Lynn and Salem, under the banner of the National Shoe
and Leather Workers (NSLW), a division of the National Shoe Workers Association,
went on strike on the morning of March 21, 1933 for higher wages and more
employment opportunities, Peabody leather workers were undecided about the strike.
After a mass meeting of leather workers in Peabody on the night of March 24th,
however, employees from three Peabody tanneries-Thayer
Kirstein-joined

Foss, Pearse Leather, and

the Lynn and Salem strikers.78

The NSLW fought to "equalize prices so that all factories would be working
on the same level in competing with each other."79 In addition, these striking workers
wanted better wages, shorter hours, recognition of the union, and more leather
workers to be employed; they wanted employers to stop relying on overtime-for
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which they were not compensated-and

instead hire larger crews." Former Peabody

leather worker Ed Freeman remembered that right after the crash in 1929, he tried to
organize a group of workers, but he had no success with his organizing efforts. By
1933 things were different: "there was a resentment all over the city. Everybody was
being cut to hell. The good jobs, the real high-class jobs were cut down to n ~ t h i n . " ~ '
And the government clearly appeared to be on the workers' side.'*
But rallying support for the March 1933 strike was a slow process. On the
surface these striking leather workers looked like a tight coalition fighting against the
tannery owners. This united front, however, was not as selfless or as tight as it
appeared. Even in regards to their demands, leather workers were not as altruistic as
newspaper accounts led one to believe. Published accounts of workers' demands
suggested that the striking laborers wanted to do away with overtime work because
they really wanted more leather workers to be employed. This was no doubt true in
some cases, but a closer inspection of these newspaper articles illustrates that the
majority of workers were not interested in overtime because factory owners had
stopped paying overtime workers time and a half. Workers did not get anything extra
by working more hours. If they were not going to get time and a half, workers
decided they might as well let other laborers do the job.83

-
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While the NSLW represented the Lynn and Salem workers, Local 1 of the
United Leather Workers Union, which formed in 1915 but was only recognized by
two Peabody tanneries-Essex

Tanning Company and Kirstein Leather Company-

represented the striking workers in the Leather City. John J. Griffin, the business
agent for Local 1, early on in the strike used the local media to rally support for what
would end up being a six-week work stoppage. In cultivating sympathy for the strike,
Griffin used language that became the mainstay of the leather union in Peabody;
words like cooperation and one hundred percent organization became part of the
union's official lexicon. Griffin cautioned that it was only from one hundred percent
organization of the city that workers could initiate "betterments in working conditions
and wage matters."84 In an editorial in the local paper, Griffin never used the word
strike; instead he concentrated on using words like unite. For the past fifteen years,
however, Griffin and his predecessors had not been able to unite more than the two
tanneries. But the outcome would be different this time: once the strike began in
1933, the majority of Peabodyites-leather

workers and non-leather workers-

supported the union movement.
When Griffin asked the community to show its support for the strike by
marching in a parade on March 27, 1933, 1,000 community members-including
strikers, women and children-paraded

through the Peabody leather district.

According to the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor, in the winter of 1933 there were

-
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4,112 leather workers residing in ~ e a b o dThis
~ . ~parade
~
included a quarter of the
leather workers living in the city, a significant show of solidarity for the strikers.
Getting all leather workers involved, however, proved difficult. Because this
strike took place at the height of the Depression, some leather workers supported the
strike but hesitated to actually walk off their jobs. Reminiscing about the early days
of the 1933 strike, Freeman focused on these early setbacks:
My first encounter with the union was I think it was April of '33 when
we went out on strike. I went to work one morning and there was a
fellow walking up and down outside the shop. It didn't mean nothing
to me. But later on during the day, I heard that he was a picket. We
heard there was a strike up in Danversport . . . . So good. So I got the
other three fellas that were working with me. There was four of us
working on this, this process. We says, "Tomorrow morning, we're
gonna strike this plant." So the next morning, we went around. We
talked to people, "When we go out, you follow us." The four of us
went in, changed our clothes, went outside. We found out, we were the
only ones outside, the four of us. So we says, "Okay, we'll go back
into the shop again." We went back into the shop again, went back to
work. The next day, we tried the same thing. No success. The third
day, we says, "Look, we're going out today. Everybody's gotta come
with us. This is our opportunity to get the union." In the meantime, the
company had gone to court to get an injunction against the picketers
outside. Well, nobody would follow us out. So we went back into the
shop, went around pushing buttons, pushing pulleys. We shut down
the plant ourselves. And finally everybody come out. That was my
introduction to getting the people into the union.86
By the end of April, Freeman recalled, enough workers in the city became tired of the
manufacturers' practices and decided that maybe this time things could be different.
Conditions had been bad in the past and workers had struck before, but this strike was
unusual. National sentiment was now behind the working class; Depression
conditions served to inspire a nation to remedy the problems in society. "Everybody
8S Salem Evening News,March 3 1, 1933, 10. At thls point Griffin disappears from the record. His
name is never mentioned again.
86
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was sick and disgusted with getting wage cuts, getting pushed around, you have no
seniority. You get laid off and the boss's son comes into work, or the boss's cousin,
or whatever."87 Emboldened by their perception of support, workers had reached their
threshold of tolerance.
Freeman and other former leather workers said the strike of 1933 was a real
grass-roots effort. The leather manufacturers, however, insisted that outside agitators
"who know nothing of the conditions nor anything about leather making" ran the
union and garnered support through means of "intimidation and violence unparalleled
in the history of the leather industry in this district." 88 Peabody's old-timers
disagreed. A1 Quantros, a former Local 2 1 organizer, argued that Joseph Massidda, a
Lynn fellow in charge of leading the strike in Peabody, "had nothing to do with

organizing the leather workers. It was one of these spontaneous things. There was no
A1 Quantros or Ed Freeman or anybody else going around organizing people. It was a
spontaneous thing."89
While some newspaper accounts and interviews with other union people
support Freeman and Quantros's assertion that the strike of '33 was spontaneous,
these recollections are not entirely accurate. According to union records, Massidda
did act as an organizer, but the community did not perceive him in this way. Instead,
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locals credited Massidda with agitating the masses. Quantros characterized Massidda
as a charismatic individual:
He could keep the people stirred up, keep them united, keep them together in
case there's anybody who would want to probably get back into the shops or
what have you. He was a morale booster, that's what he was. And he was
good. They could say anything they want about him, but he had that ability to
arouse the people and keep them unified.90

In order for Massidda to be successful, former leather workers argue, people had to
believe in the ideals he promised, and this desire for positive change in the leather
industry was palpable in Peabody during the thirties. People cannot be organized
unless they are ready and willing. Massidda capitalized on the local sentiment and
became a central figure in the quest for union identity. Because Massidda was a Lynn
resident and a former leather worker, Peabody's rank and file could relate to his
message.9' And once the majority of Peabody leather workers dedicated themselves
to the strike ideals, they were a strong force, especially when the strikers decided that
union recognition was of primary importance.
It was over union recognition that the workers and factory owners found
themselves at an impasse. The factory owners were unwilling to recognize the union.
The A.C. Lawrence Company, the biggest leather employer in the area, said that it
would close its doors before it would acknowledge the union.92The other leather
manufacturers in Peabody, Salem, and Lynn said they would not give in to the
demands of the strikers because they felt that the union did not represent the
sentiments of the workers. In addition, the manufacturers argued that the NSLW did
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not actually exist because it had no charter and thus was not incorporated. The
manufacturers saw the NSLW as a "voluntary unincorporated association, [and the
manufacturers] will not deal with the officers and organizers."93 Massidda denied
these charges and said that the "executive board of the Peabody district local is
absolutely in charge of everything that is done in its local . . . and [the] executive
board is composed exclusively of striking leather workers of this district."94
While strikers wanted a uniform wage scale for like work in all shops and a
48-hour week with no overtime, union recognition was the most important point.95
Union leaders claimed "recognition of the union by all manufacturers" was the only
means of assuring workers "protection against any policy which their employers
might care to put into effect."96 With union recognition, Freeman explained, "You
had the opportunity to be able to sit down with the boss and talk about conditionsworking conditions, your wages, and whatever benefits you could get."97 Because
strikers wanted all factory owners to recognize their right to form a union, even the
tanneries paying good wages were affected by the strike.
By the middle of April, the manufacturers were anxious to get their people
back to work. Hides were spoiling and money was being lost. Eighteen Peabody
leather shops vowed to open on Monday morning, April 17, and to pay a very liberal
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minimum wage based on 48 hours of work a week. But these manufacturers held fast
to their position that they would not recognize the union.98
Because union recognition was so important, union officials said that they
would keep the strike deadlocked until "the manufacturers recognize the union" and
would leave the matter of wages and working conditions to the state board of
conciliation and arbitration, an organization formed with the passage of the NIRA. As
a response to those manufacturers determined to pursue their goal of opening leather
factories on April 17, the striking workers decided to hold a mass parade on that same
morning. The idea, however, was short-lived; the mayor of Peabody, J. Leo Sullivan,
"nixed" the idea for the parade. 99 Striking leather workers felt that the mayor had
deprived them of "their rights as free citizens" and considered him a "traitor to the
strikers' cause."'00
Although they had been denied the right to hold a parade, Massidda told the
strikers that they "had won the fight because they did not return to their jobs [on the
1 7 ~ when
~ 1 asked to do so . . .by the factory owners." In trying to bolster the strikers'
morale and deepen the bonds of solidarity, Massidda gave a rousing speech and tried
to show the leather workers that they were outwitting the manufacturers.
They thought they were dealing with people without any intelligence,
but we outsmarted them today and all their schemes and plots to stop
the parade and to incite trouble did not have any effect whatsoever.
This is a labor fight and no trickery on their part or on the part of
politicians is going to keep us from winning. They can't lick you for
you are fighting a cause of righteousness and justice. We are the
"The Leather Workers' Stnke," Weekly Bulletin ofLeather and Shoe News 38 (April 22, 1933): 9.
"Leather Strikers to Stage Parade Monday with Wives, Children," Salem Evening News, April 15,
1933.
loo "Mayor Sullivan Firm in Stand Not to Let Workers Have Parade," Salem Evening News, April 18,
1933, p. 2.
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producers of America and will bring about a new era of prosperity that
will start from the bottom and with the workers who can do much
when they wake up. But this organization is your only protection.101
With these words Massidda espoused a progressive vision for genuine democracy. He
did not need to go into the political history of America for these workers; because of
their living and working conditions, they knew that in terms of political, social and
economic democracy, they were not living the American dream.'02
Massidda tried to inspire all Peabody leather workers to hold fast to their
position. By saying that "we are the producers of America," he tried to offer hope to
those workers who felt they had no ability to alter the course of day-to-day life.
Massidda made it clear that nothing would be achieved if all workers did not work
together. All leather workers in Peabody had to be committed to this fight.
While these striking leather workers may not have thought of their lives in
such eloquent terms, they believed Massidda's rhetoric; his words struck a common
chord within this diverse ethnic community. After listening to his speech, only fifteen
percent of the nearly 5,000 leather workers went back to work on the 17th.Freeman, a
former leather worker directly involved in the 1933 strike, recalled that Massidda was
"a little, short fellow" of Italian extraction. When he spoke, he "could set a fire; he'd
get up on that stage, and you could see that crowd stirring up, and if he told them to
burn the city of Peabody, they'd have burnt it down." Standing on a stage waving his
fist, "[Massidda] probably was one of the greatest speakers I think I've ever heard,"
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Freeman acknowledged.103While Massidda did have a powerfbl oratorical style,
Quantros said his speeches were effective because he said what workers wanted to
hear. "First he would castigate the manufacturer," for abusing workers and depriving
them of their rights.
We had no seniority. We had no paid holidays, we had no vacations,
we had no protection. Those are the things that he would draw on and
those are the things that I was interested in and those are the things that
Joe Bloke was interested in.Io4
Massidda made the Peabody leather workers feel others cared about their needs. And
he did. He lived in their community; he had suffered at the hands of tannery owners;
he was, in effect, an organic intellectual. Without any formal training, Massidda was
able to educate and rally the masses to demand change in their working and living
conditions.
As the strike gained momentum, there were indicators that the community at
large also cared about the escalating situation in the leather industry. On the political
front, four weeks into the strike Mayor Sullivan formed a Citizens' Committee,
consisting of local Peabodyites, "in an effort to get both sides together and effect a
settlement of the leather controversy."105In addition, the Peabody City Council
adopted a resolution calling on the manufacturers and the workers to settle the big
leather strike. The council asked both the manufacturers and the workers to "forget
their animosity towards each other, sit down in conference, come together on
common ground realizing that we are all hunlan beings fighting for a cause and try to
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come to some peaceful settlement." While the council stated it would "do all in its
power to assist in bringing about an early and agreeable settlement to all concerned,"
it felt that since it represented 2 1,000 people, "all of whom are affected," it would be
of most assistance by "assuming an impartial attitude.9,106
Despite official pronouncement, the Peabody City Council did not act as a
neutral arbitor. In indirect ways, the city council showed its support for the workers.
For instance, at that same April 27thmeeting, the council passed a unanimous
resolution requesting the chief of police to "inspect all trucks and buses can-ying
passengers to and from the city of Peabody" and to ascertain "whether or not these
trucks have certification from the commission of public utilities" to carry
passengers.107If these vehicles failed to show proper certification, one counselor
asked that they be removed from the highways. After this motion was passed
unanimously, it was "met with much applause from the gallery."10sThis resolution
clearly favored the strikers who adamantly complained about the use of scabs who
arrived in Peabody from outlying areas. Also at this meeting council members
adopted a resolution asking the mayor to request that tanneries not employ strike
breakers.Io9The spirit of these resolutions indicated the council's rejection of a
position of neutrality.
Besides political machinations, there were other examples of community
support. The local newspaper, the Peabody Enterprise, blatantly supported the
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workers. In a strongly worded editorial, the weekly paper called the tanneries sweat
shops and blamed the tannery owners, "who cut help beyond all reason," for
undercutting those owners paying fair wages. The paper went so far as to blame the
Peabody manufacturers for the difficult "conditions of the leather market."l1° Joining
the Peabody Enterprise in supporting the union, various ethnic and civic groups sent
monetary donations. The Turkish society gave $50 to the union to aid the striking
workers and the Polish society donated $25."' American Legion Post 153 issued a
check for $100 and assured the strikers that "more money would follow."112In
addition to its monetary support, Post 153 adopted a resolution criticizing the use of
tear gas by the police to break up crowds of strikers. In this resolution, members of
the Peabody American Legion complained about the strike's financial effect on the
city, "protested against the promiscuous use of tear gas bombs where our women and
children are congregated," and admonished that "the money used for tear gas should
go toward the poor and destitute within the city."l13 Concurring with the American
Legion, the Polish Mutual Benefit Society and 220 Greek merchants, proprietors and
citizens wrote petitions to Mayor Sullivan expressing "public resentment against the
importation of strikebreakers and police terror." These petitions "urged that 'an
immediate stop be put to the most inhumane practice in the civilized worldstrikebreaking.""l 4
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Local support manifested itself in various community actions. Although one
local newspaper, the Salem Evening News, reported that there was "considerable
public sentiment against the strike leaders of the National Shoe Workers Association .

. . for coming to Peabody and stirring up trouble," the public, nevertheless, was
instrumental in establishing a soup kitchen in the French block of Lowell Street "for
the benefit of the

striker^.""^ In addition, the union designated a committee to solicit

food fiom local merchants. After only four days in existence, Peabody's soup kitchen
was feeding between 500 and 600 people twice daily and was considered "one of the
"~
remembered a small grocery store on Walnut
busiest spots in ~ e a b o d ~ . "Freeman
Street that sent over vegetables, bread, coffee, and other food to the soup kitchen to
keep it going. Besides the soup kitchen, strikers and their families received food at
home fiom the union.'" "But I don't think that most of the people of the city were in
that position [to give food to the soup kitchen] because they all were associated with
the strike," Freeman said. "Every family in the city was part of the strike because the
father was out on strike, or the son or the brother. In some instances maybe the
m ~ t h e r . " " The
~ hardships felt by the community, however, did not go unnoticed by
city officials. The Peabody park commission took action to obtain additional land so
that 125 local families could have subsistence gardens. In years past, the city had
given garden lots to only fifty fa mi lie^."^
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One could argue that because the whole community had ties to the leather
industry, the city could not help but support the strikers. "Every police officer in the
city of Peabody, every politician in the city of Peabody, every doctor in Peabody,
every priest in Peabody were all former leather workers and they were all sympathetic
with the strike," Freeman said.l2' In fact, a typical refiain fiom longtime Peabodyites
was that everybody in Peabody worked in the leather industry. Tino Verceloni, who
spent most of his life on Peabody's Dane Street, figured that "99.5 percent of' the
people "living in [his] neighborhood worked in the leather ind~stry."'~'Jack Reardon,
a former member of the Peabody City Council, recounted that in 1957 when he was
running for mayor of Peabody, the other five candidates were former leather workers,
and he was a leather worker at the time of the election. Reardon described the
employment situation in Peabody as revolving around the leather industry:
Anybody that grew up in this town worked in a tannery. Either maybe during
the summer in high school, or a lot of guys that are maybe lawyers today, will
tell you that they didn't want to go to college, and their fathers got them a job
in the beam house . . . and after a summer of that, the kids signed up for
college.'22
Because so many people in Peabody depended on the leather industry for their
livelihood, the 1933 strike unquestionably created a hardship for the city. Not only
did people fear escalating violence as the strike dragged on, but all Peabodyites began
to feel the monetary effects of an industry closing its d 0 0 r s . l ~Five
~ weeks into the

120 Transcripts from Leather Soul, Interview with Ed Freeman at the Union Hall, 74. Others in the
community concur with this opinion. Author has in her possession interview transcripts that attest to
this.
121
Ibid., Interview with Tino Verceloni, 159.
122
Ibid., Interview with Jack Reardon, 135.
123
A discussion of the violence that the strike created will be discussed later in this chapter.

strike, city officials estimated the monetary loss to the Northshore district to be a half
million dollars.
This includes the immense loss in wages to workers which in turn has
a tremendous affect on business; the $3,500 weekly loss in revenue in
Peabody from the use of water and power, the cost to the city of
Peabody for added protection and the effect on trade by manufacturers
with jobbers, dealers, and tanning supply houses. This does not include
the loss suffered by the factory owners, particularly as to new orders.
Then there are doctors' bills to be borne by injured parties, the
property damage due to violence, etc. with the extent of the effort
being practically unlimited since, when industry stops, the losses go all
along the line.124
In observing the situation, the Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News, an industry
publication, said that no one profited during a strike of this magnitude. "The workers
themselves are suffering; the tanners are losing money, and have already had orders
cancelled intended for Easter shoes; and the cities and towns in the strike area are
suffering not only from stagnation of general business but from overburdened relief

Clergy in the Northshore area were not immune to the dilemma the strike
created. A representative of the Boston archdiocese, Cardinal O'Connell, in a radio
address prayed for the end of the controversy and asked "that divine guidance be
given the representatives of the manufacturers and the union in this very serious
trouble."'26 In his sermonizing about the strike, Cardinal 07Connelladhered to the
Catholic creed as stated in the Quadragesirno Anno which counseled capital and labor
to "work for the common welfare" and called for all workers to organize but
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cautioned that unions should embrace all workers and "be governed by good
sense."127Because the majority of rank and filers in Peabody were Catholic, the
Cardinal's words must have had a soothing effect on those leather workers unsure of
their role in the unfolding drama.12*And for the predominantly Jewish factory
owners, this use of the airwaves to preach against capitalism could only have served
to harden the animosity between the two sides.

In her autobiography Diary of a Pigeon Watcher, Doris Schwerin, a former
Peabodyite, recalled the tension that permeated Peabody in those days. Her father,
Harry Halpern, was a Jewish doctor in Peabody in the early part of the twentieth
century. Peabody social etiquette dictated that, as a professional man, Doctor Halpern
associate with the rich factory owners. But he did not. According to Schwerin, her
"Papa wasn't doing what he was 'supposed to do."' With family members looking on
in horror, Schwerin's father made his own way in pre-World War I1 Peabody:
[He rejected the] Jewish factory owners and favor[ed] the workers. Unionism
and strike were new words. He put his blessing on the new words. He rehsed
to cross picket lines. . . . The upper class of the town were horrified. . . .The
factory owners who could have made Papa rich were the aliens. The workers
were the Americans. . . .If the "uppers" of the town had wanted to print a
calling card for Papa, it would have said "Dr. Halpem, Socialist, renegade,
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betrayer." A professional man shouldn't behave the way he did. He was a
pariah--double--a Jew and a
While other professionals disagreed with Halpern's sentiments, the local Catholic
clergy supported Halpern's views on the working individual. The need for labor
unions pemeated the Boston archdiocese's Sunday Catholic hour radio addresses
during 1933. These addresses did not mention the striking leather workers specifically
but framed each semon in ternls of the larger question of organized labor in general.
For example, one sermon called unorganized labor a pathology when it flourished in
an industrial society. In this broadcast aired over a local Boston station, Reverend Dr.
John P. Monaghan admonished that the Catholic church consider unorganized labor a
social disease in a capitalist society because the "energy giving organ called Capital
has almost a monopoly of the body's

resource^."'^^ In another semon aired in the

early spring of 1933, the Catholic Church offered words that could have only served
to verify in a worker's mind that the struggle for unionization was just. In this
particular sernlon the Boston archdiocese preached that in spite of the working
person's propensity toward self-reliance and independence,
despite these tendencies and efforts among the great mass of people,
the wealth of the nation gradually flowed into the hands of the few.
Capitalists and industrialists driven by greed, monopolized the sources
of wealth and gained control of the products and profits made possible
by the progress of technological science to their own enrichment and
to the impoverishment and enslavement of the masses.13'

'29 Doris Schwerin, Diary of a Pigeon Watcher: An Autobiographical Journey (New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1976), 88.
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Hearing sermons by their religious leaders that mirrored union rhetoric could only
solidify in the workers' minds the fairness of their objectives.13*
For some workers pastoral messages about unionization started well before
the 1933 strike. In opening remarks to members of the First Baptist Church in
Peabody in 1931, the Reverend Ernest H. J. Vincent chose the metaphor of a laborer
to be the motto for the upcoming year. "For we are laborers together with God . . . .
The wonderful thing about this relationship is that while God requires that we be
laborers, He joins us, for we are co-workers with God. 'Laborers together with God."'
As Reverend Vincent continued with his address to parishioners, he drew the
metaphor of a laborer more directly into their realm of experience.
All of us who are workers in everyday life are quite familiar with all that is
entailed in being employed. It makes no difference whether it is with a small
or large concern, the relationships between enlployers and employees are
quite definitely marked. To all too many in modem industrial life it means
working for a concern so that there is no intimate contact between employer
and employed. Each individual is part of the concern, and quickly discovers
that the corporation is soulless. Individuality and personality are lost in the
grind of machinery, the drive for output and the scramble for profits. That is
the danger point in our present system. In our history books we are taught that
slavery was abolished in this fair country, the U.S.A. when Abraham Lincoln
signed that document that emancipated the Negroes of the South, but slavery
still exists in a more pernicious form in modem industry. Only recently, a
worker in a big corporation said to me, "It is getting so that we are driven like
slaves." In the Kingdom of God it is different, for He works with us. What
consternation would reign if the big boss, known only by name, should one
afternoon instead of making up a foursome at the club, suddenly appear in
overalls and rubber boots down in the cellar, and say, "Come on, boys, let's
get into this job; we are co-workers," But that is what God does.133
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One only needs to look at any issue of The Pilot during the spring, summer, or fall of 1933 to see
how supportive the Boston archdiocese was in regards to unionization. A good example of the clergy's
position can be found in "Catholic Statement Points Out Need of Christian Ideals for Sound Social
Recover," The Pilot 104 (June 17, 1933): 7.
Pastoral Message to Friends and Church Members 193 1 by Reverend Ernest H.J. Vincent, Box:
Peabody Churches, Folder: Baptist Church, George Peabody House Museum, Peabody, Massachusetts.

Although Reverend Vincent did not mention the leather manufacturers by name, his
message was clear: The working individuals in Peabody had suffered at the hands of
their employers, and the class differentials demarcating the worker and factory owner
created inequities in all facets of life. God did not approve of these differences. After
this sermon, parishioners most likely had no doubts about Reverend Vincent's
allegiance to the working person.
While St. Vasilios Greek Orthodox Church in Peabody did not use the pulpit
to discuss secular issues, Father Andrew Demontros, the head of the church in 2001,
said that the congregation in the thirties was strictly working class and sentiment for
the union ran high. In addition to the working class background of this congregation,
the Greek Orthodox Church had specific ties to many of the striking leather workers.
After World War I, the Greek Church "was a sponsor of many refugees who came
over [to the United States] . . . . These people in many cases had speaking problems
and limited resources, and they were very happy to take jobs in tannerie~.'"~~
These
same Greek immigrants were out of work in 1933. Feelings of solidarity permeated
this parish; pro-union messages did not need to be incorporated into the sermon. All
members of St. Vasilios supported the union effort.'35
But even with so much community support, the situation was grim for the
striking leather workers. In many instances, emotions got the best of the strikers and
violence became a means of trying to get their demands met. Until May 1933, the
police dealt with disturbances by the striking leather workers without resorting to
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physical violence. Instead of using clubs, they used tear gas and diplomacy.
Throughout the strike there had been many altercations that called for police
intervention. Throwing rocks at the buses bringing the scabs into Peabody was a
common occurrence. Women and children even engaged in this behavior. In one
incident two men and a woman were arrested in Peabody; the men were charged with
throwing rocks at a bus carrying strike breakers to the Dimond-Grynkraut Kid
Manufacturing Company, while the woman was apprehended for throwing a large
stone through the windshield of a truck bringing strikebreakers to work in front of the
B.E. Cox tannery on Hardy
Freeman has vivid recollections of what it was like fighting the scabs.
Our problem was fighting off the scabs that came in from Ipswich and
Beverly that had taken our jobs. They came in by bus. First it started in
Salem, on Goodhue Street. There was the Flynn Leather Company on
Boston Street and the back part of it was on Goodhue Street. Across
from Flynn was the Helbum Thompson Leather Company. And they
was the two concentrations of what I would call strike activity. They
bring 'em in on buses. Put screen all over the windows. And the
strikers and their fiiends, their mothers and fathers, would be on the
sidewalk with bricks. And as the bus came through, they'd throw the
stones or bricks at the bus. That didn't work. That didn't . . .they
weren't too successfid. So then they finally started to bring 'em in on
the trains. They'd import them up to Beverly, put 'em on a train and
then ride them and drive them into Salem. And . . .they had a spur of
track and they'd ride them in there. Then another place was a
concentration over at Cox Leather Company on the comer of Walnut
and Wallis Street, I think they call it. They had a few scabs in there.
And the strikers would move all over town, wherever these scabs were
gonna be working or employed.137
Even with this type of premeditated violence, the police tried to refrain from using
physical force against the strikers. The Peabody police opted not to use violence on
in Peabody; Expected to Take Part in Strlke," Peabody Enterprise, April 2 1,
1933, p. 1.
13' Transcripts fiom Leather Soul, Interview with Ed Freeman at the Union Hall, 73.
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the strikers, in part, because many police officers had ties-familial

or social-with

the leather workers. And in some instances, police officers commiserated with them.
While at first the police tried to refrain from using violence against strikers,
that changed on May 1. At a demonstration at the Helburn Thompson plant, strikers
attacked and harmed police officers. In response to the police injuries, Marshal John

C. Harkens of the Peabody Police Department said that he would not let his "officers
be slaughtered while on strike duty" and, as a result of this incident which illustrated
a total "loss of respect for the law. . . [ , ] sterner methods will be used by the police
in handling the mobs." While the marshal said that police had been lenient until this
point in handling strikers, he vowed to now go after strikers "with hammer and
tongs."138Police would not become victims of the leather workers regardless of their
relationships outside of work.

In their defense, strikers argued that they got out of control at the Helburn
Thompson leather plant because of the tannery's practice of using scabs. In trying to
fool the striking leather workers, the Helburn Thompson plant "instead of sending in
trucks or buses.

. . hired a locomotive and a baggage car to go in by its spur track and

take out the strikebreakers just in time to catch the train for Ipswich at Salem depot."
When workers found out about this secret plan, they "gathered to throw rocks at the
baggage car as it emerged from the factory yard. . . . Rocks struck several officers
during this barrage" and one officer holding a striker was directly attacked. 139 A
twelve-year-old boy at the time, Quantros remembered going down to Richard
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Young's, a tannery near the Thompson plant, and throwing rocks at the scabs with a
group of other kids. "We joined you know. We were all part of that whole deal."140
The police, however, were not the only victims of strike violence. A foreman
at Flynn and Sons Tanning had a rock thrown through the window of his house.
Around the rock was a note that read: "If you value your life, do not go to work
tomorrow, and also do not learn the scabs how to work on the machines.

. . .We are

out for blood. Beware we mean b u ~ i n e s s . " 'Although
~~
young at the time, Mark
Rolfinan remembered the violence of the strike in 1933. "A lot of innocent people got
hurt. You know, brick throwing. . . all that. And it was really bad, you know what I
mean? [People] were really scared. It was terrible."142
As the violence escalated, the Citizens' Committee and the mayors from
Lynn, Salem, and Peabody got together with leather manufacturers and strikers to see
if some progress could be made in settling the strike. In presenting their case to the
Citizens' Committee and the manufacturers, the strikers insisted on union recognition
which, they felt, would ensure them a better quality of life.
We are not anarchists or Reds, but American citizens. We want a fair
wage. This is serious business, gentlemen. We didn't have anything to
lose because we had nothing. We are not trying to step on you; we
only want protection. Look at it in the light of fair businessmen. We're
all human. We are not asking you to be unfair just look at it
sensibly.143
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Prefacing their statement to the group with the notion that they were not anarchists or
Reds was necessary. Throughout the 1920s big business and the government had
successfidly managed to stifle the trade union movement by labeling all union
'~~
Peabody leather workers wanted there to be no
members as ~ o m m u n i s t s .Striking
doubt about their political allegiance. They were not Reds; they were U S . citizens
who wanted a fair share of the political, social, and economic pie that characterized
the American democratic system.
Before this committee of Peabody citizens, leather workers provided graphic
details of their past experiences with the manufacturers. A female leather worker,
Mrs. Morris, described "working under unbearable conditions eight hours and forty
minutes a day for $7.20 a week, handling heavy skins while breathing acid fumes. 'I
was told if I didn't like it, there were plenty outside begging jobs for only $5 a
week.'"14' Lynn's mayor, J. Fred Manning, added credence to Morris's tale by
relating how two babies had died soon after childbirth because their mothers had
toiled in the tanneries in sweatshop conditions until the day they gave birth. Other
workers related instances of verbal abuse and greed. Edward Howe described a
tannery owner who referred to his workers like animals:
There was a guy in Salem. He was a bad man. He referred to the
workers in the shop one time at a negotiations like cattle. He said that
they were nothing but steerheads. But they were all good people . . . . I
lost respect for that man after that. And he lived in Topsfield. He
owned a beautifid home. Had a place down in Florida. He made a lot
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of money. But he wouldn't want to advance any of that to help some
of his people that worked there.146

In reply to these allegations of inhumane treatment and verbal abuse, the
manufacturers argued that they were unaware such conditions existed. Whether the
manufacturers knew about such situations or not is unknown, but Manning, a longtime supporter of labor, decided to show hls solidarity with the striking workers.
Criticizing the manufacturers' for their lack of controlling workplace safety, Manning
cited the necessity of union recognition.
The manufacturers have not given us any evidence as to their ability to
control the continuance of such evils. . . .What guarantee can they give
the workers when they go back? Gentlemen, I don't think you can give
this guarantee and until you can show otherwise, what right have you
to deny these workers protection through recognition of the union.147
When city officials take such a strong position on an issue, other important groups
usually begin to take sides as well. This was the case with the strike of 1933.
The Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News, a publication that detailed
conditions in the leather industry, followed the strike closely. This publication tried to
remain neutral in its reporting but agreed that it was an open question as to "whether
the welfare of leather workers, to say nothing of the welfare of tanners, can be safely
entrusted to the present leaders" of the leather industry.148Saying that it did not want
to "analyze the rights and wrongs of the situation in Peabody. . .[because a
controversy like this] is such an intimate and personal thing between employers and
employees that outside opinions frequently fail to grasp important factors of the
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situation," the Weekly Bulletin said that a squabble about wage hikes would have been
easier to solve. The volatile issue of union recognition put both sides into a

talem mate.'^^
This stalemate, however, could not last indefinitely. After the meeting with
the Citizens' Committee and the mayors, the manufacturers realized that the tide had
turned against them. What had seemed like "a hopeless entanglement" to most
residents of Peabody only days earlier "ended just as suddenly as it started."'50
Thirty-two leather shops and workers, represented by William B. Mahan,
signed a formal agreement on Wednesday, May 3, 1933, almost six weeks after the
start of the strike. The signing of this agreement validated a new union in Peabodythe National Leather Workers' ~ s s o c i a t i o n . Recognized
'~~
by all Peabody leather
factories except the three A.C. Lawrence plants, which had an injunction against the
leaders and organizers, this union agreed to eliminate its association with the Lynn
shoe workers. Peabody tannery owners felt that the Northshore leather industry would
be less volatile if the two groups of workers did not form an alliance. Although the
strike was over, some factory owners questioned the "fairness and the intelligence
behind a movement that is permitted to hit the manufacturer who had tried to be fair
with his crew just as hard as it hit the manufacturer who had exploited his crew."
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Strike leaders, however, reiterated the necessity of "one hundred percent backing by
all leather workers" in all f a c t o r i e ~ . ' ~ ~
Because of the concerted effort demonstrated by all workers in Peabody,
industry experts characterized the strike as having a revolutionary effect on the
leather industry. The tannery owners were still allowed to run open shops and hire
and fire workers without union interference, but owners were not allowed to
discriminate against union workers and preference was to be given to union members
in filling jobs. In regards to pay, workers getting less than the minimum wage
schedule filed with the State Board of Arbitration were given the higher salary. In
cases where the tanneries had been paying more than these minimum wage schedules,
the older, higher rates remained. In any wage disputes, the State Board of Arbitration
would be the final arbiter. Owners, workers, and the public agreed that the minimum
wage schedule would iron out the injustices of sub-standard shops.'53
After winning the strike, workers felt a sense of relief. In holding fast until the
manufacturers gave them union recognition, workers ensured their viability and
security. In terms of union recognition, Local 2 1 was ahead of the union movement
nationally. It was not until 1937 that there were twice as many strikes over union
recognition instead of merely wages or hours.lS4
Peabody's radicalism in ternls of striking and pushing for union recognition
can be attributed to three factors: a shift in national sentiment for the working person;
a belief that workers needed to put aside differences for the common good; and strong
"Leather Shops Fornu1 Agreement Are Back," Salem Evening News, May 4 , 1933, p. 1.
"The Leather Workers' Stnke Settled," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 38 (May 6 ,
1933): 50.
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leadership that capitalized on the conditions provided by the Great Depression, New
Deal legislation and public sentiment. Peabody leather workers had been silent and
unorganized for too long. Years of relying on the manufacturers to treat them fairly in
terms of wages and working conditions only to be sorely disappointed had galvanized
the working class in this Northshore community. Peabody's leather workers realized
they would need to work together to better their working and living conditions. The
victory in 1933, coupled with the backing of Section 7 (a) of the NIRA, gave the
fledgling union movement in Peabody the impetus it needed to organize all the New
England leather workers. Afier the strike in 1933, Ed Hall, another former leather
employee commented, "It seems that we were whippin' them [the manufacturers].
Without hittin' them with our hands. Whippin' 'em. With the idea that we are human.
We gotta live."'55
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CHAPTER TWO:
Strength and Unity: The Early Days of Local 21
Every historical moment contains elements of both continuity and
change. . . .But there are some time periods so marked by rupture and
upheaval that human nature itself can appear to be changing.
Traditional ways of loving, playing, or worshipping can seem
suddenly outmoded, while familiar sites like the city street, the factory
floor, or the motion picture theatre can percolate with an unfamiliar
sense of possibility. What might have seemed inlpossible yesterday
became possible today; what might have appeared inevitable and
necessary yesterday becomes intolerable and unacceptable today.'
This quote effectively characterizes life in Peabody, Massachusetts, directly
after the strike of 1933 and throughout the thirties. The six-week shutdown of the
tannery industry proved to the manufacturers that the leather workers could organize
and rally around a common ideal. The strike also proved to the workers that to some
degree they could control their work lives.* From this point on, life in the factory and
the community would be different for the leather workers of Peabody. The fomlation
of the National Leather Workers Association, however, did not mean that the future
would be "rosy and bright" for the tannery

worker^.^ Recognition of the union

provided Peabody's working class with a place to begin their struggle for a more
democratic future. This struggle would assume various forms throughout the next
three decades, but it was in those early days after the strike that the foundation for this
working class movement ~olidified.~
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Historian Elaine Tyler May characterized the thirties "as a time not only of
misery, but of tremendous energy and radicalism. Populism, union organizing, and
reform movements of all kinds flo~rished."~
It was a time during which previously
Unlike the
held convictions about the ability of labor to organize were ~hattered.~
1920s, which reflected "an unlimited faith in American industry," the thirties gave the
working person hope that workplace and societal refonn was possible. "Protection of
the right to organize was written into the statutes. . . [and] collective bargaining was
declared to be national policy."7 Although workers did not have "absolute job
security," employers had to abide by a national code of fair c o n d ~ c t . ~
But to be effective in the thirties, a union had to respond to the local, state,
and national situation and to adjust to the different circumstances confronting it.
Local 2 1 met the challenges of the thirties with confidence and strength. Because of
its perseverance and leadership in its formative years as a solidarity union, this
organization of leather workers prepared itself well for the future. Understanding its
early history provides a basis to evaluate the choices the union made later.
The NLWA, the leather industry, and the community of Peabody were not
immune to the national labor and economic strife of the depression years. Within a
year after its formation, Local 2 1 experienced tannery owner resistance during the
5
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first round of wage negotiations. Manufacturers asserted that they could not afford the
union's demand for a twenty-five percent wage increase and a closed shop in thirtynine Peabody plants. In response 6,000 leather workers in Peabody, Salem, Danvers,
Woburn, and Lynn went out on strike for the second time.9 NLWA business manager
Charles Chamouris, a former Peabody leather worker, "asked that everyone appear on
the picket line . . .and be as peaceful as they could, so that they hold up the reputation
which the union has attained during the past year." Although not seeking violence,
the NLWA wanted its demands met. To show solidarity with the workers, union
officials said they would "draw no pay during the duration of the strike.'"' This
action on the part of union leadership epitomized the essence of solidarity unionismhorizontal decision-making and egalitarian thinking.
During the early days of the NLWA, hierarchies of power did not exist; or at
least, leaders of this leather workers' union tried to alleviate any type of blatant
division of people by doing away with a hierarchy dictating that union leaders did not
do the same work as both the skilled and unskilled rank and file. This effort got at the
heart of solidarity unionism. Of course, hierarchies existed within community-based
unions, but they were not as pronounced or obvious as in the business unionism
usually associated with affiliates of the AFL or CIO, which functioned as hierarchical
bureaucracies.ll In addition, this early strike indicated defiance on the part of the new
union as a whole; at this stage in its history, the NLWA's membership knew that it
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could not afford to cower in the face of the manufacturers' aggression. Its decision to
hold fast to its position was not mandated by a force outside of Peabody. Instead, it
was a locally decided initiative.
While newspapers chose not to cover the community's reaction to the 1934
strike, Peabody City Council records show that the political leaders of Peabody did
respond to the labor situation.I2At its April 1934 meeting, the Peabody City Council
voted to "request the Massachusetts Leather Manufacturers Association sign a
working agreement with the National Leather Workers Association" to avert further
labor trouble.13The Massachusetts Leather Manufacturers Association, which opened
its headquarters in Peabody in June 1933, to promote the welfare of its members in all
phases of industry, consisted of a voluntary unincorporated association of thirty-five
tannery owners located in Peabody, Danvers, Salem, Lynn, and woburn.l4 The goal
of a manufacturers association was to aid businesspeople engaged in a particular
industry; traditionally, manufacturers associations were easier to organize than
unions:
They are simpler to organize than labor unions because, compared to the
workers, the number of individuals functioning in the role of merchantmanufacturer is small. Their specific purpose is to enable the executives thus
organized to deal more adequately with the problems involved in relating the
factories to the larger world, e.g., problen~sof vertical extension; and to
protect themselves as a group against other horizontal associations organized
in the interests of other groups.'5

None of the local newspapers mentioned this 1934 strike.
Peabody City Council Meeting Minutes, April 26, 1934, Book 4, p. 355.
l4 "Peabody Paragraphs," Salem Evening News, June 30, 1933. Future references to the Massachusetts
Leather Manufacturers Association will be made using either the Manufacturers Association or just the
Association.
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Given that the Manufacturers Association organized itself in less than a month's time
after the ending of the six-week strike in 1933, it probably formed with the sole
purpose of protecting the Northshore leather manufacturers from the newly formed
union. For approximately a hundred years the Massachusetts leather industry operated
without an official organization binding it together. Once the workers, with the
government's backing, established what looked like a viable organization, the tannery
owners took action. The tannery owners knew that the political and social atmosphere
had shifted. The government and the larger cornrnunity-city officials, some business
owners, a variety of church officials, and other industrial rank and filers-now
supported unions. In order to retain some measure of control, industry leaders realized
they would need to be proactive.
The newly formed Manufacturers Association, however, did not prove
successhl in its first fight against the NLWA. By the first week in May 1934, the
tanners gave in to the union grievances and ended the first strike of the fledgling
union. Industry publications called it a "decided victory for the union."I6 The
Manufacturers Association did not suffer its first loss well. Throughout the next thirty
years, the leather workers' union and the Manufacturers Association would be at
loggerheads, and the Association would perpetually vilify and blame the union for
every calamity facing the leather industry.I7
Although the NLWA faced an antagonistic industry and a bleak national
economic situation, it did not modify its early organizing efforts. The NLWA's
16
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actions in these formative years were characterized not only by a desire to better the
plight of all industrial workers in Peabody, but an unwillingness to concede to tannery
owners' wishes. Both goals dictated Local 21's actions throughout the thirties. When
the 1,500 members-both

male and female--of the Independent Sheet Workers'

Union went on strike at Pequot Mills, which had plants in both Salem and Peabody,
the NLWA was quick to offer its "entire treasury of $150,000" to aid the strikers in
canying "the strike to a successful conclusion." Joe Massidda, the NLWA organizer,
said he would "personally join the sheet workers' picket lines today and lead the fight
to tie up all activities at the Pequot plant."'s Massidda's offer to march on the picket
line reinforced a sense of camaraderie and equality among all industrial workers. This
was not the only instance of leather workers offering assistance to other industrial
workers in the city.
When the Northshore area coal truck drivers went on strike in the summer of
1935, tannery operators felt nervous because "leather workers are disturbed over
vehicles operated by strikebreakers delivering fuel to the shops" in Peabody. Tensions
were at such a high point that tannery owners feared a sympathy strike at some of the
leather plants.'9 The tanneries used coal to operate their plants, and many tannery
owners were "fearful of accepting the coal lest the workers there, strongly organized,
walked out as they threatened to do if coal was brought to the factory by

strikebreaker^."^^ Because leather workers refused to work in plants that used coal
18
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transported by strikebreakers, four of the major tanneries in Peabody planned to close
their factories because they had almost run out of coal; these tannery owners had
decided not to test the extent of leather workers' loyalty to the coal truck drivers.
Fortunately, the controversy in the coal industry resolved itself before the four
Peabody leather plants found it necessary to close their doors and displace roughly
1,200 leather

worker^.^' Knowing that so many jobs were at stake, Peabody leather

workers still chose not to allow coal trucks to deliver to their places of employment
using scab labor. This show of unity for other industrial workers during an especially
weak economic time was emblematic of solidarity unionism. In promising to sacrifice
the needs of their own families for the greater good, the newly unionized leather
workers demonstrated their commitment to raising the standards of living for all
members of the community.
This ideal of community solidarity surfaced repeatedly throughout the middle
years of the New Deal decade--even as the econonlic downturn of the leather
industry tested the fledgling union on a multitude of other fronts. Maintaining this
intensity, however, became increasingly difficult for the NLWA as the Manufacturers
Association worked to further its aims. The strife between the two became especially
apparent early in the 1936 wage negotiations.
The 1936 wage negotiations between the union and the Association reflected
the intensity of the times. Representatives from the National Leather Workers
Association asked for a "cost of living increase in their wages to account for the 30

"Coal Strike Settlement Prevents Shut-down of Peabody Tanneries,"Peabody Enterprise, August
30, 1935.

percent rise in the cost of food during the past two years." In response to this wage
request, the Manufacturers Association said "the tanning industry is in a serious
plight in Massachusetts and unrosy for the immediate future." After determining that
in 1934 Massachusetts' tanneries operated at "a serious net loss," the Association said
"the two sides of the operating question are out of balance, and from the present
indications there is little hope that a change in general conditions will help the
industry materially."22The Manufacturers Association predicted that the situation in
the tanning industry was so dire that the demands placed on it by the NLWA could
"drive it out of the ~ o m m o n w e a l t h . " ~ ~
The manufacturers' statements contained some relevant points. The situation
in the leather industry as a whole was discouraging; in fact, national industry leaders
questioned whether the leather trade had lost "its capacity to earn legitimate profits on
its invested capital."24 At its annual meeting in 1936, the Tanners' Council of
America concluded that since 1920 the leather industry as a whole had experienced
enormous losses on the products it produced. The Council attributed this loss to the
cost of modem equipment, rising labor costs, and fluctuating hide prices.25The higher
cost of doing business in the leather industry had resulted in fewer tanneries and
leather establishments doing business in the United States: 4,285 establishments in

"Massachusetts Tanners Assert Higher Wages Ruinous," Hide and Leather, April 6, 1935. See also
"Leather Workers Wage Arbitration," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 40 (April 6, 1935): 7.
" "Tanning Industry in Massachusetts Facing a Crisis That May Drive it Out," Salem Evening News,
March 23, 1935; "German Leather Sold Cheap Here," Boston Herald, April 16, 1935.
24
Percival E. Foerderer, Address to the Board of Director's Tanners ' Council of America (White
Sulphur Springs, NY: Tanners' Council of America, May 7", 1936), 1.
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Ibid, 1-4.
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1929 to only 3,249 in 1 9 3 7 . Although
~~
these numbers do not necessarily reflect a
smaller amount of leather being processed, they do indicate that fewer overall leather
establishments actually did the work, and that the tannery industry engaged fewer
workers. Between 1935 and 1937 the leather industry lost 200 tannery workers;
wages increased in the same period by $5,594,904.~' The average leather worker saw
hisher average hourly earnings increase by about nine cents between 1929 and
1 9 3 7 . But
~ ~ monetary increases were not enough to keep pace with inflation. Between
1933 and 1934, for example, U.S. consumers experienced a rise in commodity prices
as the index of wholesale prices went up 18 percent, and farm prices rose more than
50 percent.29
The New England area experienced the decline in the leather industry more
than other regions of the country. In the 1920s New England "dominated the shoe and
leather business with ninety percent of the country's total." In 1939 New England
"makes only thirty-seven percent of the nation's shoes and a smaller proportion of its
leather." According to the New England Shoe and Leather Association, the decline
could be traced to:
A lack of aggression on the part of the New England manufacturers, and the
fact that those in other sections have stressed merchandising more than
shoemaking. [The Association] also charged that in the past, New England

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Manufacturers 1954
Volume 11 Industry Statistics (Washington: United States Government Printing Office), 3 1-1.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Biennial Census of Manufacturers 1937 Part
I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 790.
"Wages and Hours in the Tanning Industry," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 43
(February 12, 1938): 2 1 .
29 "Living Costs Continued to Rise in 1934," Salem Evening News, January 15, 1935; "Wholesale
Level 63 Percent Up from 1933 Low," Peabody Enterprise, January 1935.
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civic authorities and bankers displayed a lukewarm interest in the industry as
compared with that received by competing section^.^'
Specifically, in the Peabody area fourteen side, calf and split plants, and ten sheepskin
tanneries had suffered serious losses in 1934. According to a local accountant, the
fourteen side, calf and split plants felt a "net loss of $368,807.81 resulting in
percentage loss of 4.02 . . . . For every dollar of sales made during the year,
[manufacturers] not only did not make any profit, but impaired the capital of the
organization to the extent of four cents for every dollar of sales."31 According to Nat
Tanzer, a former Peabody tannery owner, this type of financial situation was not
unusual. "For years," he said, "[the leather industry] went from catastrophe to
calamity and back because lots of people flew by the seat of their pants."32
Thus, the leather workers and manufacturers felt dissatisfied, and this
dissatisfaction emerged during the 1936 wage negotiations. Because the two sides
could not work out their differences over a new contract, the controversy went before
the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. The manufacturers contended the east
coast leather market tightened because so much of the shoe business "on which the
leather trade leans heavily" had migrated to the west.
It cannot be denied that the domestic raw skin market at the present time is
closer to the western tanner thereby creating a savings to him in freight costs
and an acceleration in raw stock deliveries which thereby allow prompt
shipments of finished product to nearby customers. . . . In the face of existing
conditions, with a number of tanneries now operating at a loss, the
manufacturers contend that any wage increase would so hamper them as to
bring about a serious curtailment of production due to the inability to meet
30 "Plan Campaign to Promote New England Shoes and Leather," Hide and Leather and Shoes 97
(April 1, 1939): 6.
3' L L M a s s a ~ h ~
Tanners
~ e t t ~ Assert Higher Wages Ruinous," Hide and Leather, April 6, 1935.
32 Transcripts fiom Leather Soul, April 21-23, 1989 and April 27-30, 1989 around the city of Peabody,
Interview with Nat Tanzer, 8.

competition from low-wage states, which would be reflected in the loss of
Unemployment had already reached the city of Peabody. High numbers of
Peabodyites seeking money from the relief rolls in 1935 had severely exhausted the
city's welfare f i u ~ d sAnd
. ~ ~by 1938, out of a total of 3500 union members, only 1200
were working in the leather industry; the rest were unemployed.35 .
Recognizing the difficult circumstances that existed, the Peabody City
Council approved a resolution advocating that tanneries should hire from the ranks of
Peabody residents first before filling positions with workers from out of town. The
City Council acknowledged that "if the tanners favored Peabody men, this city could
save $40,000 in welfare each year, and . . . would reduce the tax rate $2 per
thousand."36 At the February 14, 1935 City Council meeting, Peabody mayor James

E. McVann said that Mr. Roberts, secretary of the Leather Manufacturers
Association, was ready to cooperate with the council "in placing unemployed men in
the leather fa~tories."~'
Calling this move by the City Council "a long awaited break," the Peabody

Times,a local daily newspaper, said that this initiative could assist employees trylng
to get into the A.C. Lawrence Leather Company, "the most privileged factory in this
country." A.C. Lawrence, which hired only about eighteen percent of its employees

33 "Tanning Industry in Massachusetts Facing a Crisis That May Drive it Out," Salem Evening News,
March 23, 1935. For more infonmtion see " G e m ~ nLeather Sold Cheap Here," Boston Herald, April
16, 1935.
34 "500 in Riot at Peabody," Boston Herald, August 15, 1935,2.
35
"Tanners, Union Act to Save Industry," Lynn Telegram, July 17, 1938. Unemployed union members
still retained their union representation as long as they paid their dues.
36 "Putting Peabody Men to Work," Salem Evening News, May 12,1933.
37 Peabody City Council Meeting Minutes, February 14, 1935, Book 4.

from Peabody, offered its employees benefits found nowhere else in the leather
industry-pension

plans, on-site medical attention, employee safety contests, good

idea bonuses, annual company picnics, e t ~At. the
~ ~height of the Depression, A.C.
Lawrence was the first Peabody plant-and
industry-to

the first large tannery in the whole

give its employees vacation time.39(Paid vacation, however, was a

standard benefit for other industries in the thirties. According to a study conducted in
early 1935 by the National Industrial Conference Board, companies that offered paid
vacations prior to the Depression, maintained this benefit throughout the
~e~ression.)~'
In addition to offering paid vacation, A.C. Lawrence also raised wages for
hourly employees between eight percent and ten and a half percent in 1937.~'A.C.
Lawrence could offer its employees benefits during the darkest days of the
Depression because, in part, it was a national company, with diversified holdings in
many different parts of the leather and meat business.42In addition, the A.C.
Lawrence Company, from early on in its history, made a commitment to maintain a
modem facility. By operating in a more efficient manner the company managed to
38
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eke out a more favorable existence than the majority of other tanneries. A.C.
Lawrence's generous advances also assured the company that its employees and the
company union-the

A.C. L. Employees' Assembly-were

satisfied.43A.C.

Lawrence did not want its workforce to become members of the NLWA; thus, by
staying ahead of the demands issued by the NLWA, the major leather concern hoped
to prevent internal unrest.44
Because the employee benefits provided at A.C. Lawrence were better than
any other tannery in Peabody, some community representatives felt that these
employee concessions should be the norm rather than the exception. The Boston
archdiocese was vocal in its condemnation of employer greed and stressed the need to
treat the working person in a more humane manner. In the weekly Sunday radio
broadcast aired over an assortment of local stations, various Catholic officials
preached about the need to better the economic and social plight of the working class.
For instance, the Reverend Jones Corrigan used one Sunday monling radio hour to
discuss the necessity of the government to step in, as it did with the NRA, to curb the
"fundamental defect of the old order of industry4ut-throat competition leading to
demoralizing exploitation" of the worker.4sCorrigan believed that by eliminating
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unjust working conditions-sweatshop

labor and unfair wages-industry,

as a whole,

would be stabilized and competition would be ~ o n t r o l l e d . ~ ~
The leather union shared Corrigan's sentiments. At its fifth convention in
1938, the NLWA went on record in favor of establishing a Uniform National
Contract, which would standardize wages and conditions throughout the U.S. leather
industry.47Some of the Peabody leather manufacturers agreed with this proposal.
Two leather concerns on Foster Street confessed that "without this union [NLWA]
operating they would have folded up their tents in 1933, but now that the union has
stabilized factory conditions they can get decent prices for their leather, make a fair
profit, thereby having a reason to continue in business.'A8By paying leather workers
a uniform union wage throughout the Northshore, no one tannery could undercut
another tannery. The New England Regional Planning Commission, composed of the
heads of the six New England Planning Boards, recognized in a 1939 report that labor
in New England "has brought about better working conditions in the country as a
whole, [and] reflects the intelligent organization of skilled workmen under good
l e a d e r ~ h i ~ .Unfortunately,
"~
most leather concerns in the community blamed the
union for the troubles in the industry.

-

-

-
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Church leaders in the Boston archdiocese, however, had a response to the
critical comments of factory owners. Using the airwaves church officials claimed the
Depression resulted from the greed of the businessperson:
Is not the present depression a retribution for the violation of law? Does not
the industrialist find his factory temporarily closed? . . . Retribution is here,
and how long it will remain depends on how soon the irreligion of greed and
exploitation can be replaced by the religion of justice and charity.50
On a national level, the Methodist Church represented by the Methodist Federation
for Social Service advocated labor's right to organize. In supporting the Wagner Act,
the Methodist Church criticized the "open-shop forces that fought the enactment [of
the Wagner Act] and tried desperately to block appropriations for its enf~rcement."~'
Church leaders were not the only ones blaming tannery leaders for having a narrow,
short-sighted view of labor.

In the industry publication, Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News,
manufacturers found a variety of viewpoints about labor and what should be done
about labor turmoil. In the late thirties many of the articles discussed treating labor in
a more humane manner.52In one such editorial a tannery owner spoke to his
colleagues about the drastic changes taking place on the labor front.
The standard of living has reached its present level as the result of the
evolution of thought, the result of experience and the result of competition and
compromises of conflicting forces based upon the inherent and innate quality
of selfishness in human nature. [This leather manufacturer championed the]
evolution of the far-sighted business executives, who know the econon~icsof
business life, who realize and know that their income will be more stable and
their accumulated wealth more secure by a just division of and an ever
'O
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increasing percentage of profits with their employees, which thereby creates
and insures a wider, better, and sounder market for their products alleviating
violent fluctuations and depression and at the same time increases and makes
more secure the standard of living of the masses by their increased mass
purchasing power.53
In reminiscing about life as a tannery owner back in the thirties, a Fulton County,

New York tannery owner commented that many leather factory owners were ill
equipped to be good employers when dealing with labor issues. He described midtwentieth century leather leaders as ignorant of management skills:
These tanners basically were fellows with very little backgrounds,
educationally and otherwise. Anybody running a tannery of-let's say-fifty
people, was probably somebody who came up through the tannery someplace.
And here this whole labor relations thing was a new problem that came up
during his lifetime. They weren't very well suited to deal with a lot of these
things.54
Some tannery owners certainly were greedy and cared little about the conditions of
working people; many others were inexperienced managers. But leaders in the leather
industry knew that if the industry were going to survive and thrive in the future, it
needed to start recognizing the needs of the workforce.
The majority of Peabody tannery owners did not exhibit the virtues of
enlightened businessleaders. According to editorials in the Weekly Bulletin of Leather
and Shoe News and radio sermons sponsored by the Boston archdiocese, enlightened

owners and operators would provide a livable family wage and protection against
sickness, unemployment, infirmity, and old age." Many Peabody leather
manufacturers, however, said that industry conditions did not allow for higher wages
53 "A Tanner Spoke to his Community as Follows," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 43
(April 30, 1938): 22.
54 Gerald Zahavi, "'Communism is No Bug-A-Boo': Communism and Left-Wing Unionism in Fulton
County, New York, 1933-1950,"Labor History 33: 180.
55 "Radio Address on Church and Laborer Given," The Pilot 104 (September 9, 1933): 6.
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or any type of employee benefits, such as vacation pay. The archdiocese countered
this argument by saying that if employers and employees worked together all
individuals would benefit.56
The union recognized that it would prosper not simply by berating the
manufacturers about low wages, but by aiding in the prosperity of the leather industry
as a whole. The leaders of Peabody understood this as well. Inherent in the leather
business was its history "of uneven, spotty profits." These spotty profits were the
result of a four-fold risk facing every tanner: hlde and skin market fluctuations, a time
lag between purchase of raw material and sale of finished leather, variation in demand
fiom users of finished leather, and credit risks.57While the leather union and
Peabody's leadership could not fix all that was wrong with the leather business, they
could make inroads in specific areas.
One industry-wide problem that labor and community leaders addressed was
the importation of foreign skins. These skins were being sold on the market at "seven
cents a foot less than the Massachusetts tannery can afford to sell [them]."58 The
Peabody City Council officially favored the exclusion of foreign made goods and the
consumption of only U.S.-made products. The Council, with community support,
explained that "there is much agitation for backing up New England industries in
their fight against foreign competition" and initiated a Buy American campaign.
Throughout Northshore communities, leaders of the campaign formed conunittees to
orchestrate their activities. To assist with this endeavor, the National Leather Workers
56 "Recovery of the National the Subject of Boston Radio Talk Last Sunday," The Pilot 104 (October
21, 1933): 6.
" L L P r ~i
fni tLeather,"
~
Weekly Bulletin Leather and Shoe News 40 (August 10,1935): 4.
"Gernxin Leather Sold Cheap Here," Boston Herald, April 16,1935.

Association organized other labor and civic organizations "in a drive to keep cheap
foreign made goods from this country." Principally aimed at the invasion of
inexpensive Japanese goods, the leather workers also stressed the need to be
concerned with the importation of German-made leather."
The Buy American campaign experienced in Peabody was neither a local nor
regional phenomenon, nor a modem one. Such actions had their roots in colonial
times. As historian Dana Frank found, this movement "has been inextricably
interwoven with fears of alleged economic infiltration" by various other nationalities
and has been a means of individuals exercising "democratic control of their nation
and their economic lives."60 This democratic initiative received presidential support
when President Herbert C. Hoover signed the Buy American Act of 1933 right before
he left ~ f f i c e .For
~ ' Peabodyites, participating in the Buy American campaign
accomplished two goals: By supporting a nationalistic movement like this, individual
community members felt that they were doing something to help their community and
the larger country. At the same time, business leaders had a legitimate answer as to
whom they could blame for the economic woes and the problems in the leather

industry- foreigner^.^^ Local 21 supported the Buy American campaign and urged its
members to only buy union-made goods, as well.
In response to the Buy American campaign, a group of state representatives,

mayors of various Northshore communities, businesspeople, and Chamber of
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Commerce representatives founded the North Shore Industries Protective
Association. "Developed to protect Northshore industries from overseas imports, . . .
this organization is protesting the [government imposed] processing tax on textiles
and urging greater protection of Massachusetts industries against all foreign
importations."63 Although Local 21 was not represented, it supported the objective of
the Protective Association: saving the industrial base of the community.
Understanding that Peabody was a one-industry city and that this industry was
highly volatile, a committee of businesspeople and Peabody Chamber of Commerce
representatives joined together in 1935 to attract new industries into the area. While
the Buy American campaign and the North Shore Industries Protective Association
were designed to aid industry, the objective of this new initiative was to provide work
for Peabodyites and increase the revenue of the city by attracting new businesses. The
first meeting of this new group, however, proved that attracting new business
endeavors to the Leather City would be an uphill battle. Not only did Peabody have a
high tax rate, but the majority of the vacant and operational factory buildings waiting
for new owners were in poor condition. In many cases manufacturers failed to make
repairs because they either feared their tax evaluations would increase or they were
leery about local economic

condition^.^^ The committee also found that various cities

and towns in northern and southern states offered much better incentives-ten
of free taxes, cheap water and electric rates, and no unions-to

years

attract manufacturers

L L Frame
T ~ Resolutions Sunday in Peabody on 'Buy American' Drive," Salem Evening News, April
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~men
Salem Evening News, October 25, 1935.

and other busine~ses.~'
The committee agreed that the labor controversy did not help
attract new business; committee members feared that the Northshore area had
developed a reputation outside of New England as a "hot-bed for labor

trouble^."^^

It is difficult to assess to what degree the leather union turmoil affected the
overall health of Peabody's industrial sector. It is also challenging to determine how
industrial problems affected the flight of tanneries out of Peabody. Discordant
relations between labor and management did negatively affect tannery prospects.
Manufacturers used the contentious relationship with labor to further their objectives
of trymg to squelch the union movement. In an editorial that appeared in the local
newspaper in 1936 one person, who characterized himself as an average citizen,
taxpayer, and merchant, said that "the present labor disorder in Peabody is just one
more barrier to prevent manufacturers and industrialists from coming to Peabody and
operating a factory giving employment to our unfortunate jobless." Citing the
situation in Lynn "where industrial turmoil forced over 100 manufacturers to leave
the city and re-locate their factories elsewhere," this community member warned that
if labor and management could not come to a peaceful resolution, Peabody would
become another industrial ghost town. Echoing the tannery owners' sentiments, the
writer also acknowledged that the yearly labor strife had already harmed the city's
industrial potential.

In Peabody, it is beginning to pinch. At a recent leather show when a
prospective manufacturer talked of locating here, immediately he is
confronted with a brief of our industrial history. Yearly riots, strikes and
disorders kill his ambition to come to the once World's Largest Leather City,
-

65 "Peabody Mentioned in West as Being Near State Control," Peabody Enterprise, September 8 , 1939,
p. 1 .
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and all of Peabody takes a defeat. Those manufacturers who have cooperated
with the local union are now beginning to feel the sentiments. They are not
getting the orders as in fom~eryears because of the fact that the retail buyers
doubt the ability of Peabody firms to fill large orders without interference or
delays. On the same token, large financial institutions will hesitate when
issuing letters of credit to Peabody firms because our industrial history holds a
threatening cloud over us. . . .In the name of every leather worker, citizen,
taxpayer, merchant, and manufacturer, let industrial peace be restored so that
the nation at large will reverse their judgment about our city and help bring
prosperity back to our people.67
Whether this community member was a tannery operator is unknown. But what is
clear is that by the middle part of the 1930s wage negotiations were creating tensions
among manufacturers, workers, and community leaders.
For instance, wage negotiations for 1936 started in the spring of 1935 and
concluded only in January of 1936. While a strike was averted, the community
viewed the months-long talks with trepidation. In the end neither labor nor the
manufacturers achieved all their demands. Both sides made concessions. Instead of a
twenty percent wage increase, workers received "a wage increase of seven and a half
percent for day employees and five percent for piece workers, in addition to seniority
with competency." Workers did not win the closed shop concession; instead, the
manufacturers agreed to continue the three-week union clause already in existence.68
While Local 21 did not have the closed shop provision, since 1933, manufacturers
had supported an arrangement that every leather worker had to become a union
member after three weeks of employment. "This virtually means a closed shop
insofar as new employees are concerned." The problem with this arrangement was
that the "workers who were employed at the time the provisions was agreed to were
-
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not required to become union members, but could, however, join the union on their
own volition." This clause meant that Local 21 did not have full union membership.69
Local 2 1 also suffered because the 1933 agreement put unemployed leather workers
at a disadvantage when employment opportunities opened at a tannery. "The
manufacturers are fiequently prejudiced to workers who have membership in the
unions and for that reason total strangers to the leather trade are hired, while loyal
union members with long years of experience in making leather are forced to walk the
street~."~'
As if both sides wanted to show that they would not be intimidated by the
1936 wage controversy, the 1937 wage negotiations were filled with even more

acrimony. When the union requested a twenty percent wage increase, observers
assumed the manufacturers would endorse "a slight wage increase and a strictly
closed shop plan. . . . Hope along this line soon faded, however, when owners of the
various tanneries involved decided they could not agree to the closed shop and that
In addition,
conditions would not warrant any more than a five percent in~rease."~'

manufacturers argued that the members of the NLWA had "greater rights and powers
than are granted to a union in any other industry in the United
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Unlike some of the other wage negotiations, the 1937 contract discussion took
place in the public eye. Previous labor disputes garnered brief news stories and
editorials, but this labor discussion featured paid advertising by each sidemanufacturers and union. It is not clear why the union and the manufacturers decided
at this point to use large testimonial-type advertisements to get their message out to
the public. It could be that the union did not have enough funds during prior labor
negotiations to purchase advertising space or maybe they did not feel there was a
need to convince the larger community about their position. Whatever the rationale,
paid advertising became a common feature of the 1937 wage discussion. Both sides
took out advertisements detailing their positions. During the arbitration, the
manufacturers tried to convey to the community the obstacles confronting the leather
industry. To garner the widest audience, the Manufacturers Association took out an
advertisement in all the local papers-Peabody

Enterprise, Peabody Times, Salem

Evening News, and the Lynn Telegram News-that

said it was just putting forward the

facts for the leather workers. After listing all the overhead costs confronting the
leather manufacturer-machinery, a building, raw stock and other material, taxes, and
wages-the

advertisement said that the tannery owner could not offer any more than

a five percent increase for day workers. The advertisement threatened "Closed
tanneries pay no wages!"73
By the end of December the situation in Peabody had reached a volatile stage.

In addition to advertisements, the Manufacturers Association sponsored a number of

The advertisement appeared in all the local papers. For instance, see the Lynn Telegram, December
17, 1936.

73

news stories detailing the plight of the local leather industry. These news stories
discussed the manufacturers' version of the overall condition of various tanneries in
the city. One article stated how "two large employers of tannery labor within the past
few days have acquired tanneries outside of Massachusetts and may cease all
operations within the commonwealth. This fact, together with the stoppage of
business by ten other manufacturers within the past four years indicates the
seriousness of the situation."74.
The manufacturers also contended that because of the controversy they "have
been losing orders steadily as they have not been in a position to assure their
customers of uninterrupted production. This lack of assurance is throttling the
industry, means loss of employment and threatens to close factories." Besides
focusing on the lack of orders, the Manufacturers Association also attacked the union
and tried to convince the community that the NLWA was not "working in the
interests of the workers in this present emergency." Saying that the NLWA leadership
"misinfornled and misled" those who looked to it for leadership and guidance, the
manufacturers warned that the "short-sightedness of the union leaders at this time in
their desire to control the industry is gradually ruining that industry in this state, and
will eventually destroy the union itself when there are no more workers to pay dues
into its trea~ury."~'The manufacturers assured the public that this was not just idle
talk and said that in the last four years, Peabody had lost ten tanneries.
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One of the last tanneries to leave was the L. M. Hamel Leather Company. In
this particular case it appears that the union was unreasonable with its requests. Soon
after the company opened in Peabody, the NLWA called a strike because the hides in
the Hamel leather concern in Peabody came from the Hamel Company's Haverhill
tannery, which ran an open shop. The Haverhill shop had a devastating flood, and the
owners did not want to lose all their hides. They transported the hides to a leased
Peabody plant, which did employ union labor, to have the skins tanned before they
spoiled. But the NLWA opposed working on the hides because the "Hamel concern
runs an open shop in h aver hill."^^ In refusing to work on the hides, the NLWA left
the company "with a large amount of perishable raw stock on its hands." To get the
union to agree to break the strike, the "company was forced into a closed shop
agreement--or accept disastrous loss. But, as soon as the raw stock was finished, the
company closed its plant, never again to reopen in Peabody-and

the [300] workers

were out on the street."77
Editorials and letters to the editor in the local newspaper conveyed community
concern that the union had handled the Hamel Company situation poorly. In one such
letter Peabody resident, Samuel B. Jones, wrote:
One of our neighbors, a leading leather manufacturer, employing several
hundred men, paying good wages to satisfied help suddenly finds himself the
victim of a great disaster and calls on our city for help, which we were glad to
give only to find that when our good offices had brought his stock to a critical
stage, an element in our city suddenly leaped at our throat and as in an attempt
to stop our work and reclaiming his damaged stock and if necessary cause him
a loss of thousands of dollars. . . .It not only reflects to the shame of those who
have been guilty of such savagery, but it brings down disgrace on the name of
76
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Peabody as a city. . . .Are we to understand that this is the thing known as
organized labor at work? . . . If so, one can but wonder how long the decent
and orderly people of our communities will tolerate insults, assaults, and
property damage. . . .One wonders if some of these trouble-makers,
misleaders, and agitators who infest our industrial centers would not make
good subjects to recommend to the federal government as candidates for
deportation as undesirable citizens.78
It is difficult to assess how widespread Jones's feelings were in Peabody. There were
other taxpayers who felt as he did, but still others agreed the union was justified in its
stance toward Hamel Leather.
Regardless of public sentiment, the State Board of Arbitration and
Conciliation stepped in to settle the dispute. The agreement worked out between the
two sides stipulated that the Hamel concern would employ union members at union
wages; the union agreed under these conditions to have its members work on the nonunion hides.79Although the leather union won its stance against working on the nonunion hides produced by the Hamel Company, its stubborn actions in this controversy
created animosity with business leaders and merchants. This ill will created in the
community in 1936 may have led to the NLWA's decision to keep the public
informed of its position-through

paid advertising--during the 1937 wage

negotiations.
Whatever triggered the leather union's decision to publicize its situation in
1937, it seemed to help. Early in January 1937 the NLWA and the Manufacturers
Association sealed an agreement providing a modest wage increase for workers and
recognition of seniority when it was accompanied by competency. While the union

LLDeplore~
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originally requested a twenty percent pay raise, closed shop and a strict seniority
clause, the final agreement still represented a step forward for the union.80The
concessions, however, did not prove to be enough. By August 1937 leather workers
asked for another pay raise of ten percent and two weeks vacation.
Between January and August 1937, however, the NLWA became affiliated
with the CIO. Members of the NLWA, hoping to strengthen their ranks by organizing
more of the unorganized workers, voted for CIO affiliation at their fourth annual
convention in J

U ~ ~ At
. ~ this
'

time the NLWA, which originated in Peabody, had

spread to include six independent locals: Local 20 in Lynn, Local 21 in Peabody,
Local 22 in Woburn, Local 26 in Norwood, Massachusetts; Local 27 in Newark, New
to affiliating with the CIO, the
Jersey; and Local 29 in Girard, ~ h i oIn. addition
~ ~
NLWA adopted the People's Press, a national labor weekly which sponsored two
pages of NLWA activity in every issue, as its official news organization and agreed to
"launch an extensive drive to organize leather workers in factories all over the
country."83 Although no union documentation exists to explain fully why the NLWA
decided to affiliate with John Lewis's CIO, one can assume it was to give Local 21
and the other independent locals more leverage in winning concessions fiom
manufacturers and in organizing more leather workers. In addition, Lewis's visionof creating a more equitable society for all social classes-that

guided the CIO policy

must have appealed to Peabody's rank and file. Lewis saw the CIO and the labor
"Agreement with Leather Workers in Sight," Weekly Bulletin of Leather and Shoe News 42 (January
9, 1937): 25.
81
"N.L.W.Election," Salem Evening News, March 27, 1937; Philip S. Foner, The Fur and Leather
Workers Union (Newark: Nordan Press, 1950), 548.
Foner, The Fur and Leather Workers Union, 545-546.
83
Salem Evening News, May 3, 1937; Peabody Times, April 30, 1937; Boston Herald, May 3, 1937.

movement in general "as the only effective means of stopping the reactionary tide of
unchecked industrial and economic development."s4 In its formative years prior to
World War 11, the CIO represented a unionism that was similar in its basic
characteristics to the community-based unionism of the NLWA. (It was not until the
World War 11years and after that the CIO exhibited more of a conservative, business
unionism stance.)85In those early years, the CIO promised revolutionary changes:
[The CIO] helped cement the idea that all workers had certain rights and
entitlements both on and off the job, regardless of their ethnic origin, skill
level, or income. Unionization [to the CIO] meant higher pay, shorter hours,
pensions, vacations, health insurance, grievance procedures, seniority systems,
and greater job ~ecurity.'~
The newly organized CIO shared the NLWA's philosophy about the potential and
rights of the working person. It also offered the NLWA much needed monetary and
organizational resources. With the backing of this national organization, the NLWA
hoped to reach more unorganized leather workers and intimidate the manufacturers
into complying with union demands. The manufacturers, however, were unimpressed
with the NLWA's new affiliation.
In response to the 1937 summer wage increase request by the NLWA, the

Manufacturers Association reminded the leather workers they had been granted pay
increases at the beginning of the year and were working under a twelve-month
agreement in which they had promised "to make no new demands . . . and not to
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strike." Reiterating the argument they made in 1936, the manufacturers reminded
leather workers that they had the "highest wages in the industry, and best working
conditions. To raise pay and give vacations in view of competitive conditions would
be to make operation impossible." 87 Citing that their ability to grant increases
depended partly upon general conditions in the industry, the manufacturers explained
that market conditions were still unfavorable to the tanners:
Over the past ten years the tanning industry has suffered severe financial
losses, and a recent report by the Federal Trade Commission shows that the
financial losses incurred by a group of tanning companies in any one of
several years were greater than the combined loss suffered by all other groups
of related industries in six years. 88
And the fbture did not offer any brighter prospects for the leather manufacturers in
terms of leather demand, volume or price.
Local 21 did not accept the manufacturers' excuses of hardship. By mutual
agreement, both sides asked the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration to
mediate. After characterizing the situation affecting nearly 10,000 workers in
Peabody, Salem, Lynn, Wobum, Danvers, and other municipalities in the district as
grave, the State Board deemed the union demands as unjustified. The Board said that
"in the midst of the present recession, with slack leather production and with
concessions in pay being voluntarily granted by unions in shoe manufacturing
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centers, the terms offered by the tanners of a renewal of last year's agreement are
generally considered to have been very liberal."89
This wage controversy in the summer of 1937 revealed that Local 21's
affiliation with the CIO did not guarantee success or good relations with the
manufacturers. On the contrary, after ending the wage controversy, acrimony quickly
surfaced again when "members of Local 21 were forbidden, in two shops . . . to read
the People's Press." Because tannery owners did not "like the People's Press, and
[did not] want workers reading it," anger flared on both sides. Disregarding the
manufacturers' opinion, the union continued to distribute the People's Press to
workers in the leather shops.90
All of this controversy began to erode Local 21's support in the community.
This became evident when the NLWA failed to organize the 3,500 workers at the
A.C. Lawrence Leather Company in 1937. Organizing A.C. Lawrence Leather
Company, the only large leather plant in the city without a union agreement (A.C.
Lawrence did have an in-house union called an Employees' Assembly), would have
been a significant achievement for Local 21 .91In trying to attract these A.C.
Lawrence en~ployees,the NLWA distributed handbills to people going into and
leaving the plant and used a sound wagon to broadcast their unionization objectives
all over Peabody. The NLWA even appealed to the Peabody City Council for aid in
educating A.C. Lawrence employees about the benefits of its union. Arguing before
the City Council, the NLWA charged that the leather company, through the ruse of a
89
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construction project, was denying the union access to workers in the plant. The
NLWA requested that Webster Street once again be opened to the public. In its
petition the union said:
As members of the National Leather Workers Association, we know that the
reason why the A.C. Lawrence Leather Company's calfskin plant has shut off
Webster Street is that they do not want the C.I.O. organizers to pass through
Webster Street advertising and enlightening the people as to the oppression
and the drudgery that they undergo under the A.C. Lawrence Company
governed union.g2
The Peabody City Council found the charge credible and ratified the NLWA's
request. Even with this support from the City Council, however, workers at the A.C.
Lawrence plant voted to have their own independent union, called the Independent
Leather Workers Association of Peabody (an outgrowth of the Employees'
Assembly), instead of joining the NLWA. "Of the 1,942 workers voting, 1,574
favored the independent union, 35 1 were opposed and 17 cast blanks."93 The
outpouring of support A.C. Lawrence employees gave to their in-house union
indicates that the NLWA failed in its organizing attempts at this major tannery. A.C.
Lawrence leather workers most likely did not support the NLWA because they
already had more benefits than these unionized leather workers. By supporting the
NLWA they could have lost some of the benefits they enjoyed as A.C. Lawrence
employees. In addition, A.C. Lawrence workers probably wanted to avoid the
ongoing battles between Local 21 and the leather manufacturers.
By 1938 conditions still had not improved for Local 21 or for the Leather
City. "With tanneries continuing to close and those running doing so at less than 50
92 City Council Meeting Minutes, October
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percent capacity, the great majority of Peabody leather workers" remained
unemployed.94When the National Leather Workers Association asked for another
pay increase, manufacturers responded that because of business conditions they could
not afford a ten percent pay increase or two-weeks vacation with pay.95 The leather
manufacturers said they wanted "peace and harmony with their workers but they
cannot accept terms which will seriously interfere with the operation of their tanneries
or will drive them out of business." Characterizing the last year and a half as a
"period of hand to mouth existence for most tanneries," the manufacturers said it had
been difficult not to cut wages.96Manufacturers were not exaggerating the situation.
A report issued by the New England Regional Planning Commission, which was
composed of the heads of six New England State Planning Boards, concluded that
New England was already beginning to experience loss in a few key industries: boots,
shoes, leather, paper, and

textile^.^' It is unclear why the union kept requesting more

money when it knew the industry as a whole was suffering, but two of the most likely
explanations are a rising cost of living and an unwillingness to concede to
management.
Even though the leather industry continued to have trouble nationwide, the
cost of living for its workers still increased. As a fledgling union, the NLWA might
have believed that it could not afford to concede to the manufacturers. While leather
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manufacturers had been unsuccessfil in lowering wages since the NLWA formed,
this action was always a possibility. Local 2 1 wanted to make it clear that "workers
will not consider going back to a $15 a week scale."98 The union also wanted the
leaders of Peabody to realize that wages were only one part of the operating cost for a
leather concern. And even if business was poor, workers still needed to be paid a
livable wage and be treated decently. For Mary Lavato, a former Peabody leather
worker, the union was a worker's only recourse. "If we had a gripe or if we'd think
we weren't getting enough money, we could tell the [shop] steward. . . . You had to
have a union."99 Although Local 2 1 was now affiliated with the CIO, it did not push
for higher wages because of a CIO-initiated mandate. Instead, Local 21 practiced the
same type of solidarity unionism it had adopted back in 1933. The union would not
give up its objectives of bettering the quality of life for the leather worker and hisher
family.
In practicing solidarity unionism, however, Local 2 1 knew it needed to
address the problems leather manufacturers faced in the Peabody community. The
leadership of the NLWA requested the manufacturers and the leaders of Peabody to
come together and explore as a group the problems facing the local and national
leather industry. One Peabody city councilor, Daniel J. Boyle, who was also the
national executive secretary of the NLWA, said that the community needed to find
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new work for those unemployed leather workers."' Civic leaders understood the
depths of the situation:
Fearhl that other leather factories might liquidate and leave more workers
unemployed due to uncertain working conditions, civic leaders . . .declared
that some group should unite to bring in new industries and equally as
important do all within their power to keep industries here.'"
The business community rallied behind this idea. Starting in November 1938 a series
of editorials entitled "Go Forward With Peabody," sponsored by various Peabody
businesses, merchants, civic organizations, and leather manufacturers appeared on a
weekly basis inthe local press; the aim of this series was to build community spirit
and pride. These editorials started at the same time another round of contract
negotiations began between Local 21 and the Manufacturers Association. In all
probability this was not a coincidence. Since the Supreme Court's decision to uphold
the validity of the NLRA in 1935, animosity between manufacturers and labor had
increased across the nation. According to a Peabody attorney hired by the NLWA to
represent it in labor disputes, "manufacturers have adopted the practice of contesting
organizations through legal weapons" and that the number of cases pending before
the labor board was "v~luminous."'~~
The "Go Forward With Peabody" editorials aimed to "better inform the
general citizenry of the need for complete cooperation in our industrial and civic
responsibilities." Hoping to elevate Peabody back to its 1919 status as the World's
Largest Leather City, these editorials tried to instigate a sense of camaraderie among
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Peabodyites. "It is the sincere and unmitigated desire of every citizen, be he a leather
worker, doctor, banker, or merchant, that Peabody factories shall be busy with good
orders, and that the key to security in our community-the

weekly pay envelopes-

shall remain uppermost as our chief object for continued protection."'03
Even without seeing the advertisements framing these editorials, it was
obvious that the Peabody business community sponsored this series. The editorials'
language stressed a spirit of cooperation but constantly harangued labor to remember
its responsibility to the rest of the community:
We have just emerged from a period of uncertainty with our labor situation
which cost the wage-eamers several thousands of dollars in pay envelopes.
The pay envelope certainly adds to the spirit of any man's mind, for where
there is want and suffering, disappointment and doubt, there is little chance of
creating a civic spirit.Io4
These editorials ignored the possible selfishness and greed of the manufacturer and
portrayed the tanner as a victim.
Agitators who are paid to stir up trouble-to throw men out of work, and who
preach a gospel that even they themselves can't understand, must take heed
that Peabody people refbse to countenance any of their activity in this city
again. These fanatical spell binders, who have only a voice and vocabulary,
but no character, principles, or sincerity in their make-up, would have you
believe that every boss should be shot at sunrise. But the intelligent worker
knows that no boss, means no job.'05
Area clergymen mirrored, to some degree, these sentiments and beseeched workers
not to take more than was their fair share.lo6Through The Pilot the Boston
Archdiocese urged working people to push for a livable wage but be reasonable in
their request. The "Go Forward With Peabody" newspaper spots were more emphatic
lo3
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with their requests: these editorials stressed that Peabody would only prosper if
everybody worked together:
Peabody will prosper, we all will prosper, if we work for the group and do not
try to take more than our share, nor try to play highwayman and hold up
business for our own selfish ends. Any temporary success by over-reaching is
soon more than balanced by the stigma, loss of confidence and bad reputation
that the person is sure to grieve who selfishly tries to get more than to which
he is justly entitled. Not to obstruct but to assist in making business go
smoothly is the part that we can play with the full knowledge that this is the
only thing which will, in turn, benefit ourselves. If we try to go against the
basic principles of square-dealing, we hinder ourselves and those about us.lo7
These editorials and subsequent responses printed in The Pilot suggested that
Peabody's business and spiritual leaders felt that the manufacturers had already given
a fair share to the worker; they implied that it was time for the Peabody leather
worker to make some concessions. This illustrated a reversal for some in Peabody's
religious community; the clergy had been solidly behind the union in 1933. This shift
in sentiment most likely represented the change in both the econonlic and political
climate. The leather industry was suffering and war concerns began to undercut
national sentiment toward unions.

In Peabody, to counteract union progress, scare tactics became a ploy to
provoke the rank and file to give in to the manufacturers' demands. One editorial
tried to convince leather workers that signing the newest manufacturers' contract
would be the best thing for the community:
If you are a leather worker, one of the 4,000 members of the local union, will
you come out to the next meeting of the union, listen to the arguments
presented [about] why the leather workers' union officials should sign the new
agreement with the manufacturers so that labor peace may be preserved, and
107
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that orders for the tanning of leather-which
may come again into Peabody?

provide jobs for our people-

In trying to rally more of the union membership to take a stand on the wage
negotiations, these editorials implied that the leadership of Local 21 dictated what the
rank and file would do. The "Go Forward With Peabody" series beseeched the
workers not to let the less than "ten percent [threaten] to convert this tranquil city into
a turmoil of strikes, of hunger, and want again."lo8Not hesitating to resort to
intimidation to change the opinion of Peabodyites, these editorials said the
disharmony between workers and manufacturers could cause leather buyers to lose
confidence in Peabody's ability to produce leather.
By the late thirties, labor had once again become a convenient scapegoat for
the manufacturers. While manufacturers and some community leaders put the onus
for leather industry withdrawal from Peabody squarely on the shoulders of the leather
workers, some community members tried to counteract the anti-union propaganda.
The Second Congregational Church in South Peabody hosted an open labor forum in
October 1938 to discuss labor getting a square deal, avoiding labor controversies, the
government's role in labor issues, and the importance of national labor unions.109
Although the exact format of this forum is lost to the historical record, presumably
the purpose of the discussion was to better educate the citizenry on what labor unions
were really doing. This forum, most likely, tried to dispel some of the myths
surrounding unionization. How successful each side-pro-labor

and anti-labor-was
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in putting forth its viewpoint is unclear, but the role of labor and Peabody's place as
an industrial city were becoming major issues for the community.
While one of the goals for Peabody's leaders was to attract new businesses to
the area, Peabodyites had mixed feelings on just what kinds of businesses they
wanted to attract. Early in 1937 when the Peabody City Council sent Mayor James
McVann a zoning ordinance needing his signature, he sent it back with a memo that
said he would not approve the ordinance.
The city is interested in keeping all its present industries and also in bringing
new business into the city. I have been infornled that when new concerns are
looking for a new location, the first matter of interest is whether or not there
are restrictions against doing business. I feel that Section 9 of this ordinance
by expressly prohibiting forty-one different kinds of business, many of which
are closely allied with the leather industry, will be the direct means of
preventing just what we are hoping for: namely the bringing of new business
to our city. I would suggest that this section of the ordinance be eliminated
entirely.' lo
Peabody's mayor was not alone in his views about Peabody being an industrial city.
A Salem district court judge ruled in 1941 that a Peabody woman's claims that a local
tannery, Regis Leather Company, was producing noxious fumes that were detrimental
to her health was unfounded. The fumes resulted from the lacquer process used in
most types of leather finishing. "An adverse ruling [by the court] would have ended
the lacquer process in Peabody and would probably have forced many firnls to either
go out of business or move their plants to another community."'

' ' Thus, the ruling

favored the tannery owner and showed a willingness by the judicial system to support
Peabody's leather industry. The mayor's zoning decision and this court ruling,
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however, did not do much to relieve tension between the leather industry and the
community. And some Peabodyites believed that before the Leather City could once
again prosper, cooperation between industry and the larger community-including
workers and other citizens-had

to become a reality.

While Local 2 1 shared this vision of cooperation among manufacturers,
workers and city leaders, it saw the problem as much larger than merely the city of
Peabody and its labor force. In a stirring city council address, Councilor Daniel
Boyle, who served as secretary treasurer of the National Leather Workers
Association, "made a public plea for a 'showdown' with the manufacturers to find out
what is wrong with the leather business in the United States." Boyle rejected the
notion that the union was responsible for the "migration of tanneries from this city."
Commenting on the migration of the most recent twenty-six factories, Boyle said that
"17 had shut their doors before there was a union in existence." He said that the
leather workers were "against wage cuts [,I there is no leather worker overpaid," and
Local 2 1 would not be the scapegoat for the slowdown in the tanning business. "This
recession is not restricted to the tanning business," Boyle said. "The leather industry
throughout the United States is in a terrible condition. It is not restricted to
~eabod~.""*
Boyle was right about the leather industry. Tanners throughout the country felt
the stagnation of the industry. At a meeting of the Tanners Council of America in
1938, leather manufacturers acknowledged "the industry as a whole has reached
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practical stability and is unlikely to expand much faster than the nonnal population
increase." Facing a market saturated by substitute material, tanners understood that
the market had limited growth potential.
We all know that additional raw stock is not available and that a radical
increase in demand would raise prices to a level that would invite the use of
substitutes. We also know that over-capacity is likely to continue in spite of
the fact that practically no new tanneries have been built in the last twenty
years. Plants are continually being modernized, and it is a simple matter, with
the improved machinery available, to increase the capacity of any tannery
almost at will. . . .With further expansion cut off by the limitations of both our
potential market and the supply of raw stock available, there is little hope of
satisfactory profits without universal reco ition of these circumstances and
adequate leadership within the industry.lip
Local 2 1 business manager Charles Chamouris responded to this plea by arguing for
cooperation among all concerned parties.
A business manager since the inception of the NLWA, Chanlouris had
demonstrated his ability to serve the rank and file. (He was the union leader who
suggested that officials draw no pay during the strike of 1934.) According to local
newspaper reports, Chamouris was well liked by the workers because he "never [had]
broken faith with them. He is an American citizen, a prominent member of the Elks
Lodge, homeowner, and father." Not one to keep his opinions to himself, Chamouris
urged "the officials of Local 2 1 to work with the leather manufacturers and officials
of the city of Peabody, [so that] Peabody does not become another ~~nn."'
l4
Referring to the present exodus of industry from Peabody, Chamouris harkened back
to 1934 when he warned his fellow officers that manufacturers would leave Peabody
-
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Lynn. "Futher Plan For Building Up Lynn," Peabody Enterprise, March 1, 1935.

if the stalemate between the union and manufacturers were not resolved. "I was
laughed at by my brother officials and by the membership of the association, but now
they believe that I was right. The only way that this moving of our principal industry
can be stopped is by cooperation of the union with the

manufacturer^.""^ Fellow

union members, however, did not appreciate this castigation of other union officers in
the local newspaper. Local 21 members reprimanded him. In speaking his mind,
Chamouris appeared to embrace the democratic procedures and freedoms inherent in
solidarity unionism. Other Local 21 officials did not see it in this manner. The union
believed Chamouris breached union etiquette by criticizing the NLWA publicly.
After his rebuke, Chamouris said he "was sick and tired of taking abuse; it's
not worth it" and offered to resign his $2,964 position, "one of the highest paying
positions in union circles in the state." His resignation, however, was not accepted by
the membership. Instead union members asked Chamouris to stay on in the position
but forbid him to "make statements to the press." For an organization intent on
maintaining unity and solidarity, Local 21 felt that Chamouris' statement to the press
advocating closer cooperation between the union and the manufacturers was
detrimental to its cause. "In the new set-up, Agent Chamouris will not be allowed to
discuss such subjects with the newspapers."116Throughout this whole controversy
and in past action, Chamouris exhibited qualities inherent in an organic intellectual;
he did what he felt was right. He went through no fom~altraining but assumed a
leadership position because of his innate abilities. In speaking freely, Chamouris
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demonstrated that he would not be a lackey of Local 21. However, by accepting the
union position that he no longer speak to the press, Chamouris conformed to union
pressure; although he was still an organic intellectual, he tempered his rhetoric to
conform to Local 21's wishes. As a member of a community-based union, Chamouris
realized that the wishes of the majority outweighed the opinions of one individual.
The Chamouris controversy marked a shift in Local 2 1's development and
philosophy. This NLWA local still exhibited characteristics of solidarity unionism,
but it began to conform to the business unionism associated with the post-World War
11CIO, where not all members agree with or understand the union position but abide
by it anyway. This shift to a more bureaucratic chain of command became more
evident after World War 11and will be explored in later chapters.
Although Local 21 settled this internal, yet public, controversy, upheaval
again rocked the membership in 1939. If anything, 1939 was marked by even more
internal and external controversy and conspiracy. The strife began with the election of
new officers. This election became the "most important general election of the union"
since its formation because of one issue: amalgamating the local union with the
International Fur Workers Union (IFWU) of New York, which had card-carrying
members of the Communist Party among its ranks. The local newspapers played up
the election saying that an "overwheln~ingmajority of the leather workers are for
home rule, and if the conservative worker comes out and votes next Friday, the Fur
Workers cause will be badly beaten." According to newspaper reports, all of Peabody
became involved in this election:

City officials, merchants, and even members of the clergy have appealed to
the workers during the past two weeks for a heavy vote so that the outcome
can be a true indication of the sentiments held by the workers. Members of the
clergy have assailed the communistic agitators from New York [the Fur
Workers] who are using every fake promise at their command to dupe workers
into joining an outside union."'
The Peabody media and clergy opposed any communist presence and wanted
those opposed to the merger to be victorious in the upcoming election. "All eyes will
be on the returns of the latter contest for the conservatives and American workers are
waging a great fight to elect only delegates who will insist on home rule for Local 21
of the NLwA.""~ There was also a faction in the community and among the leather
workers who feared incorporating with the fur workers would end the communitybased rule that Local 21 enjoyed.
When the vote was taken on March 3 1, Local 2 1 overwhelmingly voted for
home rule. But union members barely had time to savor their victory. Twenty days
later, stunning the NLWA membership with a reversal of policy, the executive board
of the local Peabody NLWA ordered another vote on the merger with the
International Fur Workers' Union. Workers were not even given 24-hours notice of
this new election. "The first knowledge of the proposed vote came . . .when for the
first time, posters were placed on factory billboards by union officials giving notice of
the referendum."'

''

Further complicating the situation was Chamouris's reversal:
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He had been strongly opposed to amalgamation prior to [the March 3 lSt]
election, [but] now declares that he is in favor, citing reasons for the change
that the local union is stagnant, and by joining hands with the Fur Workers,
they will have better financial reserves. He admitted that the Fur Workers'
Union know absolutely nothing about the leather workers and their problems,
but said that the added strength which would come to the locals, would greatly
assist the officials in organizing plants which at present are not members of
the union.l2'
Chamouris had been re-elected business manager on March 3 lStbecause he was
against the merger, whereas his opponent, Joseph Massidda, the 1933 strike
organizer, was for the merger. By changing his position after the membership had
voted, Chamouris denied the majority of Local 21 membership the decision they had
voted for-no

amalgamation. Chamouris tried to explain his shift in philosophy by

playing down the importance of the amalgamation. Dismissing the significance of the
Fur Workers' relationship with the Communist Party, Chamouris argued that with the
merger Local 21 would not relinquish "any home rule rights, that local autonomy will
still prevail." The 25 cents per week dues that Local 21 collected from the 3,200
members of the Peabody union would still remain in the local treasury, but if the local
union needed more money, the fur workers would help.12' This reversal in
Chamouris's amalgamation decision demonstrates a shift in his philosophy; he no
longer acted like an organic intellectual, but rather as a follower of a particular
hierarchical mandate.
The amalgamation decision also reflected an organizational shift in Local 21
from a community-based union to one that started to look to a national for guidance
and direction. These changes, however, were necessary in order for the union to

12'

Ibid.
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accomplish its goals-a

more equitable future for leather workers. In order to move

forward with its objectives, Local 21 needed the support of an established national
union. With the backing of a national organization, the leadership of Local 21 most
likely believed the union would be able to increase its ranks and offer more social
programs to its membership. The Massachusetts Leather Manufacturers Association
clearly understood the ramifications of such a merger. In a letter sent to its
membership, the tannery owners admitted that the NLWA would be a powerful force
ifjoined with the Fur Workers. In terms of organizing other leather workers, the
manufacturers recognized that the NLWA "has only scratched the surface. . . .The
NLWA cannot do this job without assistance and it is the assistance that the merger
with the [fur workers] will provide."122
The manufacturers' worry was not unfounded. The results of the hastily
initiated second election in April caused even more skepticism and concern about the
proposed merger. Only 600 leather workers voted out of the 3,200 registered
members of the N L W A . ' ~According
~
to a Peabody Times writer, "what seems to be
bothering a lot of folks is why the leaders of the union who two weeks ago were so
violently anti-fur workers have changed their minds." Local 21's former president
and vice president, Kenneth McKinnon and James Brawders, accused Chamouris and
Danny Boyle, "who were on the American ticket," of having fooled the workers. To
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show their disgust with the outcome of this new vote, McKinnon and Brawders called
"those syrnpatheic with affiliation 'communists' and worse."124
Because there are no surviving records indicating why Chamouris and others
in a leadership position decided to press for a merger agreement, one can only
surmise that there was either some type of bribery, fraud, or intimidation going on or
Local 21 officials really believed at the last moment that the merger was in
everyone's best interest (which in hindsight it was). In an interview with the Salem
Evening News in 1938 Chamouris vehemently condemned communist influences in

Local 2 1. He "warned the local association that any un-American influence should be
stamped out if it is present in the association and that the democratic spirit should not
be forgotten."125But a little less than a year later, he voted for the union he had
headed from its infancy to merge with a communist union.
It could be that Chamouris believed a larger, more financially secure
organization was what Local 21 needed to propel itself forward in terms of organizing
more leather workers. At the fifth annual NLWA convention in May 1938 a
representative of the International Fur Workers International, Irving Potash spoke
about the viability of a merger between the two organizations. Maybe in his speech,
Potash said something that caused Chamouris to reverse his decision months later. In
some respects, Potash's comments about a merger did make sense. He mentioned
how fix and leather workers could present a united front when it came to dealing with
worker displacement because of new machinery and the migration of tanneries.
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Potash also stressed how any plan on merging would be discussed fully with the
"rank and file in order that they would be intelligently i n f ~ r m e d . ' "Presumably
~~
Chamouris really believed that he knew what was best for the membership. The
constitution that the NLWA ratified at its fifth convention shows evidence that it saw
a merger as being a necessity in the future. For instance, right in the preambleratified by the membership-the NLWA constitution said:
Workers must organize in the leather industry and its by-products if they
desire shorter hours, clean working conditions, and sufficient wages to
maintain decent standards of living. The interests of one must bethe interest
of all. The practice of unfair employers today makes it necessary for workers
to unite more firmly than ever before if we wish to receive the full fruits of
our 1ab0r.l~~
Before the merger could become official, however, delegates at the annual
NLWA convention had to vote; more than a two-thirds majority was required to ratify
the agreement. Prior to the vote, NLWA delegates listened to advocates of the merger
discuss its merits. Clarence Carr, president of the Independent Leather Workers'
Union of Fulton County, New York, speaking in favor of the merger told the union
representatives that the only way the leather workers could successfully confront the
problems facing the leather industry was by the "unification of all leather workers
organizations on an international scale."'28
Carr stressed the importance of organizing "every leather center for the
protection of our union, wages, and jobs." Effective organization of all tannery
centers required, according to Can, more money. The community-based organizing
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that had fonnerly characterized the leather industry would not be sufficient to take the
industry to the next level. While the merger with an international intimidated many of
the rank and filers, Carr admonished that "for any one union to think that it can exist
of itself is ridicul~us."'~~
Other labor leaders in the past year had acknowledged that the NLWA was no
longer a provincial organization, but an organization embracing other locals in
various communities. Because of the job the NLWA had done in six short years,
organizing more than 10,000 leather workers, advocates for the merger said that other
leather workers across the country were looking to them for guidance. But the NLWA
did not have the resources to provide this guidance.'30
After hearing other labor leaders discuss the positive benefits of a merger and
knowing that John Lewis, president of the CIO, supported it, the delegates,
representing twelve active NLWA locals, adopted a motion "to empower the
incoming national executive board to institute negotiations with the fur workers
looking to amalgamation."'3' With 91 delegates present from various sections of the
country, the convention of the National Leather Workers Union unanimously
Ibid.
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endorsed the merger between the hide and fur workers. The union also went on record
favoring an organizational drive among unorganized tannery employees.'32The fur
workers now needed to vote on amalgamation.
While the leather workers in Peabody nervously awaited the outcome of the
fur workers' election, others in the community watched the situation as well. Various
religious institutions rallied against the merger. "In Boston and in Peabody the priests
in twelve churches warned the leather workers not to merge with the Godless
Communist Furriers

The priests' warnings, however, were not enough to

prevent amalgamation. The International Fur Workers Union in May 1939
consummated the merger at its thirteenth annual convention. At the convention, the
new union known as the International Fur and Leather Workers Union of the United
States and Canada mapped out its long-term goals: organize the unorganized,
establish uniform rates and hours, implement a standardized union label, initiate a
credit union loan fund for members, offer a vacation facility for union members and
their families, and advance overall health and welfare of fur and leather ~ 0 r k e r s . I ~ ~
By the late thirties, Local 21 had evolved to a more mature stage of solidarity
unionism than it had experienced in its formative years. The national situation for
unions was changing. Manufacturers, with the government's help, were making
inroads into the gains laborers had wrested fiom them. Small local unions needed to
band together to have the necessary resources to forge ahead.
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While it appeared with this merger and Chamouris's transformation that Local
21 had indeed lost its grassroots origins and sense of local solidarity, the years
following the merger offer a different perspective. Local 21 shifted course in 1939,
but this shift was more complex than would first appear. In the early years of the
forties, Local 21 began to carve out for itself a niche in a larger union. In its new role,
it did open itself up to different viewpoints from an International, but it never
relinquished its local control. This becomes evident as one examines Local 2 1's
cultural, educational, and informational activities during the 1940s.

CHAPTER THREE:
Social Equality: A Community of Workers Creates Change

Even when aggrieved populations fail to seize power or to fashion
autonomous spheres of opposition, they still influence the exercise of
power in their society. In addition, when existing institutions and
organizations prove inadequate for the expression of rank and file
aspirations, grass-roots activists devise alternative vehicles of
contestation to articulate and implement goals that remain
unrecognized by those working within conventional channels.'
With the merger of the NLWA and the International Fur Workers Union
(IFWU) and its affiliation with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), Local
2 1 appeared to have lost all the vestiges of a community-based labor organization.
Both the IFWU and the newly formed CIO, however, exhibited traits inherent in
solidarity unionism. When the CIO formed in 1936, the IFWU, a relatively small
organization in New York City, was one of the first to join and was instrumental in
the growth of the ~ 1 0 . ~
Ben Gold, as IFWU president and later IFLWU president, mirrored the
leadership epitomized by CIO head John Lewis. Gold expected union officials "to
live on the same wages as the workers in the trade and to be scrupulously careful as to
how they handled workers' money."3 The IFWU president did not live at a higher
level than the men in his union. Former Local 21 member George Georges confirmed
that Gold firmly believed all union members were on an equal footing. In recounting
one particularly memorable example of Gold's moral standards Georges said, "We
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told him [Ben Gold] to raise his pay. He says, 'I'm getting $125 a week and I'm
satisfied. That's enough. I work and I live good with that.' But, $125 for an
international president. That's all he was getting!" Georges e ~ c l a i m e d .Local
~
21
espoused the same philosophy.5Indeed, the CIO, the IFWU, and Local 21 shared
many overlapping values in these years. By joining forces with the CIO and IFWU in
the late thirties, Local 21 did not lose its sense of solidarity unionism; instead, it
refashioned itself to be a more effective union in terms of initiating social and
economic reform in the years ahead.
Between 1939 and 1948 the affiliation between the CIO and IFLWU was
strong; as a result, Local 21 was able to offer its membership a host of services and
benefits formerly unknown to leather workers. This chapter discusses those services
and programs. Instead of detailing the strife of the post-World War I1 years--cost of
living increases, labor unrest, Taft-Hartley, and McCarthyism-this

chapter

concentrates on the improvements that Local 21 instigated in leather workers' quality
of life. While some of the initiatives implemented by the union happened later in the
forties and some in the fifties, this chapter analyzes these endeavors not so much in
the context of the time they were created but rather as signs of the union's
commitment to quality-of-life issues. Chapter Four looks at Local 21 during this same
period, but in relation to the political issues of the day. Breaking this period (19391955) into two chapters--one discussing social and cultural initiatives and the other
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elaborating economic and political limitations-allows

a more cohesive and logical

discussion of Local 2 1.
Just in terms of bread and butter issues, Local 21 made immediate gains after
its merger with the Fur Workers. A national assessment of wages in the leather
industry conducted by the Department of Labor at the end of 1939 found the Peabody
area to have the highest wage scale in the country. All but one leather concern in
Peabody paid on average more than 75 cents an hour. The industry average was
between 55 and 80 cents. The Peabody area experienced such an exceptional hourly
rate because it had a higher percentage of unionized

worker^.^ Wage gains alone,

however, were not enough for Local 2 1. The union of leather workers wanted to
change society and make life more equitable for all workers regardless of the job they
did. With such a lofty goal, Local 21's decision to incorporate with the CIO and

IFWU makes perfect sense. In the late thirties and early forties the mood of the
country started to change as hostilities grew in Europe and Asia. Labor needed to be
attuned and adjust to these changes. Patriotism became a defining feature of the
World War 11years; militancy and labor strife were no longer condoned by the
public.7
During the World War II years Local 21 adopted, as did other CIO unions, a
no-strike pledge. While labor, represented by the AFL and CIO, voluntarily, but with
much misgiving, agreed to a no-strike pledge during the war years, it hoped that "its
voluntary surrender would head off anti-strike legislation." Public opinion also
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influenced labor's no-strike decision. "Ordinarily a union thinks twice before striking;
with the defense program under way, public opinion compelled it to think thrice."* In
fact, the whole decade of the forties was strike free in ~ e a b o d ~ . ~
Despite a limitation on strike activity and a burgeoning war, the early forties
remained a dismal time for many industries, including leather. Business in the Lynn
and Peabody leather shops was at its lowest ebb in two years in 1940 and only 1,800
of the 3,200 Local 21 members were working.'' By merging first with the CIO and
then with the IFWLJ, Local 21's leadership believed it would be better prepared to
meet the challenges of the future. In 1937 Local 2 1 could not know that in the
afternlath of World War 11the CIO would embrace business unionism and align itself
with policymakers in Washington, nor could it know in 1939 that its union with the

fur workers would prove ultimately to be a doomed marriage because of the political
upheaval of the time." The decisions Local 21 made in the waning years of the
thirties were choices that seemed best at the time.
Local 21 was not alone in deciding to join an international. The Federal
Council of Churches of Christ in America commended the "trend toward industrywide organization" as being a practical way for labor to join forces and project a
united front." In the early forties approximately 60 percent of all the workers
engaged in the leather tanning trade worked in plants covered by a national or
8
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international union contract. And most of the organized workers were in
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York-the

leading tanning states. Out of the

twenty-nine states producing leather, twenty had union activity. In addition, eighty
percent of all organized leather workers claimed allegiance with the IFLWU and only
ten percent with the United Leather Workers International Union, of the AFL.
Independents represented the remaining 10 percent.'3
Shortly after the IFWU approved the merger, Gold, the president of the newly
formed IFLWU, went on the local Peabody airwaves to discuss the anlalgamation. In
his radio address, Gold acknowledged that the merger was necessary to preserve a
leather workers union that was shrinking. He acknowledged that the NLWA "failed to
organize the leather workers even during the years of 1936, 1937, and 1938 when
unprecedented numbers of unorganized workers flocked to the young militant,
progressive CIO organization." Characterizing the situation as pitiful, Gold reminded
the Local 21 members of their lack of funds, programs, and plans. "It [Local 211 was
a small island in the open sea," Gold said. "It was surrounded by an overwhelming
majority of unorganized workers."14 Gold's words were accurate; Local 21's attempts
to unionize the A.C. Lawrence employees had been disastrous.
Although the decision to join with the Fur Workers was contentious in the
beginning, after the merger the majority of the membership seemed satisfied. "Oh, we
did better. . . .When we joined the furriers and the leather and after we joined whew!
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We became the fourth best union in the country. First we were way behind. Our
wages were nothing. But when we joined with the Furriers, we got better. Much
better," according to forn~erleather worker George Georges."
Corroborating Georges's account, former leather worker Ed Freeman saw the
merger as essential. "[Our union made] the real gains . . . when the leather workers
joined with the fur workers." This merger came about through the initial urgings of
the CIO. Freeman explained it this way:
At that time we were members of the CIO. The CIO evidently wanted to take
a lot of these smaller unions and merge them into larger unions. And they
tried to take unions that had somethlng, some association or connection. We
were leather. The fur was fur, fur pelts, fur skins. And the CIO suggested or
reconmended that we band together. The fur workers had large membership.
They had money. They had the organizers. They had the ability to negotiate
contracts. So we merged. We had to have a vote on it. There were some
people in the city that were opposed to it because they thought that the fhr
workers were a communist group. But eventually, we became one union, fur
and leather.I6
This alliance with the Fur Workers lasted until 1955, and for much of that time, it was
a positive, beneficial relationship. It is during these years, 1939-1955, that Local 21
solidified its role as an organization dedicated to revamping the social, political, and
economic life-the

moral economy-of the leather workers in Peabody.

One way to understand the type of community Local 21 tried to create for
Peabody leather workers and their families during the forties and fifties is to examine
local, district, and national IFLWU newspapers. Union periodicals mailed to the
homes of members- Local 21 Bulletin, District One Reporter, and the Fur and
Leather Worker, respectively-described labor activities, local and national events,
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and information about the union itself. These labor periodicals, however, were not
only a source of what was going on in the union, but as artifacts themselves illustrate
the desire on the part of the rank and file worker to create a vehicle to communicate
with and educate other workers. This desire for communication is especially
noteworthy in Peabody because it was such an ethnically diverse community. The
leather industry in the early part of the twentieth century "brought about an abnornlal
demand for labor in the unskilled work of the tanneries"; immigrants filled this
niche.'' Irish, Russian, Canadian, Turkish, Greek, French Canadian, Portuguese,
Polish, Austrian, and Armenian immigrants made up approximately half of Peabody's

These first- and second-generation immigrants provided the perfect base from
which to create an alternative vision of American life. The Americanization process
practiced by the IFLWU centered around a few main themes: social equality for all
regardless of race, religion or ethnicity; governmental regulation of big business; and
an extension of the New Deal welfare state. While this ideology adhered to the CIO
platform-a

platform espousing a social, democratic public agenda-it

was a

radically different version of the Americanization process typically adopted by
federal, state, and local governments and social service groups. l 9 From these
publications it becomes evident that Local 21 took its role as caretaker for the rank
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and file worker very seriously. Under the auspices of the International, Local 21
sought to create not only better working conditions and higher wages for its ethnically
diverse membership but a well-educated, tight-knit community of workers sharing
similar ideals. The city of Peabody at this time did offer a variety of ethnic clubs,
veterans' organizations, and a host of churches and synagogues, but each of these
social institutions served to establish and maintain the various ethnic barriers. From
its inception, Local 21 endeavored to break down barriers separating different groups.
This goal was shared by the Fur Workers and the CIO.
"Because the shop paper was the union's most intimate speech to the union
member," the labor press serves as a window onto the thoughts and actions of worker
groups and the propaganda the union wished to di~seminate.~'
A close analysis of the
IFLWU publications from 1939 to April 1955, when the IFLWU merged with the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, demonstrates
these functions of the labor press. Because the IFLWU publications were dedicated to
educating the membership about the union, they are a valuable source in trying to
understand union life. These newspapers are critical in establishing that the IFLWU
worked to create a specific culture-a
politically democratic one-for

more economically, socially, culturally, and

its members. This type of environment was not being

provided by the federal, state or local governments, by the larger mass culture, or by
the employers.
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Developments, ed. J.B.S. Hardman (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1928; New York: Amo and the New
York Times, 1969), 400.
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An analysis of the social programs Local 2 1 initiated-with
and CIO's backing-provides

the International

insight into the type of community it tried to create for

its membership. The IFLWU developed a vast network of services to ensure its
membership's well-being. It is imperative to remember, however, that even though
the IFLWU had a large-union bureaucracy it remained more horizontally structured
than most of its counterparts; it placed each local in an autonomous position to govern
its membership the way that best served that particular local. Thus, in these early
years of the CIO and the IFLWU, both organizations exhibited the characteristics of
solidarity unionism. But when either the CIO or the International policy diverged
from that of Local 2 1, the local union asserted its own agenda."
In and of themselves, the IFLWU labor periodicals illustrate the dedication of
the Local 2 1 leadership and the rank and file worker to creating a more socially
equitable culture. The mere existence of a Local 21 publication is significant. Local
2 1 realized that a national publication could not possibly educate all members about
the significant issues and activities affecting the fur and leather workers. The
leadership of the IFLWU stressed at its May 1946 convention that to be better able to
fight for "their rights and demands and to expose the lies and distortion of the
reactionary commercial radio, press and other propaganda outlets" locals should form
their own publications.22Local 21 took this recommendation seriously; exactly one
year later it had its own monthly publication, the Local 21 Bulletin, which lasted until

This situation will be discussed in Chapter Four.
"Educational Work Stressed; Union Leadership training School to be Established," Fur and Leather
Worker, June 1946, p. 30.
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the early seventies.23Edited by rank and file leather worker Richard "Mike" O'Keefe
and mailed to the homes of 4,500 members, the Local 21 Bulletin was "dedicated to
furthering the interests of the union membership, their families, and the entire
community."24Paid for by advertising from local businesses and union dues, the
Local 21 Bulletin carried news about the local political battles being fought by labor

and the employment situation. As editor, O'Keefe, a stalwart union member who
succeeded Chamouris as business manager, continuously asked for feedback on the
publication and how it could better serve the needs of the local.
Sam Pizzigati and Fred Solowey, conmunication specialists for large labor
unions, argued that in the middle part of the twentieth century it was not unusual for
union locals and national unions to produce a publication because postal rates were so
low. These papers, however, were largely ineffective, they said, in competing for
workersy attention because "economic and cultural forces had combined to obscure
the role of class-and

class consciousness-in

American life." The majority of labor

publications became puff pieces.25As a generalization, Pizzagati and Solowey's
claims may be accurate, but their sentiments do not hold true for Peabody or the
Local 21 Bulletin. The obfkscation of class identity, for example, did not exist in

Peabody. In the forties, fifties, and even sixties, Peabody was still an ethnically

With the breakup of the IFLWU (in 1955), the Local 21 Bulletin was renamed the Bulletin and
became the International mouthpiece of Local 2 1's new union-Leather Workers International Union
of America, AFL, CIO. The new Bulletin was published for the first time in the early months of 1956.
Instead of being published monthly, as was the Local 21 Bulletin, the new publication was bimonthly
and then just four times a year. With the new publication in 1956, the objective of the publication
changed. It no longer was an interactive periodical exhibiting characteristics of a long-range view;
instead, it resembled the District One Reporter from the forties-a mouthpiece for the union.
24 Local 21 Bulletin, June 18, 1947, p. 1.
25 Sam Pizzigati and Fred J. Solowey, eds., The New Labor Press: Journalism for a Changing Union
Movement (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1992), xiii.
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diverse city with a population comprised of haves and have

not^.^^ The have nots

were in most cases the leather workers who were still fighting for wage gains, better
health benefits and pension plans. Compounding these efforts was the looming
specter of a declining industry. The closing of leather factories had become a
common occurrence in Peabody by the forties. Thus, Peabody leather workers were
still highly conscious of class

difference^.^^ One former leather seamstress, Pauline

Comora, recalled a certain section of Peabody, near Bishop Fenwick High School that
had tree-lined streets with beautiful homes. When asked if she knew anyone on this
street, Comora replied, "Those people were not my kind. They were well-to-do. They
did not associate with people like me."28
These leather workers also knew that certain parts of Peabody life-such
the Hebrew Community Center-were

as

off limits to them. In the Center's 1938

Concert and Ball Gala program, Max Korn, a well-known Peabody leather
manufacturer and honorary president of the Community Center, said "Preserving
Americanism is our assurance that democracy shall not perish from the earth. The
facilities of our Center are available only to those groups that maintain these
principles."29 Because of escalating world tension, trade unionism had once again
become an evil force in society-a

force equated with Communism and surely able to

26
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Stoly, 446.
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undermine the American sense of patriotism. In saying that the Center was closed to
groups that did not practice democracy, Korn was referring to Local 21 and its merger
with the Fur Workers which had a Con~munistParty member, Ben Gold, as its
president.
Local 21 membership was aware of the social hierarchy in Peabody, and in
trying to reform society, Local 21 labor leaders worked to eliminate the class
differentials that created such an unequal lifestyle among Peabodyites. But in order to
create a more moral economy in Peabody's social, industrial, political, and economic
spheres, Local 2 1 needed the financial support and organizational apparatus that both
the CIO and the FLWU had at their disposal. Thirty years' worth of editorials by
Local 21 Bulletin editor O'Keefe illustrate the desire to create a more equitable

community for leather workers. One main theme permeated all the editorials O'Keefe
wrote for the Local 21 Bulletin:
We are interested in proper and complete health care, we want more
educational opportunities, we want equality for everyone, we want to
eliminate slums and ghettos, and we want to provide hope for the poor
and their families. We want everyone to live a brighter todaym3'
In seeking a better life for Local 21 members, O'Keefe never shied away from
confronting the larger community of Peabody or the International or CIO bureaucracy
when these entities proposed initiatives that would negatively affect the Peabody
leather workers. This quality harkens back to Local 21's solidarity unionism roots.
The FLWU leadership, which included Local 21 officials, did not believe that
in the World War II-era of big business, the mainstream press presented labor's
30
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viewpoints. Speaking at the Eighth CIO Convention in 1946, CIO President Philip
Murray said:
It is extremely difficult for a labor organization to change the point of
view of a newspaper chain that is owned by a great monopoly. . . . It
should be borne in mind, however, that they do not reflect public
opinion. They merely reflect the opinion of people that own
considerable property and have a great deal of wealth . . . and that may
not have too much interest in either the well being of the individual or
the well being of the country.31
The leadership of the IFLWU saw a two-fold purpose for a union publication:
disseminate labor news and correct the errors of the mainstream press.32Issue after
issue of the Local 21 Bulletin and Fur and Leather Worker decried the abuses of the
commercial press. It was not uncommon to read in any issue of the national or local
publication statements like this:
When a slanderous attack was made on Local 21 [or any local], as a
result of a brief one-sided "hearing," the papers everywhere spread it
all over page one. When we denounced the attack and denied the
charges, the stories were buried inside or, as in the case of the Boston
Post, not carried at all.
After writing about a series of injustices similar to this one, the Local 21 Bulletin
said that "the moral of this story is obvious: Don't rely on the big daily press for the
truth about unions. Read your Union press."33 With the use of the labor press, Local
21 expanded its dissemination of information to its members. In the thirties, the labor

union relied on a small number of paid advertisements in the local newspapers to
educate its members and the community on its ideals. As the national sentiment began

'LDemandfor Wage Increases Highlight CIO 8~ Convention,"Fur and Leather Worker, December
1946, p. 3.
32 Labor radio espoused similar goals. A good example is WCFL; see Nathan Godfned's work on this
subject.
33"~ress
Shows Anti-Union Slant in News," Local 21 Bulletin, July 28, 1954, p. 2.
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to shift away from a pro-union stance with the arrival of World War 11, Local 21, like
other unions, continually had to remind its membership of what the labor movement
really meant because the mainstream press would not objectively report on union
events. Peabody's local newspapers were no exception. For the most part, the only
time Local 21 appeared in the local newspapers during World War II and the postwar
years was when there was a labor disagreement. In regards to the positive work the
union was doing, there was very little mention.34And in most cases, when referring to
the union's wage negotiations, the local papers would put a derogatory connotation
on the union by using certain words and phrases. One article detailing the 1949 wage
negotiations between the leather union and the manufacturers characterized the union
in the opening sentence as "the industry's Communist dominated union" and then in
the following paragraph followed this lead by saying, "Leaders of the Massachusetts
Leather Manufacturers Association as well as spokesmen for the Red-controlled
International Fur and Leather Workers Union . . . .,935 Thus, the first two paragraphs
of this wage controversy story established Local 21 as un-American. The rest of the
story solidified this initial assertion. Articles like this certainly did not help the leather
union win support in the community.
George Kleinman edited the International's publication, Fur and Leather
Worker, which was created after the merger of the National Leather Workers
Association and the International Fur Workers in April 1 9 3 9 . Kleinman,
~~
a New

The author bases this assertion on an overview of local papers during the World War I1 and postWorld War I1 years.
35 "Leather Parley Seeks Strike Ban," Boston Traveler, April 18, 1949, p. 1, 1 1.
36
Prior to the merger, the fur workers had their own publication entitled The Fur Worker, whch began
in August of 1937. There is no record of a publication for the NLWA.
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York fur cutter, came out of the shop to produce the paper. Published eleven times a
year, the Fur and Leather Worker played an important role in the organizing drive of
the IFLWU.~'The Fur and Leather Worker dedicated itself to fighting red-baiting,
anti-Semitism, and anti-Negro propaganda; exposing conditions in open shop
tanneries; headlining union gains; and providing organizing and political messages.
The objective of the Fur and Leather Worker was "to acquaint the union members
with the activities and the progress of every local union and of every fur and leather
center throughout the nation, to enable them to participate consciously and effectively
in the life of their own locals and of the International as a whole."38 Kleinman had no
formal training as a writer or editor. He was a leather craftsman and an organic
intellectual. Through the Fur and Leather Worker, Kleinman educated thousands of
leather workers on the intricacies of the U.S. capitalist system, U.S. foreign policy,
and the role of union members in rectifying the inequality between classes in
America. (In most cases the IFLWU condemned U.S. cold war policies and supported
Henry Wallace's platform against the "reactionary war makers" in Ameri~a.)~)
Thus,
the Fur and Leather Worker aimed to "serve as an educator and organizer of the
union.'*O
The IFLWU did not see the Fur and Leather Worker merely as a mouthpiece
for the leadership. In a memo sent to all locals in October 1945, Gold asked the

" By the early 1950s, the Fur and Leather Worker did not strictly adhere to its publication schedule. In
many instances, it would only produce six or seven issues in a year; it would double up on months and
roduce only one publication for any two months.
Fur and Leather Worker, December 1939, p. 6.
39 Henry Wallace, "Peace and Security Depend Upon Allied Unity-Not on Atom Bomb," Fur and
Leather Worker, October 1946, p. 8A.
40 Letter fiom Ben Gold to all locals, October 31, 1945, IFLWU 5676, Box 9, Folder 34.
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various labor leaders to query their membership on what they wanted to see in their
union publication. Prefacing his remarks by commenting on how he believed
Kleinman had done a wonderhl job during the war years having the publication
address membership issues, labor movement topics, and national and foreign policy,
Gold said that the International would like the Fur and Leather Worker to be as
effective as possible for the union:
We are very eager to have your opinion and the opinion of the Local
Executive Board members. If you have any suggestions which you believe
would serve to improve the contents-the articles, news coverage, feature
stories-and appearance of the publication, please communicate them to me,
as well as suggestions for additional features and other material which would
be of special interest and importance to our member^.^'
In response to Gold's plea, O'Keefe wrote back commending the International
for such a wonderful paper. "The membership of our local read the paper every
month and are right on our necks if they fail to receive an issue," O'Keefe replied.42
This exchange between Gold and O'Keefe indicates that the Local 21 membership
did read the paper and had opportunities to present their opinions about the union's
publication. Even though Local 2 1 had become part of a large organization, its
members still had a voice in a key union activity-its

publication.

For the most part, IFLWU publications concentrated on addressing the day-today concerns of the membership. Over a thirty-year span, the union's publications
commented on relevant federal legislation such as the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley
Act, World War 11, rent and price controls, and McCarthyism. While the district and
I

local publications focused on issues directly affecting Massachusetts and Peabody,

4'
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Ibid.
Ibid.

respectively, all three publications devoted space to discussing world and national
issues and how they affected the labor movement. These publications criticized the
American "war machine" and explained that American labor is "fighting a decisive
battle against our homegrown fascists, against the worshippers of Hitlerism and the
Nazi conspiracy of world domination . . . against those who even now are
maneuvering to re-establish the international cartels and trusts of the big monopolies
and munition mal~ers."~

In characterizing union publications, J.B.S. Hardman, a labor editor writing in
the 1920s, described two different approaches editors could take: the short-range or
the long-range view. Union papers adopting a short view were little more than house
organs; the editor's job "is to sing the song of praise of the 'administration' that feeds
him. . . . Syndicated canned features. . .and eulogistic matter" provide the content.44
This description does not fit the local and national IFLWU publications, but it does
describe the District One publication, the District One Reporter. Produced in Boston,
the Reporter attempted to provide a little positive information in every issue about all
of its Massachusetts locals. Although District One officially covered all of the New
England states, the Reporter focused on Massachusetts and tried to educate its
membership about legislative issues. These pieces always depicted Big Business as
evil, but never devoted enough space to educate the worker on what he or she could
do to change the situation. The Reporter, consisting of only four pages with dense

43
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"Support Labor's Strike Struggle," Fur and Leather Worker,January 1946, p. 12.
Hardman, "A View of the Trade-Union Press," 4 10.

type and few photos, most likely provided its readers with a cursory understanding of
what the union was doing.
Both the Fur and Leather Worker and the Local 21 Bulletin served as a
mouthpiece for the union, but they provided other services as well-services
necessary for creating an avid following. The Fur and Leather Worker and Local 21
Bulletin would fall into Hardman's definition of the long-range view adopted by some

union press editors. A long-range view encompasses the "larger aims of the union and
movement. The strategy of the union, its politics, its problems, its aspirations and
relation to the labor movement and the social problems of the time, will be the
paper's concern." The IFLWU local and national publications tried to fulfill these
functions. Both publications educated the IFLWU membership on a wide spectrum of
issues, investigating stories of injustice and providing information that the rank and
file could use in their daily lives. The Fur and Leather Worker and the Local 21
Bulletin sought to become "the clearinghouse of both the rank and file of the

organization and the leadership, where their views may be voiced and clarified and
eventually integrated.'"5 Both publications wanted feedback from their readership.
For instance, the Local 21 Bulletin offered a five-dollar prize to the person who had
the best letter suggesting ways of improving the Local 21 Bulletin:
The award will be made by the board for the ideas suggested, not on the basis
of the length of the letter or its fancy writing. This newspaper is the property
of the membership and it strives to be the kind of a newspaper you want. The
contest is being run to encourage constructive criticism from our
membership.46

45
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Ibid.
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Hardman believed that in order to create a bbpowerfulinstrument in the service
of the union movement" a union paper must have a number of key characteristics:
interesting stories, accuracy, discussion of union issues-good

and bad, an appeal to

family members, and a local angle. "If these components are part of the labor paper,
the press will be appreciated by both the intelligent leaders and the active rank and
file, and will become influential, as it should, in molding the union's course.'"'
Writing in the twenties, Hardrnan said that the labor press had not yet achieved this
type of periodical. Fifty years later Pizzigati and Solowey still characterized these
elements as important aspects of the labor press, but aspects that were for the most
part still missing. Pizzigati and Solowey argued that the kind of labor press needed is
one "that reflects the lives of working people-their

hopes, their fears, their troubles,

their triumphs.'"*
The IFLWU's periodicals reveal elements of what Hardman, Pizzigati and
Solowey considered good labor journalism. From the very first issue of both, the Fur
and Leather Worker and the Local 21 Bulletin presented information in a pleasing,

interesting manner. In addition to local news and comments, Kleinman and O'Keefe
strived to create publications that reflected the concerns and interests of the union
membership, which the mass culture was not doing. Pizzigati and Solowey
characterized the popular mass media as giving "us a world where working peopleand the challenges working people face-barely
47

exist. In the parade of celebrities that

Ibid., 410-41 1. According to Helen G. Norton, an instructor of labor journalism at Brookwood Labor
College during the 1920s, too many labor publications ignored the local connection. "The use of
syndicated labor news and particularly of syndicated editorials makes for a disheartening uniformity
among such labor papers."Helen G. Norton, "The Gopher Prairie Press," in American Labor
Dynamics, 406.
48
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dominates America's front pages and television screens, few working people ever
appear. We see the peccadillos of our politicians. We follow the careers of our stars.
We seldom see o ~ r s e l v e s .It' ~was
~ against this backdrop that the efforts of the Fur

and Leather Worker and Local 21 Bulletin become so interesting. These publications
offered Peabody leather workers two things: a glimpse of their own lives and another
viewpoint from which to form an opinion of international, national, regional, and
local events. A view of the individuals who made up the rank and file of Peabody was
missing in the local paper of the forties. Local publications focused on the war effort
during the early years of the forties and then spent the remainder of the decade
centered on the need to purge the communist elements from the community's midst.
The labor periodicals offered something else.
While there was a general format for each of these publications, they varied in
design from issue to issue depending on the information they wanted to highlight.
New departments were added when circumstances demonstrated a need. For instance,
after World War IT, the Fur and Leather Worker began a monthly feature devoted to
the veteran. In this column, the editor dealt with commonly asked questions veterans
had about benefits they were eligible for and employment opportunities. In
conjunction with an appeal by International president Ben Gold to help veterans get
back into civilian life, Local 21 established a Veteran's Committee that recruited
counselors from the Veteran's Administration in Salem, Massachusetts, to answer
questions that Peabody's veterans had with respect to terminal leave pay, insurance,
49
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on-the-job training, and rehabilitation." This information regularly appeared in the
Local 21 Bulletin and illustrated a concerted effort on the part of the IFLWU to offer
workers services that would aid all aspects of their lives-not

just their factory day.

Returning IFLWU veterans, many first- or second- generation immigrants, were still
unsure of the intricacies of the U. S. legal proceedings; infornlational services
provided by the union and publicized in its papers were vital.
Although the Local 21 Bulletin was only four pages long, this monthly
publication provided in-depth, detailed information about union activities, contract
language and negotiations, labor problems, and relations with other unions. Many
photos featuring a wide variety of the membership were utilized and cartoons poking
fun at big business were a common feature. Even those workers who did not speak
English could understand the implied message in a caricature featuring big business
or the government as the enemy. Indeed, some studies suggest that cartoons and
comic strips are more popular than

editorial^.^' With the Local 21 Bulletin, long-time

editor and business manager O'Keefe tried to reflect the issues pertinent to union
membership. Relying on constant feedback from the readers, O'Keefe saw the
publication as a two-way process of communicating with members. Instead of living
in a distant place and putting in syndicated information, O'Keefe lived in the
community, attended social events with other leather workers, and actively
participated in what happened in the greater Peabody area. Seeking a better life for

Tounsellor Aids Vets," Fur and Leather Workers, September 1946,20.
Puette, Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor (Ithaca: ILR
Press, 1992), 74.

" William J.

Peabody leather workers was at the heart of O'Keefe's agenda; the contents of the
Local 21 Bulletin demonstrate this.

Richard "Mike" O'Keefe, who assumed a leadership role with the union that
lasted from the early forties until his death in 1973, epitomized the essence of an
organic intellectual. Bom in Salem to Irish Catholic immigrants, O'Keefe's family
owed its very existence to the leather industry. His father emigrated to work in
Peabody's leather industry. Following in his father's path, O'Keefe left school after
the eighth grade to work in the tanneries. As a young father of four, however,
O'Keefe found the limitations of factory life troubling. No matter how hard he
worked, there was never enough money. The strike of 1933 and the growth of the
NLWA meant a change in his fortunes and that of all leather workers, a change he
welcomed. Even during the early war years when labor was used as a scapegoat,
O'Keefe, who was deeply religious, found inspiration to continue his union affiliation
after talking with his long-time fiiend and spiritual leader Reverend Father John
McCom~ack.
According to McCormack, O'Keefe had an innate ability to empathize and
relate to all different people. McCormack characterized him "as a sensitive man, a
man who was not afraid to become involved with people, no matter what walk of life
they may have come."52 This made him an effective leader. Even after serving as
business manager for a number of years, O'Keefe never lost his ability to understand
the leather worker's position. He knew what it was like to work in a beam house

'*

Carl Johnson, "Rites for 'Mike' O'Keefe &e attended by hundreds," Salem Evening News,
December 6, 1973, p. 2.

sloshing around in wet, smelly water cleaning hides or as a tacker stretching the
leather on frames day after day while one's fingers bled. He had done these jobs, and
he never forgot the inhumane conditions confronting all leather workers. Because he
really cared about the leather workers and their problems, the union members listened
to him and were influenced by his opinions.
City officials and tannery owners also respected O'Keefe. After his election to
the Salem School Committee in 1954, more than five hundred Salem-Peabody
community members, including city and state officials, honored O'Keefe at a
testimonial banquet. Judge Henry F. Duggan, of the Peabody District Court, "praised
O'Keefe for his contributions to community welfare through his leadership in the

IFLWU, recreational activities, fund drives, and other public affairs."') He was
articulate; he presented himself well; and he cared about the people he represented.
As an organic intellectual, O'Keefe did not allow others to control him. He looked to
the International and the CIO for advice, but he based his decisions on the needs of
the membership he served. An avid reader, O'Keefe did not let his lack of an
education deter him from his goals. He knew that in order to enact real A d lasting
change, the leather workers needed to understand the issues facing them. With the
Local 21 Bulletin, O'Keefe tried to educate the rnernber~hi~.'~
There were limitations, however, to what O'Keefe could accomplish with the
Local 21 Bulletin since it was so short. The much longer-usually
53
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and Leather Worker offered more infonnation about the various locals, readers'
responses, national and international concerns, and human-interest stories. In
addition, it analyzed the political scene and how various pieces of legislation were
going to affect the fbr and leather workers. Stories dealing with racial discrimination
and anti-Semitism were monthly features throughout the paper's history. Thus, the
rank and file worker could see positive images of himself or herself, while becoming
more familiar with the glaring inequalities in society. Stories of discrimination
showcased what happened when one group assumed superiority over another. For
instance, the Fur and Leather Worker did an in-depth feature story on the Jim Crow
South and how one African-American fanlily lost everything they owned because the
father, a leather worker, had been lynched. In a city as diverse as Peabody, ethnic and
religious tensions were bound to erupt. By illustrating the hannful consequences of
discrimination, the IFLWU leadership hoped to unite its many different communities
of workers. From the various stories on discrimination, Peabody workers most likely
recognized that any effective fight against the tannery owners required solidarity.
While the IFLWU's publications provide insight on the International's
mission and goals, these labor periodicals also describe the union's chronological
history of social, cultural, and political activities and programs. This information
offers a clear picture of the society Local 21 was trylng to create. For instance, at the
first joint convention of the FLWU in 1939, the International committed itself to a
host of general welfare issues: sick insurance, a loan bureau, a legal aid bureau, a
legislative department, establishing and encouraging children's activities (tap dancing
classes, singing groups, dramatic groups, hikes, picnics, Junior unions), organizing

women's auxiliaries, and creating a health and welfare department to "help organize,
direct and guide the health and welfare committees of all locals."55These programs
had been discussed at the 1938 NLWA convention. In fact, at that conference,
Chanlouris detailed the need for each local to establish credit unions and to push for
an industry-wide pension plan.56At the time, though, Local 21 lacked the financial
wherewithal to initiate these programs.
Writing in the 1930s, journalist Mary Heaton Vorse characterized these
various labor programs-worker
press, for instance-as

education, women's auxiliaries, and a strong labor

"demonstrat[ing] how the labor movement was being reborn

through the community."" And that was exactly what Local 21 sought: the creation
of a more equitable society for its members. However, Local 21 did not try to reform
society in terms of gender roles. The union did not consider women "real" workers.
As James Sawyer, a former Local 21 official, explained, the union "fought for a
decent wage, so that our wives would not have to work. I didn't want my wife
working."58 Mrs. Helen Pavensky corroborated Sawyer's sentiment about working
women: "After the war my husband couldn't find a job in the tanneries, so I went to
work as a stitcher. I did not consider it a permanent position. I was just working until
my husband found
Understanding the need to appeal to the whole family, the national and local
publications made sure they offered women something in every issue-a
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recipe,

pattern, advice on children's lunches, etc. In some issues a half page would be
dedicated to women's topics. In terms of its perception of women, Local 21 seemed
to share the same viewpoint as the IFLWU-all

people were equal in theory, but this

did not always work out in practice. While there were occasional glimpses of
progressive thinking in tenns of women workers-a

few articles dealing with

leadership training for women, equal pay, and special insurance benefits covering
maternity and matenlity leave-the

publications mostly dealt with females as wives

and mothers and not as workers.60
Both the IFLWU and Local 21 seemed content just to adopt the CIO's policy
of developing women's a~xiliaries.~'
According to labor scholar Robert Zieger, the
CIO fell short in tenns of "legitimate expectations" of what it hoped to do for women:
Innovative and imaginative in many areas of tactics and structure, CIO men
failed to grasp the importance of won~en'sgrowing role in the labor force and
the possibilities for even more effective activism and organization that
responsiveness to women's economics and political concerns might have
afforded.62
Following the CIO lead, IFLWU publications carried very few serious articles
devoted to the concerns of working women: childcare, maternity and sick benefits,
etc. Cartoons featuring women relied on the stereotypical image of the well-dressed,
high-heeled matron fighting by her husband's side. Very few actually featured a
female worker attired in more realistic clothing, i.e. work clothes.
Just as Local 21 stereotyped women's issues in its publications, in its
programming and negotiating efforts it neglected the needs of the working mother.
"Women Delegates Active in Convention Work; Urge Leadership Training," Fur and Leather
Worker, June 1946, 12.
6' hid.
62
Zieger, CIO,376-377.

Periodically, there were brief discussions in the union publications about fighting for
better wages for the female leather employees, but these attempts at equalizing the
pay scale between men and women never took precedence either in union meetings or
in negotiations with the manufacturers. This was a legacy of its parent organizationthe CIO. Just as the CIO felt comfortable viewing the family along the traditional
lines in which the male head of the household earned enough for the family to live on,
the IFLWU and Local 21 followed suit, ignoring women's presence in the labor
force.
To some degree, this inattention to the female union members reflected
women's declining position in unions nationally; from 1946 to 1954, for example,
women's union membership declined.63This lack of attention to the female worker
might have also resulted from the small number of females actually employed in the
leather industry. For instance, in 1940 women made up only one-twelfth of the leather
. ~ during the war years, Peabody women did not flock
industry's wage e a n l e r ~Even
to the leather factories; enough men remained behind to fill the wartime production
need.65
Some IFLWU locals, especially the ones in New York, did create day care
programs, but Local 21 did not. They discussed it as a possibility, but it was never
realized. Working mothers in Peabody relied on neighbors or other family members

Ibid., 350.
"Hourly Earnings in Leather Industry September 1939," Monthly Labor Review 50 (April 1940):
957.
65 Based on information from interviews by the author with a variety of former leather workers and
union officials.
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to care for their children.66A typical day for a working mother of Local 21 consisted
of dropping children off at a designated house on the neighborhood block, picking the
children up after a physically taxing day in the leather factory, going to the comer
grocery story, and making dinner. Evenings were dedicated to getting children to bed,
cleaning, mending, and other household chores.67Local 21 did not initiate any
programs to ease the burden of these women in part, perhaps, because working
women did not request them. O'Keefe's long-time secretary Margaret Abbott said
that Local 21's female members never asked for anything. "They were content with
what the union had done overall," Abbott said.68Many Peabody women came from
ethnic and religious backgrounds that advocated self-reliance and subordinate roles
for women. Domestic duties and childcare were part of these female roles. These
women may have seen childcare and housework as roles they could not relinquishand not the union's responsibility.69For the Catholic leather workers the Boston
archdiocese preached continuously about the hazards encountered when the
homemaker "is forced to leave the circle of the home, and seek remunerative work in
business or industry." The Catholic church insisted that serious injury was "done to
the welfare of society" when women went to

Through the middle years of the

twentieth century, The Pilot printed numerous sermons and stories discussing the
virtues of the stay-at-home mother. Calling the stay-at-home mother the "queen of the
66
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home," The Pilot said, "only the most pressing and exceptional economic
circumstances should cause the married woman to leave the home and seek
remunerative work in the industrial world."71 This type of advice from the local
archdiocese had to have affected the perceptions of female wage earners and limited
their chances of making workplace gains.
Although the IFLWU did not try to reorder gender roles, some unions
advocated female equality in the workplace. One example was the United Cannery,
Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) representing the
Mexican cannery women working in southern California's food processing industry.
By 1946 UCAPAWA boasted that sixty-six percent of its contracts "had 'equal pay
for equal work' clauses and seventy-five percent provided for leaves of absence
without loss of seniority."72Unlike the food processing industry consisting mainly of
women with similar backgrounds, men dominated the leather industry and considered
much of the work unsuitable for women. This could be another reason why the
IFLWU did not push for gender refornl in the workplace.
In other areas, though, the IFLWU did exemplify progressive thinking. For
instance, the International leadership urged every local to set up an education and
recreation committee. Each education committee was responsible for a minimum
amount of educational work: training shop chainnen for union leadership and contract
enforcement; training shop chairmen and active workers in parliamentary procedure
and public speaking; providing classes in citizenship, American history, the principles
-

-
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of trade unionism, and English for foreign-language speaking workers. These goals
were also discussed at the NLWA's fifth convention. In addition, the International
advocated having at least one open forum rally a month. "One of the best means of
achieving an education program is the open forum rallies. We suggest at least one
forum a month be sponsored by the locals where the . . .workers and their families
will be invited to listen to prominent men in the community who might speak on the
various problems facing the workers as a whole." Establishing education committees
and bringing in guest speakers were both goals the NLWA had adopted at its fifth
convention in 1938. Thus, these were not directives issued by the IFLWU and
followed by Local 21. Instead, these programs were initiatives Local 21 had decided
on two years previous and managed to implement once it had the financial backing.73
The International also urged the formation of district training schools. This type of
worker education was not exclusive to the labor movement. As part of the New Deal,
the government-through

the Federal Emergency Program-sponsored

workers'

education activities across the country. Although there is no indication that a federally
sponsored program existed in Peabody, one did exist in nearby New Bedford. This
community developed a workers' school that offered classes on the symptoms of
depression, employment goals, public speaking, general science, dramatics,
handicrafts, group sewing, and dancing.74
This list of objectives demonstrates the International's commitment to
providing workers with a host of services that workers received from no other source.
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All of these goals were initiatives that Local 21 had thought about in the thirties but
was unable to organize because of financial and organizational constraints. As an
independent union, Local 21 did not have enough money in its coffers to adequately
meet the monetary demands of organizing more leather workers. With the backing of
an International and the CIO, Local 2 1 tried to implement all the goals espoused at
the first International convention. These objectives naturally intersected with the
goals of Peabody's early 1933 strikers: that is, a better quality of life, both inside and
outside the factory for all rank and filers.
While committing itself to achieving these goals, Local 2 1 did not become
distracted from day-to-day factory concerns. Its affiliation with an International that
had CIO backing allowed Local 21 to pursue more than one union objective at a time.
Thus, as Local 2 1 worked to establish more social service programs for its members,
it remained attuned to plant-floor disruptions such as the displacement of workers by
new equipment. In the early forties Peabody tanneries faced a quandary: some plants,
like the Dimond Kid Manufacturing Company, decided to discontinue operations
"because the plant [and equipment] they were using was out of date and inefficient
and was giving them a cost of production which made it impossible to compete."75
While the union wanted the factories to modernize, provide safer working conditions,
and stay in Peabody, the union adamantly opposed plants modernizing with
equipment that would displace workers. This was the quandary: lose plants because
of ill-equipped tanneries or have workers displaced because of new equipment. The
union decided to focus on displaced workers. Charnouris, who still served as business

'' "Workers TOFight Modem Machines," Lynn Telegram, January 3 1, 1940.

agent for Local 21 in 1940, utilized the local newspaper to warn manufacturers not to
"attempt to displace workers with bigger and more specialized machines." This
warning came in response to a local tannery's buying new shaving machines which
were three times bigger than the shaving machines currently in operation. The new
machines would displace about 140 shavers in the city, leaving only sixty. The union
went on record with its opinion of the new shavers:
The Union has no objection to the operation of newer and bigger machines as
long as they do not displace workers and reduce wages. . . .For the present the
union has directed me to warn manufacturers using or intending to use the
new shaving machines that the present shavers will not be permitted to do
more work than they now average on the smaller machines. Even if they work
only three hours in producing the quota.76
If Local 2 1 had really wanted to craft a more equitable life for the leather worker, it
would have incorporated job retraining into its worker education programs, instead of
fighting modernization. This, however, did not happen to any real degree. Instead, the
union chose to put its efforts into convincing the manufacturers that whenever they
introduced new machinery "such a price per unit produced on the new machine will
not cause hardships, lower wages, or unemployment for our members."77The union's
bottom line was that new machines should not create unemployment or lower wages.
While the union did not prepare its members for new careers in the face of
technological displacement, it did invest its energies into other programs and
activities. Peabody's chapter of the FLWU seemed especially committed to reaching
out to the union member's family. Besides printing information that would appeal to
all family members in its periodical (albeit in a stereotypical way for the women),
76 "Workers TOFight Modem Machines," Lynn
77 LLPreparing
for Mass

Telegram, January 3 1, 1940.
Contract Renewal," Fur and Leather Worker, October 1940, p. 8.

Local 21 organized a women's auxiliary in October 1947 to better serve the needs of
union members' families. In 1946, the International devoted much space in the Fur
and Leather Worker to discussing the merits of women's auxiliaries. In these issues

the leadership stressed that every union member's wife had an important role to play:
fighting by her husband's side for higher wages, better working conditions, rent and
price controls, and political and legislative battles.78The Fur and Leather Worker
used scare tactics to rally support for the auxiliaries.
More of our locals are beginning to think of organizing women's
auxiliaries. The time to do it is now! The reactionaries and the bosses,
the trusts and the tories are not waiting. They made the greatest profits
in history during the war. They not only want to keep on making the
same profits, they want to make more-and that more is going to come
right out of the pockets of workers and their families unless we put a
stop to it. If your local doesn't have a women's auxiliary organized
yet, now is the time to get busy and start one.79
At the Sixteenth Biennial Convention in June 1946, members approved the official
chartering of women's auxiliaries and the designation of full-time representatives or
organizers for the women's auxiliaries. Delegates also allocated funds to establish
these a~xiliaries.~'
While only a handful of women showed up to establish women's auxiliaries in
some unions, Local 21 had seventy-five women attend the first meeting. The women
of Local 21 planned some of the projects that became the mainstay of the Women's
Auxiliary: an annual Christmas party for children of members; special children's
classes in painting, music, and craft work; entertainment and educational films; work
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in the community on hot school lunches and recreational facilities; and support of
union programs on such things as rent control, lower prices, and repeal of the TaftHartley law.81Many of these programs came to fruition and proved successfid,
especially the ones geared toward the children. While the International offered
suggestions for programming and activities, it was the women in Peabody who
tailored a women's auxiliary to meet the needs of the community.
Creating a well-rounded life for children of leather workers was a primary
objective of the Local 21 Women's Auxiliary. Adhering to the International's
philosophy that "organizing members' children into such groups [as the Junior Union
and a children's band] brings them closer to the Union and makes them more union
conscious," the auxiliary, with Local 21's help, created many cultural and educational
opportunities for the children of Peabody. The Christmas party, which started in the
late 1930s' ended up becoming an annual event that grew every year. One year 1,500
union youngsters were entertained at this special event. Children's classes also
became quite popular. About fifty children, ranging in age from five to twelve, were
able to enjoy free tap dancing and ballet lessons because of the efforts of the Local 21
~ u x i l i a rFrom
~ . ~ these
~
children's activities, the union hoped to accomplish two
things: educate youngsters about the "struggles their parents live through to better
their economic condition" and provide additional opportunities for these working
class children.83

LL75at Party Plan Activities for Members," Local 21 Bulletin, October 29, 1947.
Local 21 Bulletin, March 23, 1949, p. 1 .
83 The Fur Worker, June 1939, p. 9 .
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Letters to the editor in both the local and national publications favorably
acknowledged the union's goal of reaching out to young people. For instance, one
young girl wrote to the Fur and Leather Worker expressing thanks for being able to
go to camp. "I am enjoying a camp vacation this year," this young girl said. "My
father would never have been able to send me to camp if you didn't help. I am proud
that my father belongs to such a good union."84

In addition to providing programs for children and a host of activitiesdances, fashion shows, lectures-for

families, it provided other services that were

previously unavailable. For instance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington
had characterized the leather industry as one of the most hazardous occupations in the
nation, but until the formation of the IFLWU, employers had done little to ensure
workers' safety." Just a year after amalgamation, Local 21 members voted to pay a
special 5-cent weekly assessment to finance a death benefit policy of one hundred
dollars for any member in good standing.86Through the efforts of Local 21, leather
workers in Peabody obtained health insurance, free protective equipment, and free
medical screenings for occupational hazards like t u b e r c u l ~ s i sLocal
. ~ ~ 21, in fact, was
instrumental in initiating a free chest x-ray service that the majority of the
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membership took advantage of in the late forties and early fifties.88Many issues of
the Local 21 Bulletin featured notices advising every leather worker and family
member to get his or her x-ray photograph during this month-long program.
"Remember: Tuberculosis is catching. Someone who works near you or lives in your
household can give the disease to you or someone else, if he or she has it" warned the
Local 21 ~ u l l e t i n . ~ ~
Local 21 also initiated a health survey in 1952, which was called a Health
Protection Clinic. This clinic was "the first one outside of Boston and the first time
that one has been run jointly by the state and a labor union."90 Local 21, with the
cooperation of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, conducted the
screenings, which were paid for by the state. While not a pennanent affair, the clinic
was an "extension of the chest x-ray survey." In addition to chest x-rays, this Health
Protection Clinic provided blood tests, urinalysis, and electrocardiographs. Each
person being surveyed received a confidential report.9*Both the unemployed and
non-leather worker were eligible for the chest x-ray as well. The Health Screening
tests were carried out in April and May 1953. According to the Local 21 Bulletin,
"the health survey [was] expected to attract considerable attention in medical circles,
for it will be the first such state-financed project in the history of the
Commonwealth-and

possibly the first in the nation-for

an industrial

Although the state spent between $50,000 and $60,000 on the survey, it was free for
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the worker, family and community members. During the first wave of x-rays, 3,802
Peabodyites-approximately

80 percent of the workforce-from

105 different

establishments, mainly leather, received free x-rays.93
As is evidenced by the Health Protection Clinic, Local 21, whenever possible,
tried to involve the whole community in its health initiatives. Donating blood to the
local Red Cross was a good example of the union rallying community support and
participation. Union officials not only encouraged union members to donate blood,
but they tried to inspire the community at large to participate by using a beach wagon
and traveling around the city to attract attention for the Red

To encourage

support for national health insurance, Local 21's Activities Committee hosted a onehour forum on WESX, a local radio station. This forum featured a doctor from
Massachusetts General Hospital who favored the proposal to extend social security to
cover all medical, dental, and hospital care and a prominent Essex County physician
who opposed it. After the broadcast, the forum audience, consisting of union
members and area residents, asked questions for another hour. By providing a debatelike format and opening it to the community, Local 21 not only educated its own
members about an important issue but the larger community as well.9s WESX also
hosted a Thursday night show that discussed issues facing the leather industry.
Local 2 1 never forgot that it was part of the larger community and anything it
could do for the larger community would benefit both the leather worker and the

93
94

"3,802 Get Free Chest X-Rays," Local 21 Bulletin, June 16, 1948, p. 1.
LLEighteen
Officials of Local 21 to Donate Blood Tomorrow," Peabody Times, February 25, 1944, p.

1.

"Radio Forum Wins Praise," Local 21 Bulletin, May 10, 1950, p. 2; "Top-FlightPhysicians Debate
Health Plan on Union Forum," Local 21 Bulletin, March 29, 1950.
95

nonleather worker. Besides participating in Red Cross blood drives, Local 21
supported the Community Fund, which donated money to support eighteen area
agencies focused on health, welfare, and r e ~ r e a t i o nThe
. ~ ~ union also aided the
community by participating in h n d raisers for a variety of charitable organizations:
Infantile Paralysis Campaign, Salvation Amy, March of Dimes, and the North Shore
Council of Boy Scouts, to name a few.97In addition, Local 21's Activities Committee
worked with the cities of Peabody and Salem to improve the medical care of children
in school. The aim of this program was "to guarantee maximum protection for the
health of our ~hildren."~'These programs were significant because they demonstrated
the union's concern for the physical well-being of the workers and the community at
large; this concern for the larger community is consistent with the characteristics of
solidarity unionism.99
Econon~ically,the gains made for the leather workers since the merger with
the h r workers in 1939 were quite significant as well. By 1946 the leather division of
the IFLWU was 85 percent organized and had managed to achieve job security,
higher wages, paid vacations, paid holidays, seniority, and a grievance procedure.'00
From the end of the war until 1947, Local 21 members increased their salaries by
twelve dollars a week, improved safety and sanitary conditions in the factories, and
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earned a thirteen-week sick benefit policy.10' Besides the economic gains Local 2 1
achieved for its membership, it also sought to alleviate the pressure of post-war
inflation by offering a number of services: a credit union, a Consumer Service, a
Union Buying Service, and a Consumer Union. Credit unions had become popular in
the late thirties. In 1939 more than 1,000 new credit unions were established around
the country.102Functioning like a bank, the credit union was designed to act as a
savings and loan institution, generally for "small borrowers who can offer little or no
security except their own personal integrity."lo3 Not only did members borrow money
at a lower interest rate than at traditional banks, but the credit union also kept union
members' money "out of the clutches of the loan sharks," according to the Local 21
Loan sharks, of course, were the capitalist bankers and manufacturers.
Local 21's credit union opened in August 1950 and lasted until the mid sixties.105The
Local 21 Bulletin ran many articles and anecdotes to inform members of the merits of

the credit union. One story featured a real situation where a member of Local 21
borrowed money from a regular bank instead of using the credit union. The article
ended by saying "If he had borrowed the $300 from the Local 21 Credit Union. . .he
would have paid a total of fourteen dollars in interest-a

101

savings of $39.65."'06
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The credit union reflected Local 21's efforts at creating institutions to serve its
membership and its ideals. It not only allowed workers a place to save and receive
low interest loans, but it provided another opportunity for Local 21 to educate its
members about the corrupt policies of big business which had its hand in other
lending institutions. Workers also had a role in creating and maintaining the credit
union. The criterion for being on the governing board of the credit union was
membership in it, so any person who had the 25-cent initiation fee and the $5
membership share could participate in the governing of the financial institution.lo7
Thus, the very premise of a credit union epitomized the essence of solidarity
unionism-an

organization for the people and run by the people. One did not need to

be a leader in the union or the community to have a voice in the day-to-day operations
of the credit union.
Another membership-controlled service was the Consumer Service, a store
designed to offer union members household appliances and goods at a reduced cost.
"Goods [were] marked up from wholesale just enough to cover costs of operation."108
Working in conjunction with Local 20, in Lynn, Local 21 opened a Consumer Service
in 1953. Although the store was reported to be "a considerable financial aid to those
members who patronized it," the volume of shoppers was not heavy enough to make
the store self-supporting. Rather than trylng to make the store self-supporting by
investing more money and moving it to a bigger space or raising prices, Local 21

lo' Tredit Union is Growing as Members See Value," Local 21 Bulletin, June 27, 195 1, p. 1; "Local
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decided to liquidate it after only one year in business.'09 Though this venture lasted
only a short time, it was another attempt by Local 21 to offer its members more
services-services

in which the members had expressed an interest. However, when it

was obvious that members were not utilizing this service as much as necessary, the
Local 21 leadership listened to what the membership wanted. The store was closed.
To offset the closing of the Union Store in February 1954, the Local 21
BulIetin started running a half page ad by the Union Buying Service in April 1954.

The Union Buying Service was a "cooperative effort to provide for [the] membership
quality goods at reduced prices."1l o This service featured a host of household
products-housewares,

appliances, linens, giftware, infant supplies--on which the

Union Buying Service could obtain discounts."' Purchased articles were mailed to
members' homes and the Union Buying Service picked up the shipping costs. In
addition to this Buying Service, the Local 21 Bulletin and the District One Reporter
began printing a classified section called the Trading Post in the early fifties. Any
member who wanted to sell something could run an advertisement free of charge.
This feature, which was initiated because of membership demand, ran in the Local 21
BuIIetin until the very end of its publication life in 1973.

Another service designed to help consumers "get the most for their rapidly
shrinking dollar" was the Consumer Union, a non-profit testing agency, featuring
products that had been tested and found to be the best buy for the money.'I2 Initiated
-

Io9
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in the mid 1940s when the government's Office of Price Administration (OPA) had
been disbanded, the Consumer Union allowed workers and their families a way to
economize. Understanding the inflationary pressures confronting labor, the Consumer
Union tested products useful to the rank and file.
The Consumer Union tried to service the consumer. For instance, to help the
savvy buyer during white sales in the month of January, the Consumer Union
tested-by

rubbing, pulling and washing-fifty-three

brands of sheets. Consumer

Union discovered that "while white heavy muslin sheets will give you more wear per
dollar, percales may make up for their higher price in lower laundry costs and greater
The Consumer Union was a regular feature of the Fur and Leather
Worker, but it ran inconsistently in the Local 21 Bulletin. Interestingly enough, the
local Catholic Church did not condone the Consumer Union because it offered a
thirty-two-page report on contraceptive materials and their reliability. The Boston
archdiocese said that the "Consumer Union reveals itself as a service which the
decent-minded disdain."'

l4

Whether Catholic leather workers heeded the Church's

advice on this point is unknown.
With these various buying and testing services, Local 21, with the
International's help, offered members a host of ways to offset post-war inflationary
prices. Ventures were tried and then discontinued when they proved ineffective. New
ideas were implemented-like

the Trading Post-from

membership input and were

retained because they had a tremendous appeal and following.

'I4
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In addition to its consumer initiatives, Local 21 evinced a real desire to
maintain health care for the workers and initiate a pension program. Discussion in the
Local 21 Bulletin of the need for a pension plan dated to the late forties. In 1949 the
Local 21 Bulletin ran an article taken from the leather industry's own publication,
Leather and Shoes. This article urged tanneries to create pension plans for workers.

Comparing men to machines, the editorial in Leather and Shoes said that "the
industry must sharply and quickly convert its perspective toward pensions [and] it
must provide at least the same respectful considerations for men as it does for
machines and mules." Taking this comparison between men and machines one step
further, the editorial suggested that just as one writes off the cost of a machine
depreciating, the cost of "manpower should also be ded~cted.""~
While the leather industry conceded that pensions were necessary, nothing
was done. In October 1953, the Local 21 Bulletin ran an article entitled "Peabody
Survey Shows Need for Tannery Pension Program." This article related how a survey
by the Traveler's Insurance Company showed that forty-five percent of Peabody
leather workers were forty-five years old and out of "2,811 tannery workers in the
area. . .32 percent were in the 46-60 age group, 11 percent in the 61-70 group and 2
percent in the 71 year and over group." The Local 21 Bulletin characterized the
Traveler's report as pointing "up a major contention of our union. . .an adequate
pension program is mandatory-for

reasons of humanity and justice and for the

"Taming Industry's Own Paper Urges Pensions for Workers," Local 21 Bulletin, February 16,
1949, p. 2.

'IS

welfare of the industry it~elf.""~
Together these two articles gave labor more
ammunition with which to intensify its struggle for a pension plan by the mid-1950s.
The 1954 wage negotiations between Local 21 and the manufacturers
revolved around the establishment of a pension fund. In presenting its case, Local 21
said that "the evidence and considerations in this case overwhelmingly demand that at
least five cents of the wage award in this arbitration be set aside for a pension fund."
The union said such a pension h d would provide a service to workers, the industry,
and the conmunity where workers live. Claiming that upwards of one third of all
leather workers-and

almost three quarters of all industrial workers-were

now

covered by pension plans, Local 21 made the case that pensions were no longer
unprecedented and that to provide adequately for themselves in retirement,
leatherworkers needed this fund to be established. (A.C. Lawrence had initiated a
pension program in 1919 and in 1947 the company expanded eligibility for the
plan.)"7 "Even the recently improved level of social security retirement benefits fails
to meet the very minimum needs of retired workers as estimated by the government,"
the union said. Further exacerbating the need for a pension fund, the union discussed
the health toll the leather industry exacted:
[The] excessive health hazards of the [leather] industry, which create medical
bills and loss of wages not protected by Blue Cross-Blue Shield or by the
Workmen's Compensation and which lay the basis for greater than normal
financial difficulties in old age [need to be addressed in the form of a
pension]. ' I 8
-
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The union argued that not having a pension plan made it more difficult to attract a
skilled labor pool because the younger workers had left the leather industry to pursue
jobs at Lynn's General Electric plant, which did provide a pension plan."9 Even after
such an extensive listing of why Peabody leather manufacturers should adopt a
pension plan for their workers, local concerns still did not provide one.
Workers and Local 21 leadership felt strongly about the need for a pension
plan and refused to be thwarted in their efforts. Five years after the Traveler's Report
came out and almost ten years after the report in Leather and Shoes, Local 21
heralded the implementation of the Massachusetts Leather Pension Fund sponsored
by the employers. Enacted in 1958, the pension plan highlighted the degree of
interaction between the union and its members.

With the closing of more and more

leather factories in the late fifties, uncertainty marred the leather industry's future and
heightened workers' concerns. The Massachusetts Leather Pension Fund gave leather
workers at least some measure of security.
In order to maintain unity and a sense of camaraderie among the membership,
Local 21, with the International's help, sought to educate its membership on many
levels--culturally, politically, and socially. Each of these areas was related and had
an impact on creating unity. Cultural enhancement was a large part of the educational
effort. The International believed that "the American people have always expressed a
desire for cultural development. Amongst us there are singers, actors, writers,
musicians, playwrights, and artists. It is our obligation to find this talent, to develop it

'I9
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and use it for the benefit of the entire working class m~vement."'~'Because the mass
media were so deficient in representing the needs of workers, the IFLWU wanted
members to work together in creating an alternative form of entertainmententertainment that encapsulated the needs and circumstances of the working class.
With this aim in mind, the International encouraged all locals to initiate
drama, chorus, and photography groups; chess and checker clubs; and to highlight the
hobbies of their members. While it is not evident if Local 21 sponsored any types of
clubs or groups (besides sporting groups), it did acknowledge and promote workers'
hobbies. The Local 21 Bulletin periodically devoted a good deal of column space to
highlighting the interesting hobbies of various members. Usually these stories were
enhanced with photos of the brother and his hobby (in all cases men were
showcased). Apparently, some members actually used supplies from the leather
industry for their hobbies. For instance, Carl Henry, a splitter at the Korn Leather
plant in Peabody in the 1940s, was a carver. Instead of carving out of wood, he
carved "red chalk used in cellar departments for marking wet leather."'22 Henry's
work was so professional he was able to sell his wares and services. Such special
features in the Local 21 Bulletin offered members another perspective on life, one that
highlighted individuals for their skills and ingenuity. This was in stark contrast to
how rank and file workers were traditionally characterized in the mainstream press-

12' The Fur Worker, June 1939, p. 9. This type of language brings to mind Michael Denning's
discussion of the Popular Front ideology. With the Popular Front movement of the thirties, Denning
saw a segment he labeled cultural workers. These individuals worked in the cultural industriestheatre, radio, and the movies-and by so doing created an alternative from of entertainment. Denning,
The Cultural Front.
Tark Henry is Expert Carver," Local 21 Bulletin, August 25, 1948, p. 3.

"as victims. . .unemployed. . .unable to afford health care or a house [and] alienated
from
In tenns of other cultural outlets, Local 21 members had access to the Local
21 Free Library, and they could read the movie, theatre and book reviews offered by

the Fur and Leather Worker. Sponsored by the Education Committee, the Local 21
Free Library experienced considerable use. While not a regular feature of the Local
21 Bulletin, the newspaper occasionally printed the titles of the new books the library

purchased. The range of titles was quite interesting; while some books obviously had
ties to the labor movement-The

Jungle by Upton Sinclair--other titles were timeless

classics-Moby

Dick and Leaves of Grass. Many of the books had an international

theme-Behind

the Silken Curtain, Bartley Crum's depiction of the fight over

Palestine and Near Eastern oil.'24
In the books chosen for the Free Library there was a definite attempt to

educate leather workers on a whole range of subjects: American ideals, world
cultures, religion, union philosophy, to name a few. Although there is no way to
gauge the effect this library and its books had on union members, conments in the
Local 21 Bulletin indicate that workers utilized this opportunity and took books out
on a regular basis.
Besides the Free Library, the IFLWU participated in a book club service with
the publishing firnl of Cameron and Kahn. This service, which ran advertisements in
the Fur and Leather Worker and the Local 21 Bulletin in the fifties, provided newly
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published books to union members at a discounted price. The first book choice for the
book club was The Game of Death by Albert E. Kahn. The advertisement for the
book promised the story of anti-labor propaganda in the schools, why drug addiction
and crime are a problem with young people, and the poisonous effects of comic
books, radio, and television on children.12' This book espoused some of the major
political underpinnings of the IFLWU and provided a perfect opportunity to educate
the membership about anti-labor propaganda and the machinations of the mass media
and other monopolistic enterprises.
Book reviews were also a common feature in the Fur and Leather Worker. In
this section workers could get a concise plot sunlmary of a novel and find out about
the author. Books like Iron City by Lloyd Brown were typical of what was
highlighted. Brown, an African-American author, wrote his first novel Iron City
based on his experiences as a labor organizer in the early thirties. The Fur and
Leather Worker characterized it as an excellent novel that should be read.126
In addition to book reviews, the Fur and Leather Worker occasionally ran

advertisements featuring books and magazines. One advertisement was for Friday, a
short-lived, national picture magazine. Periodically in 1941 the Fur and Leather
Worker featured a half-page, tabloid-sized advertisement for Friday. An

advertisement placed in the January 1941 issue promised readers "the truth about
Ford" if they read Friday, "the magazine that dares to tell the truth-marshals-for
you to read-all
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the facts about Ford and the fascist type empire he directs." Whether

Fur and Leather Worker, July and August 1953, p. 13.
Fur and Leather Worker, November 1951, p. 19

workers chose to buy this magazine is immaterial. Just devoting so much space to an
advertisement that featured tantalizing teasers about upcoming issues had to have
affected some readers. According to historian Michael Denning, for those individuals
who read the magazine there is no doubt about its effectiveness; unlike the
mainstream press, it represented the "CIO working classes. . . and captured the
common sense of its audience, the second generation blue collar and white collar
ethnic

worker^."'^'
Like Friday, the majority of the books and periodicals reviewed had ties to the

labor movement or labor philosophy-The

People Don 't Know by George Seldes,

Simple Speaks His Mind by Langston Hughes, In the City, Was a Garden by Henry
Kraus, and The Wall by John Hersey and Albert A. Knopf to name a few. Through
these book reviews, the leadership made a concerted effort to offer readers a selection
of books that mirrored the IFLWU philosophy. This philosophy espoused the ideals
of equality for all, the need to fight big business and government for worker rights,
and the need to work collectively. These themes went directly against the messages
emanating from more traditional mass culture 0ut1ets.l~~
The monthly movie and theater reviews in the Fur and Leather Worker also
served to educate workers on labor philosophy and offered an alternative vision of
American life. The leadership of the IFLWU wanted the membership to understand
-
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their situation in life. Movies that unrealistically portrayed working life thus would
not aid the union's objectives. The leadership of the IFLWU hoped to inspire its
membership and illustrate how a united fiont would allow them to accomplish their
goals of a more equitable society. In addition, movie reviews gave workers a better
idea of how best to spend their hard-earned dollars. Movies were rated according to
Best Bets, Also Acceptable, At Your Own Risk, and Skip. In November 1950, the
Fur and Leather Worker described these current films as a "best bet": Distant
Journey, All Quiet on the Western Front (a reissue), The Men, No Way Out,
Hollywood Ten, and City Lights (a reissue). The "acceptable" films were Three Little
Words, Summer Stock, Fancy Pants, Teafor Two, Eye Witness, Broken Arrow, and
Flame and the Arrow. Movies considered to be "at your own risk" included Stella,
Shakedown, The Furies, Cariboo Trail, Black Rose, My Widow and I, Where the
Sidewalk Ends, and My Friend Irma Goes West. Movies to "skip" were Abbot and
Costello in the Foreign Legion, Desert Hawk, Death of a Dream, and Good Humor

c an.'*^
One can understand why a "best bet" would include a movie like All Quiet on
the Western Front. Though made in 1930 as a commentary on World War I, its
reissue in 1950 directly epitomized the anti-war stance of the IFLWU. Reissued when
the United States was escalating its involven~entin Korea, All Quiet on the Western
Front portrayed what the IFLWU wanted its membership to understand: the human
consequences of war. The movie depicted the human costs of war and promoted
pacifism, which coincided with the strongly worded political editorials detailing the
Fur and Leather Worker, November 1950, p. 19.

monetary ranlifications of the war machine found in the IFLWU periodicals.
Acceptable movies in the minds of the IFLWU leadership garnered a detailed
write-up. In discussing Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, a movie advocated by the Fur
and Leather Worker, the International championed its realistic portrayal of politics.
We are shown how machine politics reach right up to Congress to
force passage of fraudulent bills to line the pockets of the gang back
home. The home boys control every newspaper in the state, so that not
a single word of the gallant fight young Senator Smith puts up to
expose the senatorial state politician racket can reach the voter.
The language in this movie review was meant to make leather and fur workers ponder
the political process. Just in case there was any doubt in the minds of its union
members after reading the first part of the review, the IFLWU reiterated further along
in the article that the government was not interested in the poor, blue-collar worker
and that labor could only look to its union for help.
Labor can learn a valuable lesson from Mr. Smith's experience in
Washington. The state of Mississippi [sic] shown in the picture could
just as well have been most any other state in the union; the political
machine which dominates candidates can be founding in every one of
the 48 states. The press almost without exception is everywhere
controlled by powerful politicians and self seekers. Labor's interest,
Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, clearly shows can best be served by
electing labor candidates through organizations like Labor's Non
Partisan League and by supporting the Labor press such as their own
union paper, CIO News etc.I3O
In movie reviews like this, the International tried to raise the political awareness of
the average worker and reaffirnt the importance of union publications. By so doing
the union hoped to insert itself into the lives of its members and show these members
that the union always had their best interests at heart.
130
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While movies like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington were highly praised, movies
like The Red Menace were severely lambasted. The Fur and Leather Worker called
the 1949 release of The Red Menace, a "Fascist-like portrayal in line with current
Hollywood hysteria and the un-American Committee definition of Americanism." It
recommended that readers "skip" the movie.13' Obviously, the negative review
reflected the IFLWU's own ongoing battle with the CIO over its affiliation with the
Conlmunist

A "best bet" film detailed issues pertinent to the union's cause,

while a "skip" film illustrated ideals contrary to the labor union's philosophy.
Besides movie reviews, Local 21 membership could have also benefitedboth culturally and politically-from

the theatre reviews done in the Fur and Leather

Worker.New York City, the home of the Furriers Joint Council (FJC), a major local

of the IFLWU, was the site of many worker theatre productions, both amateur and
professional. The Fur and Leather Worker did monthly features on these plays. Most
of the plays reviewed had a labor slant and were not only entertaining but also
educational in terms of espousing union philosophy.133
Although these plays only ran for a short length of time and were inaccessible
to many because of where they were performed-in
limited seating and cramped stages-reviews

New York City theatres with

in the Fur and Leather Worker gave

readers the sense of being there. In reviewing a perfonnance of The Aristocrats, by N.
Pogodin, a celebrated Soviet dramatist, the educational director of the Joint Board of
Fur Dressers and Dyers said that the play was "a weapon in the struggle for truth."
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The educational director's only lament was that too few people were able to see the

Were it put on Broadway and in the movies it would reach trade
unionists and others who would be thrilled with this powerful state of
human change and would give them added inspiration and
understanding for the great, complicated tasks of examination and
uniting of 1ab0r.I~~
Although the majority of rank and file workers were unable to attend these offBroadway shows, the commentaries and reviews gave workers a sense of an
alternative medium of entertainment. These shows were not available locally, but
they did exist. They showed the rank and file workers that their life experiences were
important and that others shared similar hardships. In addition, the outcomes in many
of these books, movies, and plays showed workers that by banding together they
could change their circumstances in life.
All of these efforts at cultural uplift would fail if workers did not speak a
common language. This posed a real problem in Peabody because the leather industry
employed a large immigrant population. In an effort to aid the leather worker, the
Education Committee of Local 21 provided citizenship instruction and English
classes for all members and their families. In addition to the classes offered by the
Union, the Local 21 Bulletin also advertised the classes sponsored by the adult civic
education department in ~ e a b o d ~In. some
' ~ ~ locals members who enrolled in the
union's English classes were able to prepare for an examination to allow them to earn
public school diplomas.'36One local, the FJC in New York City-an
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especially

progressive local-had

afternoon classes for unemployed members. The classes

taught unemployed workers union procedures and provided skills, like public
speaking and problem articulation. An added benefit fiom these classes was that they
provided workers with a place to go during a slow employment season.'37Local 21,
however, understood that ethnic heritage was an integral part of leather workers'
lives. According to long-time Local 21 member A1 Quantros, O'Keefe had a knack
for bringing people together:
Ya know, we had a lot of foreign-speaking people, and he always made sure
that there would be somebody that could interpret for someone who was
unable to speak the language. He'd have a Greek person who could interpret
for a Greek person, a Polish person for a Polish person, a Portuguese person . .
. that kind of thing. He always had somebody who would take care of the
foreign-speaking people. It truly was probably one of the most important
things in keeping the union together, the fact that they had someone there who
would speak for the people who could not speak English. If there wasn't
anyone on the board or an appointed office, he'd go out and find s o n ~ e o n e . ' ~ ~
O'Keefe's efforts to include all workers demonstrated that these classes served as
more than attempts to Americanize immigrants. In its early days (1939 until the
immediate post-World War II years), the Fur and Leather Worker printed special
pages in other languages for its different ethnic groups, and Local 21 utilized
translators at its meetings. According to former Local 2 1 officials, this became
unnecessary by the end of the forties and was d i s ~ o n t i n u e d .It' ~became
~
unnecessary
because immigration had drastically tapered off after World War I in response to the

--

13' Fur
138

and Leather Worker, February 1940, p. 10.
Transcripts from Leather Soul, April 21-23, 1989 and April 27-30, 1989 Interview with A1
Quantros at the Union Hall, 78.
139 Interview with James Sawyer, Peabody, Massachusetts, February 200 1.

Immigration Acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924 and the Great ~ e ~ r e s s i o140
n .Thus, by the
late 1940s, the union's abandonment of foreign language pages and translators
reflected the changing needs of its members.14'
Another aspect of the union's education mission meant keeping the members
well informed of their union rights. The Local 21 Bulletin was replete with regular
features providing information about insurance and health benefits and contract rules
and regulations. To help ensure that all workers received the full benefits they were
due, the Local 21 Bulletin ran features discussing a host of job-related questions.
Some of these features were a rehash of lectures that were conducted at membership
meetings. For instance, in the fall of 1947, a Boston attorney came to a Local 21
membership meeting and spoke on how to make sure workers injured on the job got
their full monetary benefits. "Many workers fail to collect their full benefits for
injuries received on the job because they do not obtain the facts and witnesses at the
time of the accident," Harold Roitman, Boston attorney in the firnl of Grant and
Angoff, warned the membership.142Other articles were devoted to answering
commonly asked questions workers had or highlighting a speech an important person
made at a Local 21 outing. In the late forties and early fifties, Local 21 brought in an
interesting array of individuals to speak to workers at holiday celebrations. These
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of New York Press, 1986), 209;
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holiday gatherings usually attracted large numbers of leather workers and provided
the perfect setting to educate the leather community on a myriad of issues.
One discussion topic, for example, was the lack of manufacturing
opportunities in the city of Peabody and the state as a whole. To address
unemployment problems in 1949, Local 2 1 formed a Council of the Unemployed "to
launch a campaign for more liberal unemployment compensation in Massachusetts."
The committee aimed to boost maximum unemployment benefits, which, at $30 for
forty weeks, was not sufficient to cover the basic needs of unemployed leather
workers. 143
While recognizing the necessity of education, the IFLWU also believed in
supporting recreational opportunities for its members. In October 1946, the IFLWU
joined with other CIO and AFL locals to create a Sports Federation, designed to
foster inter-union competition. The IFLWU encouraged each local to set up a
basketball, bowling, and softball league; to sponsor various sporting tournaments; and
to use union publications to report scores. Sports were an integral part of Local 21
life. At the Eighteenth Biennial Convention of the IFLWU in the spring of 1950, the
International praised Local 2 1 for its sports program, especially its bowling league
which was the largest in the nation.144
Local 2 1 saw its sports program as helping "to bring many of our members
together and enabl[ing] them to appreciate more the good fellowship that they receive
from this."145In sponsoring a basketball team, a sofiball league, a golf tournament,
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and a bowling league, Local 21 fblfilled its goal of promoting social a d ~ a n c e m e n t . ' ~ ~
Through the sports program members could feel a part of a larger group. In talking
about the rise of labor sports across the country in the mid thirties, the Daily Worker,
a Communist Party publication, acknowledged "there's a very valuable experience of
workers uniting with spirit and efficiency to weld something for their own benefit."
The Daily Worker envisioned the day when labor sports would displace attendance at
professional sporting events.I4' While maybe not displacing the importance of
professional sport, labor sports became an integral part of Local 21's life. The Local
21 Bulletin devoted its back page to discussing its sports programs-golf,

softball,

and bowling. The various tournaments and league games had an avid following, and
banquets culminated all of the athletic contests. These sporting events built a feeling
of camaraderie, a feeling that was cultivated and fostered by union leaders.
Prior to the formation of Local 21's sports program, there were a few
progressive tanneries in the Peabody area that did sponsor a baseball team; A.C.
Lawrence was one of those companies.'48Because there were so few local teams, the
A.C. Lawrence team had to travel throughout the greater Northshore area to
compete.'49 That changed when the union began to sponsor teams in the early forties.
The union sporting events provided entertainment for the whole community and
served to strengthen the bonds of solidarity unionism. Manufacturers quickly realized
Union Grows," Local 21 Bulletin, January 19, 1949, p. 2.
Lester Rodney, "Labor Sports Spreading in U.S.,"Daily Worker 13 (December 2 1 , 1936): 8.
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the benefits of organized sports for the workers. By 1945 many of the leather
manufacturers also sponsored softball and bowling teams. The Weekly Bulletin of
Leather and Shoe News said that by equipping and sponsoring their own team, the

manufacturers had taken "a step [in the] right direction to promote and maintain
cooperation and better understanding between labor and

manufacturer^."'^^

With these sporting activities the union and leather employers vied for
workers' attention and loyalty. While workers engaged in both union sports activities
and company-sponsored sporting events, the manufacturers' paternalistic advances
proved insufficient in diminishing Local 21's impact on workers' lives. A close
analysis of the activities of Local 21 illustrates that despite the efforts of big business,
popular culture, and govenmental regulations to limit and hinder unionization in the
1940s, the IFLWU, and more specifically Local 2 1, managed to ensure an alternative
community for its members. With the financial and organizational backing of the CIO
and the IFLWU, Local 21 implemented a host of programs and activities that served
to equalize some of the economic and cultural discrepancies found in society.
Although there was still a wealthy class and a laboring class in mid-twentieth century
Peabody, the laboring class had started to attain more equality in terms of workplace
rights, cultural and recreational opportunities, and social programs. Tannery owners
were no longer the only ones on the golf course. Union members could be found on
the links, as well.
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Local 21's programs and activities were not unusual for the period. Many of
the goals of the IFLWU came directly from the CIO platform and the programs
adopted by Local 21 were creations of the CIO.'~'What distinguished Local 21 from
other unions, however, was that it carried out so many of these initiatives and
cultivated a worker culture for so long. Even after the disbanding of the IFLWU,
Local 21 tried to maintain and advance programs and activities for its members well
into the 1960s.
Under the auspices of the IFLWU and the CIO, Local 21, through the services
and programs it provided, initiated a moral economy in the city of Peabody for the
leather workers. In creating this moral economy, the union concerned itself with
creating a better quality of life for the workers. They defined this quality of life not
only in terms of workplace reforms but also in regards to leisure time, economic
opportunity, and social activities. These rank and file workers understood that the
"political democracy that exists in America, the right to choose between opposing
candidates, falls far short. . . . The ultimate issue that has always been at the base of
the progressive vision is genuine democracy, the rule of the people in all aspects of
~ ~ the leadership of Chamouris and later
society, political, social and e c ~ n o m i c . " 'With
O'Keefe, Local 21 began to "chip away" at Peabody's social and economic
inequities. Local 21 did not merely reflect the International's directives, but instead
reflected and was shaped by the workers living in the Leather City. Former union
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leader A1 Quantros credited O'Keefe with being instrumental in initiating all the postwar union activities:

I think that was all part of Mike's personality-all part of Mike's bringing
people together and getting people to know one another. He would get them
all involved. He's actually the one who started the bowling leagues and all of
the leagues that we had. Of course, a lot of it came from some of the members
who would say, "Why don't we have one and he would go right out and push
for it, work for it, and get it going."'53
Cooperation, unity, and strong leadership epitomized Local 2 1 in the early postWorld War I1 years. When O'Keefe listened to what the membership wanted in
regards to social activities and workplace gains, he ensured the union's viability in the
postwar years. Local 21 tried to remain an essential organization in the leather
workers' lives. By appealing to workers' social and physical needs, Local 21 did not
allow itself to become irrelevant; nor did it allow the manufacturers to gain workers'
attention.
The leather workers in Peabody were active molders and shapers of their
future. Their sense of activism and independence epitomized the true character of
solidarity unionism. This becomes evident in Chapter Four, which details the way
Local 21 handled its expulsion from the CIO and its ultimate divorce from the Fur
Workers.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
The Repression of the Postwar Years: Local 21's Fight to Retain Solidarity
Unionism

Even though [the labor movement] may always remain a minority
movement in point of membership among workers, it will exercise the
power that a minority always exercises in proportion to its clearness of
purpose, its efficiency of organization, and the integrity of its
directors. In as much as the labor left demonstrated courage and
leadership on the issues of rank and file democracy, control of the
workplace conditions, and gender and race equality, it had power to
change them and American society. Its struggle for autonomy, dignity,
and decent standards of living had and still has a heroic quality in a
world where poverty, disease, and the increasing control of
corporations of our daily lives are reality.'
The decade of the forties was a progressive period in which Local 21 initiated
a host of programs and activities. It also marked a crucial decade in labor history. At
the end of World War II, labor's "aggregate numbers suggested real power."2 By
1945, eleven million workers were organized-thirty-six

percent of the labor force.3

Cost of living increases, war sacrifices, and wartime no-strike pledges all served to
create post-war labor strife. In 1945, there were 4,750 strikes involving 1.34 million
workers. Four million workers were involved in 4,985 strikes in 1946, the largest
yearly total in American history4 This strike wave cost the country 119.8 million
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man-days of lost production.5 Leather workers were not immune to the national
situation.
Although the leather workers comprising the IFLWU had adhered to a nostrike pledge and had accepted nominal wage increases through the war years, their
docility was only temporary. When leather manufacturers tried to cut wages at the
conclusion of the war, the leather workers united "to protect the gains already made,
but also to carry on the fight for continued improven~entsuntil they were won." In an
unprecedented show of solidarity, 60,000 leather workers in eighteen states
participated in a one-day work stoppage on November 15, 1945. Rallying support for
this nationwide stoppage, Ben Gold told the leather workers that their union was vital:
[Leather] is an important, basic industry of our country. It requires training
and skill to produce leather. It is injurious to the workers' health. The least the
industry can do for its workers is to provide them with a decent livelihood.
During the war years, the unscrupulous profiteers in our country, in violation
of the President's Executive Order, and in violation of every decent principle
of patriotism, raised the cost of living to such a degree that the millions of
workers were unable to meet the high prices. As a result, the wages of the
workers were actually reduced, compared with the rise in the cost of living.
The millions of American workers throughout the country are therefore forced
to demand that this great injustice be rectified. American labor demands a
substantial wage i n ~ r e a s e . ~
Leather workers wanted a thirty percent wage increase to offset the high and rapidly
rising cost of living. Local 21 unanimously supported this stoppage. In a Western
Union telegram to IFLWU president Ben Gold, Local 21's business manager Richard
"Mike" O'Keefe said:
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The leather workers of Peabody . . . unanimously support you as our
spokesman and leader in demanding a decent living wage for the leather
workers. We assure you of our determination to stand united with the rest of
the leather workers in our international for a strong progressive union and a
human standard of living for all workers.'
Leather workers' show of solidarity had its desired effect. Across the country, tannery
bosses conceded to wage increases and other improvements.8
Labor in a host of other industries replicated the "overt show of force on the
part o f ' leather workers. To thwart this rising tide of union militancy, the
government, industry, and the public joined forces in "a growing mood of
conservatisn~."~
To protect their profits big business, with the help of the government,
began to undercut the labor movement by resorting to the tactic it had employed
earlier in the century: red-baiting. Business and government "began a heated
campaign against the communists who agitate and incite the workers to demand
higher wages and who carry out strikes in order to ruin American ind~stries."'~
Historian Gary Gerstle traced the beginnings of the conservative, anti-labor
tide to the strike wave of the mid thirties, which instigated a "middle-class backlash
against organized labor."" And by the late thirties, feelings of intense anticommunism once again began to sweep the nation. "Anticommunism, by 1939, had
become as deeply felt a sentiment in Catholic communities, [such as Peabody], as had
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devotion to Roosevelt and his new deal."12 By the postwar years, the witch-hunt was
on.
Labor provided a special target for the Truman administration's anti
communism . . . . Unions constituted one of the few institutions in U.S.
society where Communists, although few in number, actually maintained a
visible presence and provided a potential threat to stability. Anti communism
offered a convenient way of drumming up labor support for Truman's foreign
policy, of isolating and discrediting militants within the working class, of
further consolidating the power of union bureaucrats, and, just in case any of
those failed, of identifying real Communists as scapegoats.13
Eradicating the Communist element from the labor movement became synonymous
with internal security.l 4
To deal with "Big Labor," the nickname in the forties for the AFL and CIO,
the Eightieth Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor
Management Relations Act, in 1947. Even though President Truman vetoed TaftHartley, Congress had enough support to override his veto. While Taft-Hartley
"retained the Wagner Act's framework of certification of unions through elections
supervised by the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] and its prohibitions
against specified 'unfair labor practices'.

. . it changed the thrust of the [Wagner]

Act" by outlawing the closed shop, contract strikes, mass picketing, secondary
boycotts "and other actions of solidarity."15
Called the slave labor act by labor, Taft-Hartley ushered in a new period in the
American labor movement. In order to curb labor successfidly, though, the
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government needed to form a tighter bond with the CIO. This did not prove difficult;
the government offered the CIO representation in federal legislation if the CIO helped
the government in its quest to further its foreign policy and contain unrest on the
home front. By unrest at home the government meant labor, specifically labor with
ties to the Communist Party. The CIO became a willing accomplice. By 1948 the CIO
adamantly acknowledged that it would not permit Communists to be part of its
organization. CIO President Philip Murray chose to close his convention remarks in
1948 by verifjmg his anti-communist stance.
Under no circumstances am I going to permit . . . Communist infiltration into
the national CIO movement. I make this statement with sincere conviction
based upon a knowledge that has come down to me through the years, of the
damaging effects, the devastating effects, the degrading effects that special
outside interests, particularly the Communist Party, may have upon the labor
movement in the USA.'~

In making this statement, Murray engaged in selective amnesia. He chose to disregard
that the CIO, from its inception, had willingly allowed Communists, who made up
fifteen to twenty percent of the CIO, to flourish within its ranks and that they had
been instrumental in allowing the CIO to attain many of its goals for worker equality.
The CIO's leftist h n g e included some of the most effective trade unions in terms of
bargaining for contract and wage concessions. "Even some of the pro-Soviet left's
fiercest critics have conceded that the Communist-influenced unions were among the
most egalitarian, the most honest and well administered, the most racially
progressive, and the most class cons~ious."'~
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The federation, however, broadly defined its policy of ousting the Communist
element. Mirroring the government's policy, the CIO labeled "all opposition to the
imperialistic policy labeled Cold War, with its aggression abroad and its repression at
Ridding the labor movement of the Red influence became the
home" as ~ornrnunist.'~
top priority of the government and the CIO. Unions adhering to a Communist
philosophy "were too important to ignore, and the state was too strong to resist."19 In
accordance with a directive from U.S. policymakers, the CIO began a campaign to
oust left-wing unions from its midst. In all, the CIO expelled eleven unions on
charges that they were Communist dominated. The IFLWU was one of the eleven
unions. The ouster of the IFLWU from the CIO had many consequences. Most
importantly, it eventually led to the dismantling of the International union. It did not,
however, signal the end for Local 2 1. Exploring the downfall of the IFLWU
highlights the dynamic, democratic forces within Local 21. By remaining true to its
origins as a community-based union, Local 21 relied on its strong leadership and
sense of solidarity to persevere through a difficult time. By 1955, when the CIO and
AFL merged, Local 2 1 had returned to its roots-an

independent union.

A closer inspection of the events that transpired between 1939 and 1955
reinforces the reputation the local had earned for offering its members something
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other than business unionism. During this tumultuous decade, Local 2 1 battled on
various fronts-within

the local itself, the community, the state and federal

governments, and the International-and

yet managed to retain its sense of duty to its

Peabody constituents. While simultaneously handling a series of crises, Local 21,
under the leadership of O'Keefe, kept the needs of the leather workers at the forefront
of its mission and implemented a host of programs and initiatives that moved the
union closer to realizing its goal of revamping society economically, socially,
culturally, and politically.20
While the affiliation between the CIO and IFLWU was strong for many years,
the post-World War II years were difficult for labor. The anti-communist sentiments
expressed by the CIO leadership in 1948 were reaffirnled at the Cleveland convention
in 1949. Convention delegates "voted to put the skids on the Commies, to bar them
from membership on the CIO Executive Board and to pave the way for expulsion of
unions which adhere to the party line in preference to CIO policy."2' In denying the
charge that it had swung to the right, the CIO leadership explained that it was still
"left of center," but it could no longer tolerate the Comn~unistinfluence if it wanted
to have any voice in swaying Congress to enact labor-friendly legislation.22
In private after the 1949 CIO convention, CIO president Murray and ex-

president John Lewis told the IFLWU's Ben Gold that the CIO could not spend its
time fighting against Taft-Hartley as Gold wished because it b'wouldbring the CIO
See Chapter Three for a discussion of these programs and initiatives.
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into conflict with the govenment." Knowing that the House of Representatives
Committee on Un-American Activities (formerly known as the Dies Committee)
would call the CIO for a hearing, Lewis told Gold that the CIO had to be ready.
We have to have the speeches of our major leaders down in black and white in
order to wipe the floor with the Dies Committee when they dare to call us!. . .
Our goal is the machine! We must have our representatives in Congress and in
the Senate who will represent the millions of workers and curb the
reactionaries, the enemies of the workers.23
To be a player in post-war political life, the CIO claimed it had to make concessions.
One of those concessions was cleaning its house of the left-led unions. In order to
preserve what it characterized as "the greater good, the CIO leadership was willing to
sacrifice a few unions for the benefit of other CIO

affiliate^."^^

The IFLWU made an easy target for the CIO since its president, Ben Gold,
was a declared member of the Communist Party. The CIO, however, said that Gold's
affiliation with the union was not enough to "sustain the charges against" the union.
To find more evidence that the IFLWU was adhering to Communist doctrine, the CIO
conducted a detailed investigation of the IFLWU's papers and policy statements. As a
result of this investigation, the CIO determined that there was more than enough
information to tie the IFLWU to the Communist Party. In making its case, the CIO
concluded that the purpose of the Communist Party, which has fiom "its inception
been to establish a new order of society-'the

dictatorship of the proletariat'-which

would be controlled by and operated in the interests of the working class, has been the
purpose of the IFLWU." Instead of being "genuinely devoted to the advancement of

-
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the cause of American labor and American democracy," the CIO contended that the
IFLWU was intent on undennining the basic democratic structure of the United States
because its "policies and activities are determined by the Communist party."25 The
committee explained that the union's official publication, Fur and Leather Worker,
rife with Marxist and Stalinist doctrine, "offered some amusing reading material to
'prove' that Soviet Russia is a worker's paradise."26
Some of the charges the CIO made were correct. The IFLWU did support a
socialist economic system, but coupled with a democratic government; the
International believed this fonn of governmental structure would allow working
people to experience a better quality of life. Local 2 1, in its quest to create a more
equitable society, characterized as a moral economy, also espoused a socialist
economic system that favored a redistribution of income "via progressive taxation,
welfare spending, public works projects, and the regulation of financial and labor

market^."^' This, however, was not a shift in thinking for either of these labor
organizations. In saying that it advocated a socialist economic philosophy, Local 21
adamantly denied it supported communism. Characterizing communism as "a blight
on the American picture and throughout the world," O'Keefe declared communism to
be "a dictatorship and neither Stalin nor Franco nor any other dictator can ever expect
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to have the people swallow their form of government."28 O'Keefe explained that
Local 2 1's governing philosophy was to "establish real unity [based] on a sound
democratic principle. Everyone in the Union is on the same basis-regardless
color, political belief or religion-and

of

everyone has a right to speak up at meetings,

help decide policies and state his differences without fear or favor."29
Regardless of how the IFLWU, and Local 21, described its political
philosophy, the CIO Executive Board officially charged the International on
November 5, 1949, with carrying out activities and policies "consistently directed
toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party
rather than the objectives set forth in the Constitution of the CIO." The CIO set April
18, 1950, as the date for the formal hearing for the IFLWU. After Gold requested a
postponement until after the annual IFLWU convention, the CIO rescheduled the
hearing for June 1, 1950. When June 1 arrived, however, instead of sending
representatives to the hearing, the IFLWU sent a telegram that read:
Resolution adopted at 1 8 ' ~Biennial Convention of International Fur and
Leather Workers Union rejects charges by CIO officials against our union as
false and dishonest. It rejects kangaroo hearing set by CIO officials against
our union. It condemns raiding, splitting, union wrecking, and strikebreaking
directed by officials of National CIO. It condemns policy of CIO officials as
declared by Carey to unite with fascists in third world war. In view above,
convention decided overwhelmingly to disaffiliate from CIO with only three
opposing votes. Our union stands for united labor movement of AFL, CIO,
Miners union, railroad brotherhoods and all independent unions on policy of
trade union democracy and original olicies of CIO against war and fascism
for security, democracy, and peace.3 t
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With this telegram, the IFLWU severed its connection with the CIO and confirmed its
commitment to those ideals it had stood for since its merger in 1939: equality for all
individuals regardless of race, religion and ethnicity and a better quality of life for the
working person. Gold explained that the CIO no longer shared similar goals or a
sense of democracy:
The expulsions of the progressive trade unions, is nothing but an active
demonstration by Phil Murray and his lieutenants of their readiness and
willingness to silence the voice of progressive trade unionism and to crush
resistance on the part of progressive labor against the efforts of reaction to
force upon labor its war program and war preparations.31
After reading Gold's telegram, the CIO investigating committee determined to
proceed with the hearing despite the failure of the IFLWU to appear. After going over
all the evidence, the CIO investigating committee recommended that "the Executive
Board exercise the powers granted to it . . . and revoke the certificate of affiliation
heretofore granted to the IFLWU and expel it from the C I O . " ~Without
~
a dissenting
vote, the CIO officially expelled the IFLWU from the federation on June 15, 1950.
The United States government validated the CIO's findings when the
subcommittee on Labor and Labor Management Relations, under the guidance of
Hubert Humphrey, presented the CIO report on the IFLWU before the Eighty-second
Congress. Humphrey characterized the report as being significant for two reasons:
"[it] demonstrate[s] how an alert and democratically governed organization destroyed
Communist infiltration by due process, [and it] illuminate[s] the nature of Communist
3' LLFur
Workers Quit CIO on Trial Eve," CIO News 13 (May, 29, 1950): 7. See also "CIO Committee
May Urge IFLWU Ouster," The Leader-Republican-Gloversville and Johnstown, June 15, 1950.
Historian Art Preis agrees with this assessment of the CIO. See Art Preis, Twenty Years of the CIO:
Labor's Giant Step (New York: Pathfinder Press, l972), xviii-xix.
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strategy as a conspiracy to subvert unions as democratic institutions and to convert
them into bases for the extension of Communist power."33 Humphrey's words against
the IFLWU sealed the international's fate: it would survive intact for only another
five years. Gold, in his memoirs, acknowledged that withdrawing from the CIO
before it was expelled made the IFLWU an independent union, separated from the
mainstream labor movement. "This separation weakened the union. Our isolation
from the labor movement began a process which severely affected the International,
resulting in vital losses of membership because of raids on the leather locals by other
unions."34 This was not the case with Local 2 1.
The Peabody local managed to outlast the IFLWU because of its leadership.
Under O'Keefe, Local 21 used honesty and full disclosure to remain strong and
united throughout this turbulent time. O'Keefe understood that solidarity was key to
the union's survival. By keeping members informed and updated on the problems
with the labor federation, the elected officials of Local 21 created a feeling that all
leather workers were a team. Local 21 did not wait for the local media or the
International to educate its membership. When the CIO began pressuring the IFLWU
about its Communist members, Local 21 immediately discussed the controversy in its
monthly publication. Through the Local 21 Bulletin union officials, most notably
O'Keefe, maintained a steady dialogue with the membership.
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In addition, Local 21 did not just follow the International's lead in seceding
fiom the CIO; it had its own reasons for wanting to leave the CIO. The Peabody
union did not like many of the policies enacted by the CIO. In a strongly worded
statement in the Bulletin, O'Keefe said that Local 21 refused to "knuckle under to the
political thinking and dictatorship of this ruling crowd [in the CIO] . . . . We have a
union where we decide our own policies. We have full guarantees of our personal
rights and liberties. No one dictates to us."35 The leadership of Local 21 made it clear
to the membership that the problems between the CIO and International began before
the Communist investigation in 1950. "The trouble is that the national leadership of
the AFL and CIO have tied themselves so closely to the Truman administration and
its policies that they don't dare do anything effective. Labor has lost its bargaining
power in Washington, and the men in Congress fiom both parties know it."36
A similar development occurred within individual states. O'Keefe detailed how at the
state level, the CIO had failed to support some crucial benefits for Local 21's
membership in 1949.
Since last January our Union has been carrying on a vigorous campaign to
increase benefits and extend duration of unemployment compensation. We
filed a bill (House 905) in the state legislature last December to boost benefits
from $25 to $30 per week for single workers and to increase duration of
benefits fiom 23 weeks to 40. Realizing the importance of this measure, we
presented it first to the state CIO and urged that organization to introduce it.
The CIO refksed to do it and suggested we introduce it instead. Since that day,
although the unemployment situation has become more critical every week,
the state CIO has actually opposed our program to ive needed aid to many
tens of thousands of idle workers in Massachusetts.8 7
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O'Keefe explained that the CIO had sacrificed its goals and objectives for the
working person to appease politicians at all levels of government. As a result of the
CIO's reversal in position, Local 21 no longer wanted to take advice from an
organization that was focused on aiding the business community and government
rather than the worker. Historian Art Preis shares a similar opinion about the postwar
CIO: "At every step of the way they [the CIO] sought to subordinate the interests of
the workers to the dictates of the capitalist state or entrust the workers' interests to the
decisions of the capitalist government."38

In outlining the CIO's transgressions, O'Keefe told the membership that the
IFLWU would not take any action against the CIO-like

withdrawal-unless

it had

the members' approval. At the 1949 IFLWU district conference of the twelve New
England locals, delegates adopted a resolution solidifymg their conviction that all
union members have a part in decision-making:
Our union's policies are determined by our membership. At the same time,
our members and locals have always been guaranteed complete freedom of
thought and political action. This democratic principle makes us united and
strong. It assures us that the welfare of our members will always come first in
all our activities. . . .We oppose any attempt by the controlling group on the
national CIO executive board to dictate the thinking of our membership.39
Although Local 21 did not want to divide the labor movement by leaving the CIO,
protecting the workers remained the union's ultimate objective. In describing the CIO
controversy to the rank and file, O'Keefe was frank. While he admitted that it was
unfortunate that the split from the CIO would divide the labor movement, he did not
see any alternative. "We would much prefer that the CIO went back to its former

'* Preis, Twenty Years of the CIO, xviii-xix.
''"We Demand Right to Set Our Policies," Local 21 Bulletin, October 26, 1949, p. 1.

democratic program. But rather than see our union abandon its democratic policies in
order to stay in the CIO, we prefer to be out."0 Local 21's membership believed what
O'Keefe said about the CIO; they demonstrated their trust by voting overwhelmingly
to re-elect O'Keefe as business manager in the 1949 spring election. The landslide
victory he received "testified as to the extreme confidence the union members have in
[his] stewardship.'"
Because O'Keefe had such strong support, it is not surprising that at a Local
21 membership meeting scheduled directly after the IFLWU's Eighteenth Biennial
Convention in May 1950, where the International decided to leave the CIO, the Local
2 1 membership voted-with

only seven members in opposition-to

support the

convention's decision of "withdrawal of our union from the CIO in protest against
open scab-herding, strike breaking, and dictat~rshi~."~
O'Keefe assured the local's
membership that no longer being affiliated with the CIO would not alter the union's
goals and objectives. "Even when our union was part of the CIO, we set our own
independent course on negotiations, organization, etc. The rulers of the CIO treated
us as independent. CIO didn't organize for us. They never gave us a dime."3
Regardless of whether O'Keefe was telling the truth about the monetary arrangement
between Local 2 1 and the CIO, the relationship between the two organizations was
not as simple as the labor leader proclaimed. Because of the CIO's extensive
administrative network, it had more resources available to develop progranls and
40
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activities that affiliated unions could adopt. Local 2 1 did use the CIO programs as
models for its activities. However, maybe by 1949 the Peabody union had learned
enough from this labor federation. Whatever the reality was, O'Keefe tried to
downplay the significance of the CIO expulsion.
O'Keefe's leadership role during the CIO controversy was key. During a
confusing period, O'Keefe kept union members focused on the local's ideal: creating
a better society. His message did not change: leaving the CIO was a difficult decision,
but the federation had become too dependent on Washington's opinion and goodwill.
If O'Keefe had wavered in his commitment to the International, the membership,
most likely, would have followed. Decisiveness was of paramount importance. As an
organic intellectual, O'Keefe inherently understood that "when existing institutions
and organizations prove inadequate for the expression of rank and file aspirations . . .
alternative vehicles of contestation" must be devised.44It was time to leave the CIO
fold.
While there was much infornlation in the Local 21 Bulletin about the situation
with the CIO and Local 21's feelings on the disafiliation, interestingly enough, the
local media ignored the controversy. Even after the CIO expelled the IFLWU, local
newspaper accounts still used the CIO label when referring to Local 2 1. The only
published account of the expulsion was in an editorial by Dr. Goldstein, a Catholic
priest, in The Pilot. Goldstein admonished the IFLWU for its Communist influences
and said, "when trade unions become direct or indirect instruments for fiuthering the
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Communist cause, loyal citizens should quit them or their existence should be
o u t l a ~ e d . Why
' ~ ~ the rest of the local media did not discuss this issue is unclear;
communism was certainly a concern on the local level. For instance, as far back as
1933, Peabodyites involved with the Rotary Club and area churches-to
organizations-had

name a few

been indoctrinated into the evils of communism. Early in 1933

the Reverend Arthur Johnson, of Ipswich, Massachusetts, warned the Peabody Rotary
Club about the "seven planks named by Karl Marx as being desirable for Communists
[and] practically in force in this country. . . .We are in the throes of a bloodless social
r e v o l ~ t i o n .The
' ~ ~ Reverend Clinton Macy, minister at St. Peter's Episcopalian
Church in Salem, also did not hesitate to integrate the hazards of communism into his
sermons. Although communism most definitely was a topic on Peabodyites' minds,
because this controversy peaked just a little before McCarthyism became a real
concern, maybe anti-communist sentiment had not yet reached a newsworthy level in
the Northshore community.
Another explanation for the lack of local media coverage might be that Local
21's programs and initiatives in the latter part of the forties favorably impressed the
community. In addition to the assortment of activities developed by the local, wages
had also increased on a yearly basis.47This was a point that even the CIO conceded.
In a report that CIO President Murray prepared for the 1949 convention, he disclosed
that only two industrial unions had won wage increases in 1948. The IFLWU was one
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of the two unions.48According to a State Department of Labor report issued in the
spring of 1948, Peabody's industrial workers, of which leather workers made up the
majority, led all other cities in the state in average weekly wages.49Residents of the
greater Peabody community most likely looked at Local 21 as a savior because of its
wage gains. Maybe this expulsion was too intangible to affect community members'
opinion of the union.
Whatever the reason, the CIO expulsion did not become an issue in Peabody.
Instead, in the fall of 1949 local newspapers, when they discussed Local 21, discussed
the union's 25-week strike at Kirstein Leather and Kirstein Tanning, two separate
plants owned by David Kirstein, employing 350 workers together.50With this work
stoppage, Local 2 1 once again demonstrated its tenacity and sense of solidarity
unionism. Relying on direct action-the

strike-leather

workers held firm and

refused to give in to the demands of the company.5' In the end, the leather factory
conceded and ratified an agreement based on the "same terms as demanded by the
workers when they went on strike."52In his monthly editorial in the Local 21 Bulletin,
O'Keefe boasted that the "great Kirstein strike victory is a milestone in the history of
our union in New England . . . .If we had been like other CIO unions that pride
themselves on being right wing we probably would have sat down with the employer
"1, 500,000 Total Gain in New England," Local 21 Bulletin, February 18, 1948, p. 1.
"Peabody Leads in Weekly Pay," Local 21 Bulletin, April 2 1, 1948, p. 1. In 1949 Peabody had 113
industrial establishments and 78 of them were in the leather industry. These 113 industries employed
6,376 individuals and out of that pool, the leather industry employed 5,000. Only 1,300 were employed
in other industries. John Wells, Report on the Leather Industry of Peabody and Salem, Massachusetts
and the South Essex Sewerage District for the Salem-Peabody Area Tamers (SPAT). (no date for thls
report)
50 "Agreement Ends 25-Week Strike at Kirstein Plants," Salem Evening News, October 27, 1949, p. 1.
5' Staughton Lynd, Solidarity Unionism: Rebuilding the Labor Movementfiom Below (Chicago:
Charles H . Ken, 1992), 25.
52 "Kirstein Strikers Victorious," Local 21 Bulletin, November 23, 1949, p. 1.
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and agreed to a speed-up . . . . Let's continue devoting ourselves to our members'
welfare and stronger

contract^."^^

As evidenced by the Kirtein strike, the International's troubles with the
federation did not deter Local 21's ability to advocate successfblly for the rank and
file. Once the IFLWU was officially expelled from the CIO, Local 21 still managed
some major successes. The biggest accomplishment was the winning of the Peabody
A.C. Lawrence leather workers into its fold-something

the union had been trying to

do since its inception in 1933. On May 16, 1951, the workers at A.C. Lawrence,
Peabody's biggest leather complex, voted to abandon their company union-by
overwhelming margin of 1,160 votes out of 1,350 cast-and

an

join with the IFLWU as

Local 33.54O'Keefe credited Local 21's track record in winning wage concessions
and benefits as the key reason rank and filers at A.C. Lawrence decided to give up
their company union.
In the face of today's wage cutting, anti-union drive by industry, it is clear that
all leather workers must unite to defend their conditions and win new gains in
wages. Our workers remember that we did not start making real gains in
wages and conditions in this area until we went out and united into one union
85 percent of all tannery workers in the United States. The importance of A.C.
Lawrence in this area is such that the workers there and our own members
make the best progress only if we are all united in one union.55
O'Keefe credited three factors as crucial in swaying A.C. Lawrence
employees to join with the IFLWU: Local 2 1 was a clean, democratic union (although
"A Great Victory," Local 21 Bulletin, November 23, 1949, p. 2.
LbA.C.
Lawrence Workers Join with IFLW," Salem Evening News, May 17, 195 1. See also
"Peabody Group Switches Unions," Boston Herald, May 17, 1951; "Join Our Strong Union to Win
New Benefits, Fight Speed-up Plan," Local 21 Bulletin, May 23, 195 1, p.1. Although Local 33 was
given its own identifying label, it was in reality a part of Local 2 1, sharing office space, union officials,
and a labor publication. It, however, voted on issues separately fiom Local 21.
55
"Union Spurns Drive to Organize ACL, Defeat Company Program," Local 21 Bulletin, January 25,
1950, p. 1.
53
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the CIO certainly did not agree with this assessment); wage and contract benefits
were significant; and members had complete freedom to determine their own affairs.
As O'Keefe reiterated in the pages of the Local 21 Bulletin, "No one seeks to dictate
to us how we think or how we run our

That was a freedom that members of

A.C. Lawrence's company union did not have.
Local 2 1 union officials characterized the organization of A.C. Lawrence
employees as a "victory for tannery workers everywhere" because the majority of
Peabody's leather workers would now "represent a united front to the employers."
Any wage gains that Peabody leather workers could expect to make would help
leather workers throughout the country. While citing past achievements-local

21

led all industrial unions in New England in getting wage increases, job security, and
other contract benefits-O'Keefe

predicted further advances as a result of the

dissolution of the A.C. Lawrence conlpany union. Fighting A.C. Lawrence's speedup programs and winning increased job security for all leather workers were the
short-term goals of the union in the spring of 195 1 .57
O'Keefe's words were not just idle rhetoric. In its first contract negotiation
Local 2 1 reversed a no wage increase trend at A.C. Lawrence and won a general
wage increase of eleven cents an hour, plus other substantial benefits in June 1952.
"For the first time in the history of the Swift organization [A.C. Lawrence was a part
of the Swift conglomeration], a union succeeded in ending the system of the 25
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percent wage reduction forced upon the workers under the corporation bonus
incentive plan."58

In addition to gathering A.C. Lawrence employees into the IFLWU fold and
winning major concessions for them, Local 21 continued to win concessions fiom the
National Leather Manufacturers Association, which represented the rest of the major
tanneries in the city.59The union, because of its tenacity, won a fifth-round wage
increase in August 1950. Ruling against the nine-cent wage cut employers wanted to
institute, an arbitrator for the case justified the wage increase "on the basis of the
rising cost of living, the higher productivity of North Shore leather workers, high
profits of tanners, and post-war wage gains by [Local 211 in other parts of the
co~ntry.'"~
And in July 1952, an arbitrator granted a six-cent boost to the 6,000
workers in Locals 20,21,22, and 270.
Breaking through the wage cutting or no-increase drive of New England soft
goods industries [Local 211 won general increases . . . for most of our leather
workers in the district, boosting them to among the highest paid industrial
workers in the area . . . . The victories-bringing all Peabody area workers up
to an average wage of $1.83 per hour-came in the face of the fact that leather
workers have suffered from extremely heavy unemployment for more than a
year.61
Although tannery owners complained that they had lost money over the past twelve
months, the arbitrator found the strength of the IFLWU elsewhere in the country was
such that similar increases were being won fiom competing tanners. The arbitrator
said that "the welfare of the workers was a paramount consideration" and the rank

1954 IFLWU Convention Report, IFLWU 5676, Box 6, Folder 10.
Chapter Three for background on the Manufacturers Association.
"Three Cent Gain for North Shore in Arbitration," Local 21 Bulletin, August 30, 1950, p. 1.
6' YJnion Defeats Wage-Cut Plans of N.E. Industries; 7, 500 Workers Benefit," Local 21 Bulletin, July
23, 1952, p. 1-2.
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and file should not "bear the necessary risks of operating a tannery." In making his
decision in favor of the union request, the arbitrator pointed out that the proportion of
labor costs to total costs is relatively low in leather and that in determining "success
or failure (of a tannery) the price of hides plus judgment and luck in dealings in the
hide market would appear to be more significant than a six cent increase in the price
of labor."62 Because of these gains, the IFLWU led all other industrial unions in New
England in wage increases, job security, and other contract

benefit^.^'

Other groups noticed the gains Local 2 1 had made against seemingly
insurn~ountableodds--disaffiliation from the CIO, unemployment, and a slowdown
in the leather industry. The production and maintenance workers of the Winslow
Potato Chip Company in Marblehead asked O'Keefe if they could join Local 21
"insist[ing] they wanted our union [Local 211 because of our record of winning
benefits and protecting our membership." Although O'Keefe tried to convince the
workers to pick a food union, they "unanimously insisted they wanted the IFLWU."~'
Even though Local 21 made significant gains in the early fifties, more
problems were on the horizon. These problems had their roots in the 1949-1950 CIO
conflict and the nation's growing fear of corn~nunism.~~
Historian Steve Rosswurm
argues that the expulsions from the CIO were "devastating for both trade unionism
and American working people" for a number of reasons.66The ostracization of these
eleven unions created an atmosphere in the United States that denounced dissent and
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encouraged conformity. People and organizations questioning U.S. foreign policy
easily fell victim to red-baiting attacks and persecution. Rosswurm believes that "the
drive against left unionists, both in the expelled unions and those in remaining CIO
unions, eliminated and/or silenced a generation of shop-floor militants and helped
solidify the developing 'workplace rule of law' and trade union reliance on the
federal government."67 Local 21's problem, however, was its refusal to silence itself.
Because of its sense of solidarity unionism, Local 21 could not remain inactive (and
quiet) when forces--cultural, political, social, economic-sought

to undermine

workers' quest for a more democratic future. This inability to be more docile in the
early fifties put Local 21 squarely in the spotlight of McCarthyism.
While Local 21's problems with anti-communist government agencies started
with the CIO expulsion of the IFLWU, its vocal condemnation of Big Business
during the early fifties did not help the situation. Instead of trying to keep a lower
profile as anti-communism raged through the country, Local 21 utilized every
opportunity to blame Big Business and its role in U.S. foreign and domestic policy for
the high cost of living and drastic unemployment the country was experiencing.68
O'Keefe, through the Local's paper, described Big Business as "systematically
robbing the American people through passage of unfair laws and control of the whole
machinery of government."69 He blamed unemployment on the greedy practices of
business owners and argued no place in America was immune from this
unemployment crisis, least of all New England.

67 Ibid.,

13-14. See also Schrecker, "McCarthyism and the Labor Movement."
Rosswum~,CIO *sLeft-Led Unions, 13.
69 Richard B. O'Keefe, Time For Action," Local 21 Bulletin, July 31, 1951, p. 2.

O'Keefe's assessment of the unemployment situation was correct. "With its
heavy concentration of textile, leather, and machinery factories," New England found
itself in a precarious employment situation by January 1950.~'In testimony before the
Senate Committee on Public Works, John Edelman, the CIO Textile Workers
Washington representative, acknowledged that while the rest of the nation was
experiencing rising employment levels, "New England's key industries have been
slipping badly in the last 25 years. Textiles and leather goods, once the main
foundation of this region's economy, have been migrating to other areas. . . . In
February of this year, when unemployment in the nation amounted to 7.6 percent of
the total labor force, the rate of unenlployment in New England was approximately
9.5 percent."71By 1951, unemployment in the leather tanning business reached its
highest level ever.72Local 21 estimated that one third of its membership was
unemployed.73
Using the Local's newspaper, O'Keefe tried to help workers understand why
they did not have a job. He said, "high taxes and high prices are reducing the people's
buying power, while industry reaps profits that are at the highest level in history." In
describing the slowdown in the leather industry, O'Keefe described the ploys Big
Business used to make quick money:
-
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Planning to get rich on the Korean bloodshed, the shoe industry increased
production ten percent in 1950 and early 1951 and boosted prices more than
sixteen percent. The industry produced 25 million more pairs of shoes than
people could buy with their cut-rate dollars. Shoe plants closed down or cut
back production, forcing tanneries to lay off workers . . . . Another factor has
been the attempt of the big meat packers to reap huge profits out of hides.74
This explanation of the circular effect of employer greed showed Peabody's rank and
file how America's capitalist system worked: each action had a significant reaction
that usually affected the worker. The rank and file did not need to look too far to see
the immediate consequences of Big Business: leather workers were being laid off and
those who could find employment landed jobs at the General Electric plant in Lynn,
which was experiencing a war-time boost due to the fighting in Korea and growing
fears of Communism on the homefront. Ironically, these leather workers, as part of
the IFLWU's political platform, had denounced America's role in any militaristic
conflict. In commenting on the situation in the Bulletin, O'Keefe said "it is a sad state
of affairs when we must rely upon production of weapons of destruction in order to
have jobs for our people." O'Keefe blamed the situation on Big Business which he
said was orchestrating Washington's every move. "The war program is being used to
pile up higher and higher profits, at the expense of the people."75 Unpatriotic
sentiments like this, in the early fifties, were harbingers of trouble. It was only a
matter of time before Local 21 and O'Keefe would be scrutinized for Communist
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O'Keefe probably speeded the Communist-interrogationprocess with the way
he handled the next IFLWU crisis: the National Labor Relations Board's (NLFU3)
revoking of IFLWU privileges.77In May 1954 the NLRB took an unprecedented
action and refused to give the IFLWU "the privileges of its services" because the
IFLWU did not remove Gold from his position as president of the International after
he was convicted of lying on his Taft-Hartley affidavit. Section 9(h) of the TaftHartley Act required that every local and international union officer file an annual
affidavit with the NLRB stating that the individual is not a Communist Party member
or affiliated with the Communist Party. In addition, the officer had to verify that
helshe did "not believe in, and I am not a member of, nor do I support, any
organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods."78 The federal
court of New York found Gold guilty of making two false statements: that he was not
a member of the Communist Party and that he did not support any organization that
advocated overthrowing the government. Local 2 1 quickly found itself embroiled in
this problem.79After reporting on the NLRB's unprecedented action, the Salem
Evening News responded with an editorial stating the paper's disappointment with

Local 21 :
This action of the Labor Board is the first time in history that a national labor
union has been denied the services of the NLRB. It certainly establishes a
77 Official Text
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precedent that can be as portentous for all labor organizations as anything that
has occurred. It is most unfortunate that our friends and neighbors are
involved in any infraction of federal laws particularly those that relate to labor
law. The publicity, which of course, is international in scope, centers itself too
close to home.80
The situation for the IFLWU and Local 21 intensified after O'Keefe, who
headed the New England section of the IFLWU's leather division (in addition to his
role as business manager for Local 2 I), and other delegates voted at the 20th biennial
convention to re-elect Gold even though he had been charged and convicted for
falsifjmg his non-Communist affidavit. The convention delegates also pledged "full
organizational, financial, and moral support by the union to defeat the recent court
ruling against Gold" and to post bail so the International president would not need to
remain in jail until his trial. Only sixteen delegates out of 339 voted against
supporting

old.^' O9Keefe's vote in this important election put him squarely at odds

with the local Catholic archdiocese, community churches, and some of his own
constituents. St. Ann's Church of Peabody wasted no time publicly condemning the
activities of the IFLWU and O'Keefe in its official publications and in the local
media. In addition, the Reverend Gilbert S. Leduc, a local curate at St. Ann's Church,
preached from the pulpit for "leather workers to fight for what is right and elect
officers who best represent the common interest of social charity and social justice."82
The curate equated the common interest of the community with a disavowal of
anything remotely related to Communism. In an extended sermon that was reprinted
in many of the local newspapers, Leduc warned parishioners to be aware of
''Wluch Way Next?" Salem Evening News, June 10, 1954, p. 33.
Re-Elected President of Leather Workers Convention Despite Conviction,"Leather and
Shoes, May 15, 1954, p. 1 1 .
82 "Priest Blasts Union Men Apathetic to Communism,"Salem Evening Navs, June 7, 1954, p. 1.
" "Gold is

"Communist infiltration within the framework of any union." Leduc urged that all
Catholic Local 21 union members no longer "tolerate the election for 30 successive
years of a president who uses their numerical influence" to hrther the spread of

Exhibiting its customary fighting spirit, Local 21, under O'Keefe's guidance,
did not accept the church's opinion nor did it rely merely on the Local 21 Bulletin to
get its message out as it had with the CIO controversy. The leather union began a
weekly half hour radio address aired over WESX to inform the citizens of the greater
Peabody community about issues facing the leather industry during this controversial
time. In countering what Peabodyites read in the local paper, O'Keefe used the
airwaves to stress the union's democratic principles and independence. O'Keefe
explained:
[Local 211 takes no dictation from the top. We allow freedom of expression.
We believe in the greatest benefits to the greatest number. . . . There is no
sudden Red menace . . . . We take second place to no one in our devotion to
Americanism. Our union exists for one purpose: to improve wages and the
working conditions of our members.84
When his own integrity was questioned, O'Keefe elaborated his personal positions on
Communism. He stated that he and other top-ranking leaders of Local 2 1 had signed
loyalty oaths which were on file with the NLRB; he also explained that while he
"differed politically with Ben Gold," he wanted FLWU members "to withhold final
judgment on Gold until the due processes of law are completed in the Supreme Court.

. . . I have answered the $54 question on communism and all of the leaders of Local

83
84

hid.
Transcript from the June 22, 1954 5:30 p.m. WESX radio broadcast. Original in author's possession.

21 have done likewise," 07Keefetold his radio audience.85Besides doing radio
addresses and writing editorials in various community and church publications,
O'Keefe spoke to community organizations.
In fighting the Communist charges against the union, O'Keefe tried to inform
civic organizations about how the red-scare threat was a menace manufactured by the
government so the American people would support the buildup of weapons. In a talk
before the Peabody Rotary Club in 1952, O'Keefe said "Big business, not the workers
are responsible for spiraling prices." He stressed to the Rotarians the "fact that local
businessmen and the operators of small industries such as tanneries have more in
common with organized labor than they have with Big Business, who dominate
industry and government." In closing his talk, O'Keefe asked the local businessmen
to "be alert to the growing campaign by big industry to weaken or smash the labor
movement in the United
Understanding the seriousness of the red-baiting charges and the need to
rectify the misinformation in the media, Local 21 leadership adopted a direct mail
approach to firther reach the membership and keep it informed. Local 21 officials
cautioned that a misstatement of fact "whether intentional or through ignorance, could
result in splitting, dividing, and destroying our union." 87 Being true to the union's
solidarity unionism roots and his sense of organic intellectualism, O'Keefe, in these
mailings, asked union members to refrain fiom judging Gold too early. He reminded
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the membership that Gold resigned his membership in the Communist Party in 1950
before he signed the affidavit under Taft-Hartley.
It is a fundamental American principle that a person is innocent until proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and after a trial by his or her equals . . . .
Many critics of our Union are going to town over the indictment of our
International president, Ben Gold, on a charge of perjury in connection with
his signing of the non-Communist affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley law.
To face these accusations against their union, O'Keefe urged every member to stay
united: "it is not the first and it will not be the last attack on our Union and its
leadership. If we were a weak and ineffective union, we wouldn't be attacked."88
O'Keefe's efforts at dispelling membership anxiety did not work as well with
this controversy as it did with the CIO expulsion. The Boston Post reported that Local
21 "members aren't listening to O'Keefe with the same militancy as in the past. They

are demanding a cleanup-or else."89 The most vocal critics of O'Keefe and the
International were Local 33 members. One A.C. Lawrence union member said, "We
can not, and must not, give him (President Gold) any aid whatsoever in his appeal."
While acknowledging the wonderful work Gold did for the working class of Peabody,
the A.C. Lawrence employee explained that "like any other citizen, President Gold, is
no different. If he disobeys the laws of the United States, he should be punished." The
union member summarized the sentiment of Local 33 as being a case of Americanism
versus Ben

old.^

While O'Keefe had his own personal beliefs about Gold, he desired solidarity
in the ranks of the Peabody leather workers. He put the needs of the membership
88
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ahead of his own judgment and acquiesced to members' wishes that Local 2 1 (and
Local 33) not support Gold financially in his trial.91In the end, however, O'Keefe
was right; the Supreme Court vindicated Gold.
During this whole controversy, the Massachusetts State Commission on
Communism had been conducting an investigation of O'Keefe and other top-ranking
union leaders from both the IFLWU and other labor organizations around the state. In
September 1954 O'Keefe appeared before the labor sub-committee of the
Massachusetts Commission on Communism at a public hearing. O'Keefe and Local
21 business agent Arthur Cecelski testified before that committee:
We were not and never had been Communists and Local 21 has not been and
is not now under domination of any group or individuals, Communist or
otherwise. In the light of our union's record it was fantastic for anyone to
charge that our local is dominated by anyone . . . . Our uniting in the IFLWU
of 90 percent of all U.S. leather workers has given us the strength to make
steady advances in wages, working conditions, and other benefits-without a
major strike in 20 years . . . . Our members know our union is run on
thoroughly democratic principles, with every local running its own affairs and
with strict financial accounting of every penny spent.92
Even after the Massachusetts Committee on Communism cleared O'Keefe of
communist ties, there were still those in the Peabody community and in the union
who had doubts about the

Fueling these doubts was a former Local 21

president, John L. Silk. Elected in March 1947, Silk resigned his position as president
of Local 21 after only three months "because of Communism in the Union." Silk
charged he was unable to fulfill the duties of his elected office "because of imported
workers with Communist leanings who have infiltrated the industry and have been

"Union Spurns Ex-Red Aid," Boston Traveler, March 5, 1954, p. 13.
Local 2 1 Officials Deny Red Ties," Salem Evening News, August 17, 1954, p. 1.
93 "Reds 'Still Around Us, "' Salem Evening News, July 28, 1955, p. 1.
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put on committees by the powers that be." When he tried to address the Communist
influence within the union, Silk said he was rebuffed:
My protests of actions of certain officers within the union have been of no
avail and instead of receiving support and encouragement in trying to run the
union on purely American lines, I have been cautioned to suppress my
thoughts and urged to go along with the suggestions of certain members
within Local 2 1. 94
In rebuttal to Silk's charges, O'Keefe said "it was no surprise that the former
president has raised the cry of Communism-that

always seems to be the method of

people who do wrong." According to Local 21's executive board, Silk had been
accused of trying to "assume dictatorial powers in office and has exercised the power
of that office against the best interests of the union," but instead of defending himself
against these charges, Silk decided to resign. The union accepted his resignation, and
assumed the matter was closed when Silk gave up his union membership. But during
the 1954 controversy over Gold, Silk's charges became public once again.95
While allegations never got any hrther than a few newspaper reports, Silk
was not the only community member charging Local 2 1 with being influenced by
Communists. Salem Evening News editorial writer Colonel Roland W. Estey began a
series of scathing columns in June 1954 against Local 2 1. Having only the harshest
criticism for Gold and for those who supported him, Estey said:
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One cannot support editorially and verbally, people who have been found
guilty of advocating the violent overthrow of the country, and it is most stupid
to defy the U.S. govenment by electing to a top union office a man who has
been sentenced by the courts for falsifying an affidavit that he was not a
member of a Communist party or Communist group.
In encouraging the local to "make a fresh start and become an organization for the
leather workers instead of a financial contributor to a union with a very dark name,"
Estey remarked that the fall might bring "some startling changes in the top
administration of the IFLWU. And, it is about time, for the leather workers of Salem,
Peabody, and Danvers have been misled, pushed around and in some instances threats
have been reported." 96
Estey was correct in asserting that some change was imminent in the upper
ranks of the IFLWU; during the summer of 1954 the International leadership, of
which Gold was still a part, secretly began discussing plans for a possible merger
with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, affiliated with the AFL.
As rumors about this possible merger spread, Gold denied them, saying the union
"has not been talking merger with the AFL" and characterizing the rumor as "such
fantastic stories, slanders, and

invention^."^' Because the IFLWU had lost its NLRB

benefits, a merger with the meat cutters would have re-established the leather and f i r
workers collective bargaining rights. A merger between these two internationals
seemed unrealistic, however, since the AFL Butchers were virulently against
c ~ m r n u n i s r nEven
. ~ ~ O'Keefe, who was an International executive board member,
-
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knew nothing about the merger under discussion other than what he read in local
newspapers, trade publications, and the memo all members received from Gold.
At this point, O'Keefe needed to make some decisions. Throughout his tenyear career as business manager, he had been successfid in leading the local forward
in its

objective^.^^ For the most part, the rank and file had always respected his

leadership abilities. That was not the case in the fall of 1954. Animosity confronted
O'Keefe on all sides: A growing cadre of union members were displeased by the
rumors of a possible merger with the Amalgamated Butchers. A significant number of
A.C. Lawrence union members were displeased about the International executive
committee's re-election of Gold; they partly blamed O'Keefe for this because he
vocally supported Gold. And the community was also turning against the union
because of the growing stigma of communism.
Once again, O'Keefe needed to take decisive action. He did. By early
December 1954, Local 21, under O'Keefe's direction, had set up a special committee
to deal with possible options if Local 21 left the International. O'Keefe then resigned
his position as International executive board member of the IFLWU. By the end of
December, Local 21 officials believed that secession from the IFLWU would best
serve the union. loo In making these decisions, O'Keefe, ever the organic intellectual,
held staunchly to his convictions about Gold's innocence. He said he did not resign

99

According to Local 2 1's bylaws, the office of business manager was the most important union
position. While the union president served as a figurehead officiating at union meetings and collected a
small stipend, the business manager was a full-time, paid union position. It was the business manager's
responsibility to handle all grievances, supervise the union office, maintain relationships with shop
stewards, make reports at meetings, and keep the membership abreast of union developments. "Bylaws of Local 21, IFLWU 5676, Box 27a, Folder 3.
100
"O'Keefe Letter," December 23, 1954, IFLWU 5676, Box 29, Folder 20.

because the IFLWU had a communist leader, but because in trying to get information
about the proposed merger with the Butchers, he was told he would be "given no
Such secrecy went against everything Local 21 and
information from the ~ffice."'~'
O'Keefe believed in and stood for. At the very heart of Local 21's organization was
the commitment that all members have a say in how the union would be run. The
International's closed-door bargaining with the Butchers violated solidarity unionism.
In accepting the Local's decision on Gold, and putting aside his own desires, O'Keefe
again exhibited democratic leadership. This quality was further evidenced when he
listened to the sentiments of the workers and began to distance the Local from the
IFLWU.
On December 28, 1954, the administration of Local 21 sent a telegram to Abe
Fineglass, who replaced Gold as president of the IFLWU. The telegram was in
response to one sent by the International saying that it had suspended Local 2 1. In
reply Local 21 said that "neither we nor our Local recognizes your suspension. In
accordance to our elected offices we shall carry out our duties in accordance with the
instructions of our local membership. We also claim the International has broken its
contracts and agreement with our local membership. Your proposed pact with the
Butchers Union smells to high heaven."lo2
On January 6, 1955, Local 21 hosted a special membership meeting to vote on
disaffiliation from the I F L W U . ' ~In~ a letter sent to the International, Local 21 listed
ten primary reasons for disaffiliation from the IFLWU. Foremost among these was

'O'
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Local 21's belief that the International had been deceitful to the membership and was
no longer effective as a bargaining agent for the rank and file:
The International Fur and Leather Workers Union cannot carry out the
purposes of an American trade union, in that it cannot effectively bargain with
respect to wages, hours, and working conditions in the future. As a result of
this failure to clean house, it is apparent that this union will be unable to
organize leather workers, particularly anlong those workers who are employed
by employers who have run away from our locality to northern New England
and to other parts. . . . It is apparent that the International Fur and Leather
Workers Union is on the verge of complete collapse which was admitted by
President Feinglass at a recent meeting in Boston when he said that "we have
to get into the main stream of the American labor movement because we
cannot live as we are."Io4
The local voted 1203 to 8 at a mass meeting in early January 1955 to disaffiliate from
the IFLWU. Local 2 1 officially disaffiliated from the IFLWU on January 10, 1955,
and renamed itself the Leather Workers Organizing Committee (LWOC). '05
At this point Local 21 exhibited a more conservative approach. While it still
advocated a more equitable society for the working class in its monthly publication, it
realized that the political atmosphere of the fifties could limit its effectiveness as a
trade union. Distancing itself from Communist elements was necessary for Local 21's
survival. In addition, the IFLWU was no longer trustworthy; it had secretly agreed to
merge with the Butchers without consulting the various locals. This went against all
the democratic principles the International had espoused throughout its history.
Peabody's union of leather workers could not afford to alienate itself from the larger
community and staying with the IFLWU would have tested the city's tolerance. Thus,
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Local 21's philosophy did not change, but it tempered its rhetoric during this
tumultuous time.
After only a few months as an independent union, however, the officers of
Local 21 realized that if it wanted to grow and prosper, it would have to build "up a
powerful international" and expand "the committee into all areas of the country."
This meant affiliating, once again, with the CIO. '06 As a small union in a politically
unfriendly environment, Local 2 1's survival depended on organizing other leather
workers; it had to rejoin the CIO. Anti-union and anti-Communist sentiment made it
nearly impossible for an independent community-based union to survive in the mid
fifties. While affiliating with a federated labor organization once again made sense,
reaffiliating with the CIO was not assured.
The 1949 expulsion proved not to be a problem, however. In March 1955
"60,000 CIO members located in the North Shore area voted through their delegates
to the North Shore Industrial Union Council to welcome back to their ranks the
leather workers' local unions which have been affiliated with the Leather Workers
Organizing Committee." A resolution presented at the meeting said that the CIO had
been working for the past four years "to induce the members of those expelled unions
to break away from their Communist leadership and return to free democratic
American trade unionism under the banner of the CIO." In disaffiliating from the
IFLWU, the North Shore Industrial Union Council praised Peabody leather workers
for having the "courage and initiative" to cast off "the shackles of the IFLWU by
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voting to return to the CIO and the North Shore Industrial Union Council." '07 This
was good news to the officials of Local 21; they would once again be accepted into
the CIO fold. The good news, however, was tempered by the fact that the IFLWU had
by this time merged with the AFL Butchers and was contesting with the CIO for
representational rights of the leather workers.'08
The NLRB ordered an election between the LWOC and the Amalgamated
Butchers to determine which group would represent the leather workers in the various
Peabody plants.'09 On May 19, 1955, the jurisdictional election took place; 3,2 18
workers in eighty-four tanneries in the Peabody area had a choice between either the
LWOC, CIO; the Amalgamated Butchers, AFL; or no union.' l o By the time election
day arrived, tensions had reached such a frenzy that "federal agents moved [to
Peabody] . . . to keep a close eye on the bitter fight for union control of the 1000's of
leather workers." International executives of the CIO sent telegrams reminding Local
21 workers that "the entire nation was watching the outcome," looking to Local 21 to
"lead the way in the establishment of a union for leather workers that will be free of
communist domination and commies" by voting for the LWOC, CIO."'
Officers of Local 21 did not just hope for the best in regards to this election.
They used the various local media to educate the leather workers of ~ e a b o d ~ With
."~
monetary sponsorship from the national CIO, Local 21 bombarded Peabody residents
-
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with leaflets, radio broadcasts aired over WESX, and newspaper advertising. The
Butchers, however, also used the local media to get out its message.'I3 Leaflets
explaining each side's viewpoint were mailed and distributed citywide. In one such
leaflet, Local 21 officers and stewards tried to make the membership understand why
a vote for the LWOC was necessary. In this leaflet union officials appealed to
members7 sense of Americanism and democracy. In addition, officials stressed how
the decisions made by Local 21 were directives of the membership:
FIVE MONTHS AGO the Stewards and Officers of Local 21 recommended
that our Union break its ties with the International Fur and Leather Workers
Union and join with the CIO in building a clean, free, democratic Union, of,
by and for leather workers. This decision was directed by the membership of
the Local Union-the workers in the leather factories. The membership, 1200
strong at the High School meeting, and thousands more in the shops, greeted
this action with cheers and a spirit of unity never before seen in our Local.
Nevermore will we have to apologize for, or try to explain away, the presence
of Communists among our national leaders. Nevermore will we fear the
courts, the government Boards and agencies, that were closing in on all groups
that had been tainted by Communism. Nevermore will the newspapers, the
radio, the churches, the schools, even our families and neighbors, class us with
Communism. At long last, we can look any man in the eye and know that our
union is fighting the enemies of our free, democratic way of life while at the
same time protecting our conditions, our wages and our security and always
working to improve them."4
This plea in the newspapers explaining Local 2 1's position illustrates the conservative
approach the union adopted after its divorce from the IFLWU. The election between
the LWOC and the Butchers took place at the height of McCarthyism. Local 21 knew
its survival depended on winning back the support of the Peabody community by
pledging its abhorrence to conununisn~.After appealing to members' sense of
-
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democracy, the leaflet tried to dispel some of the accusations that the AFL had spread
about the inner workings of Local 2 1.
We knew that the Communist forces would not take this defeat meekly or in
silence. We expected attacks, character assassination, lies and vilification to
be hurled at us. . . . Some of the tactics and charges of the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and ButchersAictated to them by the same Communist puppets we
drove from our midst-have plumbed the lowest depths of indignity,
dishonesty, and depravity. They have singled out our Business Manager, Mike
O'Keefe, as their target. Destroy O'Keefe, they say, and you destroy the unity
and determination of Local 21 leather workers. They overlook one important
truth. Mike O'Keefe, like every officer and steward of Local 21, is just the
expression of the will and the desires of the membership. . . . Mike O'Keefe is
each and every one of us. An attack on him is an attack on us and you. The
Communists should name all leather workers-not just one-when they seek
to attack their enemies.ll5
Local 21's messages appeared to work. Peabodyites seemed committed to the
LWOC."~A vote in sixty-three Peabody tanneries yielded 1,658 ballots in favor of
the LWOC and only 448 in favor of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
workmen.' l 7 In a memo to its affiliates, the Massachusetts Leather Manufacturers
Association told its members that 89.6 percent of those eligible actually voted, with
only about one percent voting for no union. After this decisive vote, the CIO became
the union voice for practically all the leather workers in the Peabody, Danvers, Salem
area.118
Once affiliated with the CIO, Local 21, representing 3,500 leather workers in
the Salem, Peabody, and Danvers area confidently looked forward to rapid growth
and further action. The first test would come with their comrades at the A.C.
-
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Lawrence plant. Members of Local 33 had not yet voted for which union would
represent them. Slated for July 26, 1955, Local 33's election was key to Local 21's
quest to build the union on a national scale. Once again, prior to the election, Local
33 members were inundated with local newspaper advertisements taken out by both
the Amalgamated Butchers and the LWOC. In these advertisements, each side
purported to be providing Local 33 members with the truth about each of the two
unions. Local 33 held its election on July 26, 1955. While 357 A.C. Lawrence
workers were swayed by the Butchers, most Local 33 members stood as a united front
with the other leather workers in the community and "scored a complete break with
the elements of the old Red-dominated Fur and Leather Workers Union." Eight
hundred and eleven A.C. Lawrence leather workers voted for the LWOC. Four
individuals left their ballots blank.l19 According to Local 33 officials, the union's
decision to side with the LWOC was in keeping with this its anti-comnlunist
sentiments:
When it [Local 331 was part of the Fur and Leather Workers Union, it led the
fight against alleged Communist domination of the union. It was the leader in
the campaign to clean house of alleged Communist influence and it was the
first IFLWU local to vote no support to Ben Gold, the then leader of the
IFLWU. During the hectic days preceding the disaffiliation of Local 33 from
the IFLWU, the union's rank and file demanded a house cleaning.'20
With all the leather workers in Peabody under the auspices of the CIO, it did
not take long for the labor federation to see that the LWOC had committed itself to
bettering the cause of the leather worker. By November 1955, the CIO's executive
board "authorized the LWOC as a full fledged international union" with the "right to
"North Shore Workers Snub Leather Union," Boston Herald, July 27, 1955, p. 18; "LWOC Wins 21 in Election at A.C. Lawrence," Footwear News, July 29, 1955, p. 5 1.
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shape its own destinies and avoid complications that might occur in the merger of the
AFL and CIO." By the end of the year, the merger of the two labor federations was a
reality. In relaying information about the AFL-CIO merger to the membership,
O'Keefe was optimistic. He said that the "newfound unity of the AFL-CIO offers
labor an unprecedented opportunity to make its voice felt so strongly that candidates
and parties will be forced to accept the progressive and liberal legislation we
sponsor."121With the support and sanction of the AFL-CIO, the LWOC, renamed the
Leather Workers International Union of America (LWIUA), slowly gained ground
and momentum in organizing the leather workers who had previously been with the
IFLWU. By the fall of 1955, the LWIUA consisted of approximately fifteen locals
and around 10,000 dues-paying members.'22
The Peabody leather workers not only whole-heartedly supported the LWIUA,
they overwhelmingly believed in Mike O'Keefe. The slanderous attacks on
O'Keefe's character that had dominated the headlines in the local press since the
spring of 1954 had been ineffective in swaying leather workers' opinions of their
leader. In the March 1956 election, Local 21 members returned O'Keefe to his
position as business manager, for the eleventh consecutive year, with the highest
(He had served as a Local 21
number of votes cast for any office in the e1ecti0n.l~~
officer since 1945.) At this time, he was also elected president of the newly formed
International. In the early days of the new International, O'Keefe exhibited his strong
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leadership qualities. Through his monthly columns in The Bulletin, he tried to dispel
members' uncertainty about the future of the labor movement. He also stressed that
this International was "not a one-man union . . . . this is a union responsive to the
needs and desires of its membership and it is being run by a team of officers and
executive board leaderships selected by the membership and working together."'24
Local 21 had been through a difficult period, but it had not lost its vision for a
more equitable society for the working class. By working as a united organization,
Local 21 began to focus once again on its overarching goal: creating a moral
economy for the working class. In its first wage negotiations as an independent, Local
21 negotiated a five-cent hourly wage increase and received improved fringe benefits,
including an extra paid holiday and an increase in sickness insurance and
hospitalization payments for its 3,500 members.'25In addition, under the auspices of
the LWIUA, Local 21 finally secured a pension plan, and the first pension payments
were issued on May 25, 1959. A group of forty-six retired Local 21 members
received the first pension checks ever to be granted in the leather industry under a
union-negotiated pension plan.'26 Local 21 also helped women office workers
employed in the tanneries. These female clerical workers, represented by the LWIUA,
received wage increases raising the office minimum to sixty dollars a week and a
maximum of seventy-five dollars. The new contract also provided for a nonnal
workweek of thirty-six hours and twenty-five minutes with one and a half hours for
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lunch and a fifteen-minute rest period during the day. The office workers also won
vacation pay.127
Besides the monetary gains, Local 2 1 won back the approval of the
community. At a testimonial dinner for O'Keefe in 1964, more than 1,000 civic and
labor leaders paid tribute to him. The governor of Massachusetts attended the event
and praised O'Keefe for bringing the "standard of living to where it is today." He told
those individuals employed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that they "owed
a debt of gratitude to labor leaders like O'Keefe who have carried on a continuing
battle to improve the status of the working mand2* The local clergy were also vocal
in their support. At a LWIUA banquet in 1957, the Reverend Francis W. McDonnell
from the Boston Archdiocese assured Peabodyites that the "vast majority of
America's 50,000 labor officers are completely honest, sincere, loyal Americans."
Dispelling the negative feelings the Boston Archdiocese had felt toward Local 2 1 in
the early fifties, McDonnell said:
Most of the labor movement is being conducted in confonnity with what is
good for the community. . . . Our society is a democracy and it is also an
individual society. Unions are not only normal but essential. When you have
big industry on the one hand, no worker is able to bargain successfblly for
himself. '29
Clergy of all denominations, represented by the Peabody Ministerial Association,
seemed to come to a similar conclusion as McDonnell. When the Ministerial
Association met with O'Keefe in 1958 to better understand the union and its
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activities, both sides-labor

and the churches-seemed

to benefit from the

One reason the local clergy might have again endorsed the union is that in
divorcing itself from the Fur Workers Union, Local 2 1 still adhered to its sense of
solidarity unionism. True to its community-based origins, Local 2 1, as part of the
LWIUA, did not forget its relationship with the city of Peabody. O'Keefe used his
editorials in The Bulletin to remind the membership about helping those less fortunate
in the community. In one editorial, O'Keefe urged members to do a kind deed for the
senior citizens of the community. He called the aged, the "victims of invisibility.
They are everywhere." He called on all members to "volunteer some of our free time
to help bring about a better life for those who must need it but cannot get it."13'
O'Keefe also asked union members to remember the preamble to the LWIUA
constitution that said:
The struggle for human freedom is a continuous one. The task of those who
would bring security and greater understanding to mankind throughout the
world is endless. Racial persecution, intolerance, selfishness, and greed have
no place in the human fanlily. We will not be satisfied until ours is a world of
free men and women and of happy ~ h i 1 d r e n . l ~ ~
O'Keefe really believed those words. Many of his editorials in the sixties discussed
the need to continue fighting for the rights of all Americans, not just the leather
workers. With the backing of the International and Local 2 1, O'Keefe extolled the
virtues of a minimum income standard for all Americans and urged members to vote
for individuals "who will not tolerate the prevalence of widespread poverty and
- -
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substandard

condition^."'^^ This was not idle rhetoric. In terms of providing

community service work, offering health screenings, and trying to educate workers
about the needs of others in the conlrnunity, Local 21 committed itself
wholeheartedly to these

initiative^.'^^

While the organizational changes Local 21 made throughout the fiftiesleaving the CIO, disbanding fiom the IFLWU, and rejoining the CIO-tested

the

union's commitment to solidarity unionism, these changes also made the union
stronger and more willing to fight for additional workplace gains. In the thirty years
since its inception, Local 21 had grown and matured. It had weathered many
storms-accusations

of unfair labor practices by manufacturers, communist charges,

and loss of federated union support-but

through it all, the resilient local persevered.

Local 21 engaged in what historian Steve Rosswurnl characterizes as a "collective
struggle against the boundaries of our existence." While the union of leather workers
recognized that "there were boundaries out there . . . they understood that the world
could be transformed-barriers

to equality can be lowered and attitudes can be

altered."13' The struggles Local 21 encountered in the late forties and early fifties
prepared the union of leather workers to make inroads throughout the rest of the
decade and into the next. Their tenacity allowed them to continue forging ahead and
building up the ranks of the new International.
Throughout its whole history--even in the fifties-Local

21 never lost sight

of its ultimate goal: creating a more equitable hture for the rank and file. The union
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defined an equitable future as a society that practiced a moral economy; members of
Local 21 did not want capitalists to govern everyday life. Instead, they wanted the
working person to live comfortably and engage in leisure activities. Local 21
members envisioned a society where each worker was treated as a person with certain
rights-health

care, pension funds, adequate housing and food, safe working

conditions, and the ability to enjoy social and cultural activities. Peabody's leather
union members wanted to enjoy the same security and pleasures in life that the
factory owners enjoyed. Leather workers advocated for a future when workers and
manufacturers would band together to meet the challenges of the leather industry:
when industry conditions were good, owners and workers would reap the benefits.
And when conditions were poor, all would share in pooling resources. Although this
type of moral economy was never realized, the effort of working to achieve it caused
Local 2 1 to adapt and change throughout its history. Because Local 2 1 remained
attuned to its solidarity roots, it felt compelled to react to the community. Thus, when
McCarthyism became a real concern in Peabody in the fifties, the union distanced
itself from the Fur Workers and the IFLWU, a visible communist entity. Adhering
itself to the Fur Workers in 1939, however, made sense at the time; the merger fit
Local 21's philosophy of accepting all workers regardless of their race, religion or
political philosophy. But the social and political environment was more friendly and
accepting of left-leaning union members in the thirties than it was in the postwar
years.
Local 2 1, in fact, probably remained with the IFLWU a little longer than was
prudent because of O'Keefe. The longtime business manager staunchly believed in

accepting people for their actions not their beliefs. O'Keefe never doubted Gold's
commitment to the working person or his integrity as a U.S. citizen. It would appear
that O'Keefe accepted the notion that people could compartmentalize different
aspects of their lives. So in this respect, according to O'Keefe, although Gold was a
self-described Communist, he could still be an American citizen trying to make the
U.S. government more responsive to the working individual, not trying to overthrow
it.
The Gold debacle tested the strength of Local 21's sense of solidarity
unionism. O'Keefe was reluctant to listen to what the membership and the
community felt about Gold and the Fur Workers. In voting to support Gold, O'Keefe
did not act as a representative of the Local 21 membership. In hindsight, O'Keefe's
actions, while seemingly dictatorial, can convey other qualities as well. By 1953
O'Keefe had earned the respect of the more than 4,000 leather workers in his
community. O'Keefe most likely believed in himself and felt that he was sometimes
privy to information that the rank and file did not fully understand. This organic
intellectual might have thought Gold's ordeal with the federal government would
dissipate and that the International president would be a free man in the near future.
Because Gold personified the essence of what Local 21 wanted-equity
people-it

for all

must have been difficult for O'Keefe to turn his back on this man. But in

the end, O'Keefe did. In resigning his International executive board position and then
sending a letter to the IFLWU describing Local 2 1's disaffiliation, O'Keefe showed
his integrity as a leader of a solidarity union. He understood that he was only the

spokesperson of the Local 21 membership and that the sentiments of the majority
always overshadowed the minority opinion.
Union members forgave O'Keefe for his momentary lapse in judgment in the
mid fifties. In 1958 he once again was re-elected business manager.'36But even for
O'Keefe, the years ahead would be difficult. Local 21 suffered a double misfortune
during the 1950s. Not only had it suffered the ramifications of being associated with
an international that had communist ties, but it also served an industry that was
slowly dying. Between 1955 and 1966 eighteen leather concerns left the city of
peabody.I3' For most of its existence after its withdrawal from the IFLWU, Local 21
had to contend with the social, political, economic, and cultural consequences of
deindustrialization. The Epilogue details how the forces of deindustrialization
ultimately stifled the Peabody union of leather workers and the leather industry itself.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
Epilogue: A Community Responds to a Dying Industry

The historian is just another dim figure trudging along in another part
of the procession. And as the procession winds along, swerving now to
the right and now to the left, sometimes doubling back on itself; the
relative position of the different parts of the procession is constantly
changing . . . new vistas, new angles of vision, constantly appear as the
process-and the historian with it-moves along. The historian is part
of the history. The point in the procession at which he [she] finds
himself [herself] determines his [her] angle of vision over the past.'
While the leather industry had long been an economically precarious industry,
by the late fifties leather manufacturers faced many obstacles-substitutes,

foreign

competition, rising labor costs, tariffs and quotas, and environmental regulations.2
This signaled change for Peabody as well. Instead of becoming a defunct factory
town, however, Peabody altered its destiny. The late fifties ushered in a period of
remarkable growth in the Leather City. The blossoming of industry along Route 128,
which served as a beltway around Boston, was a boon to Peabody. Located alongside
Route 128, Peabody was a perfect bedroom community for workers flocking to the
capital city to take part in the technological revolution. To service this influx of new
residents, service-oriented businesses, like the North Shore Shopping Center, started
to replace the leather fa~tories.~
Compounding these social and industrial changes was the achievement, at
least in part, of Local 21's efforts at equalizing society. As leather workers realized
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Construction on Peabody's first shopping plaza, later turned into a mall, was convleted in 1956. The
shopping center became a major incentive for other service-centered businesses and potential residents
to relocate to the Leather City. It also brought in much-needed revenue.

better wages, working conditions, and benefits, more workers had the income to buy
cars and to travel outside their conmunity for leisure activities. This, however, was a
double-edged sword: "The automobile really changed things," explained former
.~
of the automobile, social networks
Local 21 secretary Margaret ~ b b o t tBecause
outside the community supplanted the union and its social activities. Although the
leather workers' union still fought to break down barriers of inequality throughout the
rest of the sixties and seventies, Peabody's altered industrial and social landscape
started to erode the union's significance. In addition, older leather workers began to
want and expect a different lifestyle for their children. Fewer and fewer leather
workers were encouraging their offspring to enter the leather industry. And fewer and
fewer young people were joining Local 21. Exacerbating these changes was the death
of O'Keefe in 1973. When O'Keefe died, solidarity unionism died in Peabody.
A former, long-time Peabody mayor, Peter Torigian, characterized the decline
of the leather industry commencing shortly after World War 11 as a second economic
depression for the city.5 Instead of rebounding as other industries did during and after
World War 11, leather manufacturing faced stiffer competition, both at home and
abroad, while increasingly stringent environmental regulations "chased many
tanneries fiom the city in those post-war years."6 By the time Torigian assumed office
in the spring of 1979, Peabody's leather industry was beyond help. In the end efforts
to save the industry on the part of union, industry, and city officials proved
insufficient.
4
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While O'Keefe was still at the helm, though, the union fought a dual battle: it
tried to maintain and increase workplace reform for Peabody leather workers and
fight for industry-wide reform to save the leather industry. O'Keefe believed
industry-wide refornl necessitated increased workplace reform, which started with
manufacturers reinvesting in their current plants. O'Keefe warned about the hazards
of not reinvesting in the future:
Tanners in this area have failed to re-invest in new plants and equipment as
they should have or to the extent that Midwest tanners have. If this has
affected their competitive position to any extent, it is not the Union's
responsibility and the workers should not be penalized for it. However, in
actuality, it seems apparent that the employers have found ways to keep pace
with the increased productivity elsewhere in the industry out of the sweat of
the worker^.^

In addition to not reinvesting in outdated equipment, O'Keefe argued that Peabody
manufacturers had been too interested in the bottom line for too long and had been
"negligent in promoting [their] products in competition for the consumer's dollar.
[They have] not spent the money [they] should on research to develop a better

In his Bulletin editorials, O'Keefe explained to the membership that other
factors-foreign

competition, lack of unifornl national workmen's compensation

standards, low minimum wage levels, and impractical unemployment compensation
benefits+ontributed

to the leather industry's present stand-still as well. O'Keefe

told union members that if leather wages could be standardized across the country,
leather factories would not leave Peabody to settle in Maine or in various southern
7
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states to find cheaper labor. And if the government would stop allowing the
exportation of American hides to foreign countries and importation of finished shoes
back into the country, the U.S. leather industry would have a chance at survival.
Unfortunately, very few people in the leather industry or community attended to
O'Keefe's warnings in time.9
Instead of heeding O'Keefe's words manufacturers used the union as a
scapegoat. Bertram Creese, the executive secretary for the Massachusetts Leather
Manufacturers Association in the fifties, explained to union and city officials that
manufacturers did not want to invest further capital into their Peabody plants because
wage rates were too high and productivity too low.'' These manufacturers did not
think they would ever see a return on their investment. This statement by Creese,
however, was inaccurate. New England leather workers only earned on average $2.10
an hour, whereas their counterparts in the Middle Atlantic states and Great Lakes area
earned $2.20 and $2.27 respectively. By the early sixties, the only leather workers
earning less than those in New England were the ones in the southeast." Even with
their misstatements of fact, the manufacturers could not blame all their troubles on the
union. In terms of the national slowdown in the leather industry, local leather
manufacturers reluctantly agreed that the industry as a whole had not done enough to
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promote its product.12 Industry leaders knew they had to start working harder to
promote leather goods. Unfortunately, their efforts were too little too late.
In May 1959 A.C. Lawrence made a concerted effort to tell the world about its
leather product; it implemented "the biggest advertising campaign yet undertaken by
the world's largest leather tanner." With this new advertising push in the late 1950s,
A.C. Lawrence tried to "make the name LAWRENCE synonymous with LEATHER
the world over." A.C. Lawrence touted its record of experience and quality when it
said, "No company in the leather industry can approach the size and scope of
operations familiar to us at A.C. Lawrence." These advertisements tried to "acquaint
people with our Company-its

heritage, operations, and people."

Before the advertisements appeared, A.C. Lawrence told its employees about
the public relations campaign and how important they were to the continued success
of the company. A.C. Lawrence challenged each employee "to do his best so that the
combined skills and experience of all will deliver consistently high quality products
to our customers at a reasonable cost. This is the kind of teamwork that helps
guarantee jobs."13 While this advertising venture mainly appeared in publications of
the leather and shoe trade, A.C. Lawrence did not forget its local customers. In 1959
A.C. Lawrence set up a display, called the "World of Leather," at the newly built
North Shore Shopping Center. This display offered community members the chance
to see what A.C. Lawrence produced. "The reaction from most people was

l2
l3
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amazement at the variety of products and the complexity of the tanning process along
with admiration of the beauty of quality leather in all its many uses."I4
Even after A.C. Lawrence's successful advertisement and public relations
campaign, it was not until the mid sixties that other leather manufacturers made a
concerted effort to promote their products. In 1965, recognizing the need to expand
its market, the New England Shoe and Leather Association "jointly sponsor[ed] a
program of billboard advertisings designed to promote the sale of all-leather shoes."
This advertising campaign focused on two major shoe-buying seasons: back to school
and Easter. Both advertisement can~paignslasted thirty days and promoted the
"fashion and the natural beauty of genuine leather." These advertisements appeared in
the Boston area; Worcester, Massachusetts; Portland, Maine; and Providence and
Pawtucket, Rhode 1sland."
During the summer of 1967, the Leather Industries of America (LIA), the
promotional arm of the U.S. tanning industry, presented a series of weeklong fashion
shows at major retail centers throughout the country. Peabody hosted one of these
traveling shows. Hundreds of Northshore residents watched as models demonstrated
the latest in leather fashion. As part of these promotions, LIA trained sales clerks to
identify the positive merchandising advantages of American made leather
merchandise. Unfortunately, these major efforts on the part of the leather industry
were too late. Synthetic and other ready-to-wear clothing had already won over the
hearts of consumers.

Ibid.
"Leather Trade Associations Sponsor Billboard Ad Campaign," Tan-0-Gram14 (August-September
1965): 2.

l4

Although the manufacturers were slow to respond to a changing consumer
market, city officials in Peabody had been well aware of the problems facing the
leather industry. Throughout the history of Local 2 1, the city of Peabody had spent
considerable time and energy addressing the volatile state of the leather industry and
trylng various initiatives to stabilize conditions in the Leather City. For the most part,
Peabody's governing officials worked to retain and bring in new industry to this
manufacturing center, but oftentimes their efforts just could not reverse downward
trends that had a way of spiraling out of control.
For instance, in the winter of 1954 members of the city council, the mayor,
and the city solicitor met with the directors of the Chamber of Commerce to address
how to improve conditions for business in the city. This particular meeting looked at
how well the city had addressed a list of items that the Chamber of Commerce had
presented two years earlier that were considered a priority for the city. One of these
items was the adoption of a long-range advisory commission that would determine
the f h r e needs of the city. The Chamber had founded a commission and in its first
report, the commission deternlined the city to "be very lax in providing information
later than 1937 in zoning maps and up-to-date data which prospective buyers of
industrial sites in Peabody would want to know." To address the deficiency, a $5,000
appropriation was given to the planning b ~ a r d . ' ~
In addition to updating information about industrial sites, Peabody officials
developed an Industrial Development Commission early in the fifties. The

l6 "Chamber Directors and City Officials Discuss Betterment of Local Affairs," Peabody Times,
February 18, 1954, p. 8.

commission, which was one of the first of its kind according to Peabody city officials,
tried to impress upon the citizens of Peabody that since the thirties many leather firms
had been closing and the city had not been expanding i n d ~ s t r i a l l ~While
. ' ~ home
construction had blossomed in Peabody during the fifties, the cost of building new
streets, electric lines, water facilities, and schoolhouses had not been offset by
expanding business.'* Through the various media outlets, the commission explained
to the public that in order to attract "new and diversified industries, it is necessary to
open up new and modem sites in areas not recently zoned for this type of building."
Because Peabody was growing residentially, the commission told Peabodyites that
attracting new industry would help the city confront and pay for necessary changes to
the infrastructure, like sewage.
One of the main problems confronting Peabody in the next decade will be
sewerage. This will be a most expensive job, and almost too much for
individual homeowners to pay for, so we need more industry to help absorb
this tremendous cost. With more industry-and a determined effort to keep
what we have, Peabody will be able to face this problem. . . . We repeatPeabody has ALWAYS been industrial-it needs to be kept so for the benefit
of all. Factories provide not only tax money but employment-jobs-wageswhich are the life blood of any community. Factories attract people to the
city-people spend money in the Peabody stores-we build up our residential,
commercial, mercantile and industrial groups together, and all prosper. We are
interdependent, one upon the other. Keep Peabody ind~strial.'~
Keeping Peabody industrial in terms of the leather industry, however, began
to be more of a challenge in the mid fifties. And with the relocation of the Kirstein
Tanning Company in July 1955, after twenty years of operation in Peabody,
conditions in the leather industry began to look even bleaker for the Leather City.
Times, January 7, 1954, p. 4.
By 1960 the population of Peabody had increased by 42 percent since 1950. That equaled an
increase of 9, 557 individuals. Information from Wells, The Peabody Story, 446.
19
Peabody Times, July 23, 1953.
" Peabody
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Leaving seventy employees jobless, the Kirstein Tanning Company explained that it
was "unable to compete with tanneries operating in New Hampshire and Maine. . . . 'I
can't compete with tanneries only twenty miles from Peabody because of production
costs,' David Kirstein said. . . 'These other tanneries are underselling me three or four
cents per unit and I can't compete."' Intending to open a factory in Vermont, Kirstein
said he did not arrive at his decision lightly. Before deciding to move, he installed a
new water system and new engines to cut down the overhead, but "labor costs in this
area are higher than out of state and production is lower."20Kirstein claimed that
these factors added to his inability to meet the out-of-state competition.
Not everyone in leather circles was willing to castigate labor as the main
problem in the Northshore leather industry, however. In 1957 at the tercentennial
anniversary of the leather industry in the Northshore area, Irving R. Glass, executive
vice president of the Tanners Council of America, talked about his hope for the
leather industry. Seeing inefficiency as the biggest problem facing the industry, he
cautioned: "The North Shore leather industry must be streamlined if it is to become a
part of the country's healthy industrial climate . . . . The individual practices of every
North Shore tanner must be streamlined, corrected, and updated if the industry is to
gain its righthl place in the new industrial climate which prevails in the nation
today." Echoing O'Keefe's sentiments, Glass said that too many tannery operators
had failed to react to the "dynamic change" going on in the industry. Advising
industry leaders to shift their thinking, Glass suggested that instead of seeing the
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leather industry as "being mature and even venerable," industry leaders must see it as
a young industry with unprecedented opportunities.
Modem technology is now revamping the shape and character of this industry.
There are developments in the techniques of producing leather which compare
with the most startling advances in new areas of industry. Our industry is no
longer content to produce the familiar leathers or to follow the established
production routines of the past. It is responding to the necessity in today's
competitive industrial markets for new products and the enhanced efficiency
of chemistry and engineering.
To be successful in the modem leather industry, Glass explained, one must engage in
"technical progress, market alertness and productive efficiency," without foregoing
the "traditions of quality and of craftsmanship long associated with New England." If
a leather manufacture failed to adjust his business priorities and relied on "fixed
practicing, the dead weight of obsolete routines and restrictive antiquated production
concepts," then that enterprise would not be able to survive, Glass warned. He said:
In a free enterprise system every industry and every company within it has to
scrape the barnacles off its own hull. No one else will do it for you. The
reward which is within sight well justifies every company and every leather
community in trying to make certain that it sails in this new race toward new
opportunity without an anchor dragging."

Glass and O'Keefe were not alone in their sentiments that leather
manufacturers had to modernize their equipment. A report issued eighteen years
earlier-in

1939-by

the New England Regional Planning Commission, composed of

the heads of the six New England state planning boards, stated that "there must be
quicker scrapping of obsolete equipment and machinery and quicker application of
modem management methods free from nepotism." This report went on to praise
"labor legislation in New England, which has brought about better working
21
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conditions than in the country as a whole, as reflecting the intelligent organization of
skilled workmen under good leadership."22The Weekly Bulletin Leather and Shoe
News also stressed the need for tanneries to become more efficient and the

manufacturing process to be improved and shortened if these tanneries wanted to stay

Unfortunately, many of the Peabody tanneries were unable or unwilling-for
whatever reason-to

change the way they manufactured leather. Some of the smaller

shops just did not have the capital to undertake any degree of modernization. Other
plants chose not to look to the future. One company, however, was willing and able to
change the way it did business: A.C.Lawrence. In order to try to adapt to a changing
industrial landscape, A.C.Lawrence initiated a bi-monthly colloquium between
laboratory personnel and production supervisors to discuss what practices were
working in the company and what changes needed to be made. Leaders of A.C.
Lawrence hoped that these forums would provide worthwhile information that would
keep A.C.Lawrence ahead of its competition.24
This optimistic philosophy about the growth and potential of the leather
industry, however, could not alter the future in Peabody. The majority of the tanneries
had been lackadaisical about industry conditions for too long and by the time they
realized that the Northshore leather industry might be experiencing a permanent
downward spiral, there were too many factors working against tannery owners. For
too long, tanners had been "concerned about the large losses that they would take on
22
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their inventories in the event of a market drop in hide prices." Consumed with the
price of raw stock, moreso than the profit margin between raw stock and finished
leather, tanners throughout the thirties, forties, and fifties felt that "by shrewd buying
they can outguess their competitors and provide their customers with cheaper leather,
thereby taking a greater share of the business themselves." This practice led to
problems when over capacity resulted. Unless markets expanded, over capacity would
continue. The modernization of plants only served to exacerbate the situation. This
trend of "short and sharp price cycles" in the leather industry created erratic earnings
and forced tannery owners "to do things that were not good for the industry as a
whole . . . [and] with m h e r expansion cut off by the limitations of both our potential
market and the supply of raw stock available, there is little hope of satisfactory profits
without universal recognition of these circumstances and adequate leadership within
the ind~stry."'~
Further exacerbating the situation was the lack of export controls on hides.
A national organization, called the Hide Action Program consisting of 20 different
groups, unions and leather manufacturers alike, joined forces to produce a pamphlet
detailing the crisis situation facing the United States. The pamphlet opened with this
dire warning:
Our industry is facing a crisis situation. Unless it is solved, the impact on our
jobs could be quite severe. Foreign countries, especially Japan, are buying all
the cattle hides they can and will pay any price to get them. . . . If the United
States doesn't do something right now to limit hide exports the leather goods
industry won't have the raw material we need to make our finished products.
This means plant shutdowns and job losses at tanneries and factories where
we make shoes, handbags, belts, furniture, gloves, briefcases, and garments.
25
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Even if a manufacturer can get the leather he needs, the price he charges for
his wallets, belts, clothing and shoes will be higher. . .a lot higher. This means
more inflation when we are told inflation is our number one national problem.
Lamenting the fact that they-leather

goods companies and trade associations-had

not been able to get the government to act, this pamphlet beseeched American
citizens to get "our government to act."26 This type of plea by both unions and
industry was somewhat hypocritical, however. As historian Dana Frank explains, in
the seventies, industry leaders throughout the manufacturing sector complained about
the Asian market taking over many of the U.S. major industries, but it was these same
industry leaders who had moved overseas in the fifties and sixties to make bigger
profits. Using the garment industry as an example, Frank said that "Fashion U.S.A.
only meant a corporate shell based nominally in the United States, as the
manufacturers went global, like a heat-seeking missile flying at the speed of
international capital toward the lowest wages anywhere on earth."27
Unfortunately, the leather industry followed the lead set by Fashion U.S.A. By
the late 1980s, despite aggressive initiatives by Peabody city leaders, the leather
industry had relocated to Asian and Latin American locales and left the Leather City
behind. When the production of shoe side upper leather in Peabody, a large part of
A.C. Lawrence's leather niche, began a rapid decline because of a lack of demand,
leather workers knew the situation was bleak. Even though A.C. Lawrence promised
to "try to help affected employees find other work," workers knew they were seeing
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the end of an era.28A brief reprieve came in 1976 when ten senior management
employees, all former leather workers, took over the operation of the company when
it was on the verge of closing, hoping to turn it around. Although the new owners
were not able to prevent the ultimate demise of the company, they did ensure seven
hundred jobs for another fifteen years.29After leading the country in the leather
industry for one hundred and sixty years, however, A.C. Lawrence, with its six plants
from Maine to Kentucky producing forty million square feet of leather annually,
could no longer compete with cheaper foreign imports and tougher federal
environmental regulations.30By the time A.C. Lawrence closed its doors in 1991,
there was really nothing anybody could do to stem the tide of deindustrialization.
With the closure of A.C. Lawrence, many of Peabody's smaller leather plants shut
their doors as well. Instead of factory whistles greeting the downtown visitor, the
sound of bulldozers and wrecking balls had become the sounds for the new
millennium.
While Local 21 tried to educate its membership about the mounting problems
facing the industry, it was unable to enact any type of lasting change in the way
manufacturers did business. In 1970 O'Keefe wrote an editorial in The Bulletin
lamenting the government's insufficient trade policy:
The U.S. government has failed to face up to new developments in world
trade and the present trade policy is more applicable to the world of the late
28 A.C. Lawrence Memo to Employees, September 4, 1969, Box Leather Tanneries and Strike, Folder
Letters Regarding Negotiations in Strike at A.C.L 1964, George Peabody House Museum, Peabody,
Massachusetts.
29 "ACL 'Gamble' Saved 700 Jobs," Salem Evening News, January 30, 1978, p. 12.
30
"Tanner's Twilight," Salem Evening News, July 3, 199 1, Box Leather Tanneries and Strike, Folder
Letters Regarding Negotiations in Strike at ACL, 1964, George Peabody House Museum, Peabody,
Massachusetts.

forties and fifties, than the seventies. The U.S. position in world trade has
deteriorated with harsh effects on workers and their communities because of
new developments in the postwar years. That accelerated in the sixties. These
include the spread of managed national economies, with direct and indirect
government barriers to imports and aid to exports; the internationalization of
technology; the skyrocketing use of investments by U.S. companies in foreign
subsidiaries; and the spread of U.S. based multi-national corporations.
In order to stem the current trend in the leather industry, O'Keefe called for a
"thorough revision of U.S. government posture and policy" in regards to foreign

market^.^' O'Keefe planned to keep fighting this trade policy issue with
Massachusetts government representatives and in Washington. Unfortunately, this
was not to be.
Shortly after this editorial was published, O'Keefe suffered a series of
illnesses that kept him out of the office more and more. In the fall of 1973, doctors
diagnosed him with cancer. Two weeks after the diagnosis, he died. OYKeefe'sdeath
signaled the end of the progressive leather union and its International. Although the
union would continue to represent leather workers through the remainder of the
seventies and into the eighties, O'Keefe's death marked a deviation from the union's
overall structure. While solidarity unionism was based on the efforts of workers
joining together to enact change, leadership was a necessity for coalescing the various
voices into a united front. This unified front was especially important in the midseventies as the industry seriously contracted.
Unfortunately for Local 2 1 and the leather industry, the various individuals
who assumed leadership positions after O'Keefe lacked his abilities as an organic

3 1 Richard O'Keefe, ''New Direction Asked in U.S. Trade Program: LWIU Gears For Union Huddle in
Nation's Capital," The Bulletin, January, February, March 1970, p. 1.

intellectual. O'Keefe possessed the rare ability to take the needs, wants and desires of
a diverse group of individuals and fashion these elements into a cohesive agenda.
With his death Local 21 lacked the leadership necessary to synthesize peoples'
desires into concrete realities and to promote effectively the interests of the leather
industry to the wider community. "When Mike died, many of the social activities and
programs the union offered ceased," said Margaret Abbott; and so did Local 2 1's role
as an activist organization in the larger community.32As the seventies waned, Local
2 1 no longer functioned as a community-based union intent on creating a moral
economy. It had become strictly a business union representing fewer and fewer
leather workers. In 1978, Local 21 only represented 2,110 leather workers.33
At the close of the twentieth century, Local 21 still existed but the essence of
its organization no longer did. It had mutated into an entity representing a whole host
of other industries-clerical, office, machinery, and plastics to name a few. Like any
viable entity in the twenty-first century, Local 21 had to diversify. While housed in
the same location as in its heyday, Local 21 lost its official relationship with the
leather industry when it became the Office and Professional Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, in the mid nineties. While some old-timers at the union office
remember Peabody's leather heyday, most Local 2 1 members now have no
connection with the leather industry. An ironic twist to Peabody's leather saga is that
an industry that at one time could not maintain and retain an effective union, finally
found a union that outlived the industry.
32
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